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For over a decade, scathing critiques of government have been fueled by a group of studies
called "regulatory scorecards," which purport to show that the costs of many government regula-
tions vastly outweigh their benefits. One widely cited study by John Morrall, an OMB economist,
claims that government regulations cost up to $72 billion per life saved. Another study, co-authored
by Bush's regulatory "czar, "John Graham, claims that over 60,000 people lose their lives each year
due to irrational government regulation. A third group of scorecards-compiled by Robert Hahn
of the A El-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies-claims that over half of all major regu-
lations issued since 1981 fail cost-benefit tests. These studies have contributed mightily to a wide-
spread skepticism about the ability of government to regulate rationally. This skepticism has pro-
duced, in turn: legislative requirements for more elaborate agency analyses; closer OMB oversight,
congressional review of agency decisions, a stream of proposals for further "regulatory reforms"
aimed at reining in government agencies, and a hostile climate for all proposed new measures to
protect public health, safety, and the environment through regulation.
But what is the skepticism based on? This Article demonstrates that all three scorecards rely
on undisclosed data and non-replicable calculations; use biased regulatory samples; misrepresent
ex ante guesses about costs and benefits as actual measurements; and grossly underestimate the
value of lives saved, or the number of lives saved, or both. They also exclude all unquantified costs
and benefits, disregard all questions about the fairness of the distribution of cost and risk, and con-
ceal the large uncertainties that are present in virtually every regulatory analysis. Close inspection
reveals that Graham's sensational claim-that 60,000 lives are lost each year through irrational
regulation-is not supported by his study's own data. In short, these studies are so fundamentally
flawed that they prove nothing at all about the rationality of regulation.
This Article also shows that the most serious defects in these studies are endemic to strictly
numerical scorecards and render them a defunct mode of analysis. The Article concludes with sev-
eral affirmative recommendations for improving the assessment of individual rules and govern-
ment regulation overall.
INTRODUCTION
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that
federal government regulation costs businesses or consumers over
$500 billion per year.' Millions of Americans-as well as many schol-
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ars, pundits, think tank analysts, the President, his staff, and a majority
or near majority of the House and Senate-believe the costs of these
regulations often outweigh their benefits.
The result has been a sustained campaign to try to force agencies
to be more "rational": demands for ever more elaborate regulatory
impact analyses, closer OMB review of agency regulatory decisions
(with more frequent returns), new requirements for congressional re-
view of individual agency decisions, a stream of proposals for further
"reforms" to rein in agencies, and an indeterminate number of fore-
gone regulations aimed at protecting public health, safety, and the en-
vironment.
the library staffs of Georgetown University Law Center and University of Connecticut Law
School for superb assistance in tracking down esoteric agency documents.
I See OMB, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations,
Notice, 67 Fed Reg 15013, 15038 (2002). Estimates by leading regulatory critics are even higher.
See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Policymaker's Snapshot
of the Federal Regulatory State (2001), online at http://www.cei.org/PDFs/I10KC-_2001.pdf (visited
May 5, 2003) (estimating year 2000 costs at $788 billion); Thomas D. Hopkins, Regulatory Costs
in Profile, Center for the Study of American Business Policy Study No 132 (Aug 1996), online at
http://wc.wustl.edu/csab/CSAB%20pubs-pdf%2files/Policy%2OStudies/psl32%20hopkins.pdf
(visited May 5,2003) (estimating costs at $688 billion per year).
2 According to a December 2002 Harris poll, 26 percent of voters polled expressed a
"great deal of confidence in the executive branch of the federal government"-a number which
is up from historical (pre-9/I 1) figures of 18-20 percent-while nearly half of those surveyed in a
Council for Excellence in Government poll agreed that "we deserve to get better government."
Harris Poll, Dec 12-16,2002, and Council for Excellence in Government Poll, May 21-28, June 1,
1999, online at http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm (visited May 5, 2003). The Contract
with America devoted an entire chapter to the need to "Roll Back Government Regulations and
Create Jobs." Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds, Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep.
Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation 125 (Random
House 1994). Although the Contract did not pass in its entirety, major regulatory "reforms" did
get enacted, and countless other reform bills have been, and continue to be, proposed. See note
3. For examples of cost-benefit critiques by policymakers and scholars, see notes 4, 8-10, 13,15-
18,20-22,26-27, and 29.
3 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995), codi-
fied at 2 USC §§ 1501-71 (2000); Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub L No
104-121, 110 Stat 847, enacting the 1996 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,
codified at 5 USC § 601 (2000) and 5 USC §§ 801-08 (2000); Government Performance and Re-
sults Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-62, 107 Stat 285, codified at 31 USC §8 1101, 1115 (2000). See
also Patrick J. Michaels, Regulatory Overhaul Report Card, Wash Times A17 (June 10, 2002);
Ellen Nakashima, For Bush's Regulatory Czar, The Equation Is Persuasion; Graham Wields Cost-
Benefit Analysis For, Against Rules, Wash Post A35 (May 10, 2002). For examples of reform pro-
posals driven primarily by cost-benefit critiques, see Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan, Rec-
ommendations for Improving Federal Regulation, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Regula-
tory Reform and Oversight, the House Committee on Small Business (June 2002), online at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/testimony-02_05.pdf (visited May 5, 2003); Erin M.
Hymel and Laurence H. Whiteman, Regulation: Reining in the Federal Bureaucracy, in Issues
2002: The Candidate's Briefing Book (Heritage Foundation 2002); C. Boyden Gray, Obstacles to
Regulatory Reform, 1997 U Chi Legal F 1, 1-5; W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U
Chi L Rev 1423,1436-55 (1996); Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regula-
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Although regulatory skepticism is by no means new, the recent
wave of regulatory skepticism is distinct from earlier attitudes. If the
traditional concern was that agencies would be captured by regulated
interests and, consequently, would regulate too little, the modern cri-
tique is led by charges that agencies-driven by ideology, bureaucratic
ambition, or "public interest" pressures-are regulating too strictly
and too much. And the cure offered by these critics is not more or bet-
ter representation in the rulemaking processes as in the past, but more
analysis and searching outside review.'
The remarkable ascendancy of the anti-regulatory movement de-
rives from two main empirical sources. One is a stream of well-
publicized "horror stories" of government zealotry and caprice: com-
panies forced to clean up Superfund sites to the point where children
can eat the soil 245 days a year; air quality regulations issued in total
disregard of costs; property owners denied development rights when
the footprints of cows were declared wetlands, and so forth.'
tory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1 (1995); Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effec-
tive Risk Regulation (Harvard 1993). Congressional proposals for reform are far too numerous to
catalogue. For a few examples, see Agency Accountability Act, S 849, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147
Cong Rec S 4603 (May 9, 2001); HR 750, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H 441 (Feb 27,
2001) (requiring full regulatory impact analysis for regulations impacting small businesses);
Regulatory Improvement Act, S 981, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec S 6742 (June 27,
1997); The Dole-Johnston Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong,
1st Sess, in 141 Cong Rec S 2056 (Feb 2, 1995).
4 Professor Shapiro offers an insightful discussion of the rhetorical shift in regulatory
criticism from theories of agency capture (which he christens a "reformation") to stories of regu-
latory over-reach (which he calls a "counter-reformation"). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro,
Administrative Law after the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48
U Kan L Rev 689 (2000). Professor Sunstein discerns three separate strands of regulatory criti-
cism: the agency capture and the contrasting adversarial schools mentioned by Shapiro, and the
bureaucratic self-aggrandizement theory of administrative behavior put forward by Niskanen
and others. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz L
Rev 1267, 1269 (1981). The classic expression of the traditional critique may be found in Grant
McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (Knopf 1966). Dual critiques-expressing
concerns with agency capture by regulated interests or public interest groups-may be found in
Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 NYU L Rev 1495, 1515-18
(1999) (providing an excellent overview of the public choice literature and documenting some
egregious cases of regulatory capture-both by industry and environmental groups); and William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory In-
terpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275,285-90 (1988).
5 The two most famous and influential anecdote-based critiques of regulation are Philip
K. Howard's national best-seller, The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America
(Random House 1995), and Stephen Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 3).
The journalist Richard Lacayo reported that The Death of Common Sense is "amply stocked
with ... loosely detailed horror stories about regulatory mischief. Some of them are memorable;
some partial or misleading; some flatly wrong." Richard Lacayo, Anecdotes Not Antidotes: Philip
Howard Is Everyone s Favorite Anti-regulatory Guru, But His Best-Selling Book Is Flawed, Time
40 (Apr 10, 1995). He goes on to rebut several prominent horror stories. See id. David Mehegan
points out that "[n]one [of Howard's anecdotes] is footnoted, so we can't check Howard's facts
or assess his interpretations." David Mehegan, A Seductive, Simple-MindedAttack on Rules, Bos-
ton Globe 57 (Feb 14, 1995). For critiques of Breyer on empirical and conceptual grounds, see
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This Article will not have much to say about these stories, except
that they need to be treated with caution. Anyone who begins to in-
vestigate these stories quickly finds out that some are true; others are
exaggerated; many are simply fabricated.' Most are published (or re-
peated) as stories with little or no investigation of the facts. Even if
the story turns out to be true, one has no way of knowing whether the
incident is typical of agency practice or an aberration .
The obvious shortcomings of anecdotes as vehicles of proof have
given rise to a group of broader studies that have largely supplanted
anecdotes as the leading source of regulatory skepticism. These stud-
ies have yet to be recognized as a formal genre. I will call them "regu-
latory scorecards."
Regulatory scorecards are a sub-species of cost-benefit analysis.
While the typical cost-benefit analysis devotes hundreds of pages to a
Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions
of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 NYU Envir L J 295 (1995); Sheila Jasanoff, The Dilemmas of
Risk Regulation: Review of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 10 Issues in Sci & Tech 79 (1994).
6 For example, the first anecdote cited above has not been rebutted. The second is a mis-
statement of law: the Clean Air Act does not rule out cost consideration in air pollution standard
setting, as the Supreme Court made clear in its unanimous decision in Whitman v American
Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457, 486 (2001) (concluding from the many Clean Air Act
subsections that expressly require EPA to consider cost in setting technology-based emissions
standards that Clean Air Act § 109(b) does not indicate an implied congressional intent to per-
mit EPA to consider costs in setting health-based ambient air quality standards).The third anec-
dote is pure fabrication. The "footprints of cows" to which House Majority Leader Tom DeLay
referred (in successfully opposing Clean Water Act re-authorization) were not footprints at all,
but "wetland sloughs" several feet deep and up to two hundred feet wide, which fill with water
every year to provide vital sustenance to local and migrating birds. In fact, the land in question is
not pasture, but a forest which forms a part of the "only [remaining] large forest habitat adjacent
to the Gulf of Mexico." See Letter of David L. Hankla, Field Supervisor, US Fish and Wildlife
Service, to Colonel Robert B. Gatlin, US Army Corps of Engineers (Apr 19, 1995) (on file with
author).
For evidence of the broader veracity problem in the regulatory debate, see, for example,
Citizens for Sensible Safeguards, Myths & Consequences: Paying for the Use of Myths and Distor-
tions by Anti-regulatory Zealots (May 17, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(collecting twenty-seven widely circulating anecdotes about government regulation that are
false, exaggerated, or at least factually contested); Tom Kenworthy, Truth Is Victim in Rules De-
bate: Facts Don't Burden Some Hill Tales of Regulatory Abuse, Wash Post Al (Mar 19,1995) (re-
lating anecdotes that "have the ring of truth, but not the substance"); Jessica Mathews, Horror in
the House, Wash Post C7 (Mar 5,1995).
7 As Roger Parloff pointed out in his review, "the rhetorical power of The Death of Com-
mon Sense derives from the fact that Howard provides only one set of anecdotal horror stories-
those that stem from certain unwise laws and regulations, or from unwise applications of them.
He never tells the horror stories that prompted all of these laws and regulations." Roger Parloff,
The Death of Common Sense-And Its Apotheosis, Am Law 34 (Apr 1995). See also David A.
Wirth and Ellen K. Silbergeld, Book Review: Risky Reform, 95 Colum L Rev 1857, 1884 (1995)
(noting that Breaking the Vicious Circle "focuses almost exclusively on cases of regulatory over-
kill ... [while] situations that demand more aggressive or rigorous regulatory requirements ...
receive scant attention").
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narrative describing the costs and benefits of a single project or rule,
scorecards reduce these hundreds of pages to a few summary statis-
tics-costs, benefits, net benefits, and/or cost per life saved. Scorecards
then tabulate these summary statistics across scores of rules in order
to generate what appears to be a concise, precise, and comprehensive
picture of the cost-benefit rationality of programs, agencies, and regu-
lations overall.
While any number of such scorecards are circulating, three sets of
scorecards have been particularly influential in shaping the modern
debate over the rationality of the administrative state:
" In 1987, an OMB economist named John Morrall published a
table which suggests that federal regulations cost up to $72
billion per life saved, and that nearly one-third of the forty-
four regulations in his table cost over $100 million for every
life saved.'
* In 1995, John Graham and Tammy Tengs at the Harvard Cen-
ter for Risk Analysis co-authored a study, entitled Five-
Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost Effective-
ness, which reported that regulatory interventions impose
wildly disparate costs ranging from less than zero (saving
money) to more than $1 trillion per life saved. The least cost-
effective interventions, they found, are those aimed at con-
trolling toxins.
In 1996, Graham and Tengs published a second study, The
Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-
Saving, which used a computer to see how many additional
lives might be saved at constant cost by reallocating funds
among some of the interventions examined in their earlier
study.' The conclusion: sixty thousand additional lives are lost
each year by spending money on small or costly risks instead
of more cost-effective interventions." Graham calls this
"statistical murder."' 2
a John F Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25,30 table 4 (Nov-Dec 1986).
9 Tammy 0. Tengs, et al, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 Risk Analysis 369 (1995) (calculated by multiplying $99 billion, the highest cost
per life-year in the Tengs database, by 15, a conservative estimate of the number of life-years as-
sociated with each life saved).
1( Tammy 0. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social In-
vestments in Life-Saving, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs and Lives Saved. Getting Better Re-
suits from Regulation ch 8 (Oxford 1996).
11 Id at 177.
12 Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis, Hearings before the House Committee on
Science, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 71,79 (Jan 31,1995) (testimony of John D. Graham).
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In 2000, Robert Hahn updated his widely cited 1996 study-
Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell
Us?-with a new study entitled Regulatory Reform:Assessing
the U.S. Government's Numbers. These studies examine over
100 major regulations in what Hahn claims is "the most com-
prehensive assessment to date of the impact of federal regu-
latory activities on the economy."'" Both studies reach the
same conclusion: though regulations confer a net benefit on
society overall, "less than half the rules pass a neutral
economist's benefit-cost test" using the government's own
numbers.'4
When three widely cited studies reach the same dramatic conclu-
sion, it should come as no surprise that the impact is enormous. The
Morrall table has fueled scathing regulatory critiques by Justice
Stephen Breyer, Kip Viscusi, Cass Sunstein, and others." It has ap-
peared in OMB annual reports to Congress, in congressional testi-
mony, in court of appeals opinions, and in the debate over the 1994
House Republicans' Contract with America." Law students receive
their baptism in the follies of regulation when they encounter the
Morrall table in their administrative law and environmental law case-
books and classroom readings.'7 Scientists and aficionados of science
13 See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government's Numbers, in
Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective 32 (AEI-Brookings 2000)
(hereinafter Government's Numbers (2000)); Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the
Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs and Lives Saved ch 10 (cited in note
10) (hereinafter Government's Numbers (1996)).
14 Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 38 (cited in note 13); Hahn, Government's
Numbers (1996) at 239 (cited in note 13).
15 See, for example, Breyer, Vicious Circle at 24-27 (cited in note 3); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal
Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 264 table 14-5 (Oxford 1992); Viscusi, 63 U
Chi L Rev at 1430-36 table 1 (cited in note 3); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U
Chi L Rev 1533,1547-48 table 2 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U
Chi L Rev 407, 410 (1990). These sources are cited in Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981,1983 n 2 (1998).
16 OMB, Regulatory Program of the United States Government (Apr 1,1991-Mar 31,1992)
12 table 2 (Executive Office of the President 1991); Joint Hearing on the Impact of Workplace
and Employment Regulation on Business, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities and
the Subcommittee on Regulation and Paperwork of the House Committee on Small Business,
104th Cong, 1st Sess 32 (1995) (testimony of Robert W. Hahn); Department of Energy Risk
Management Act of 1995, S 333, 104th Cong, 1st Sess, in 141 Cong Rec S 2041-42 (Feb 2, 1995)
(statement of Senator Murkowski); Gillespie and Schellhas, eds, Contract with America at 131-35
(cited in note 2). See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1983-84 n 3 (cited in note 15).
17 See, for example, Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy:
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confront the lunacy of regulation in two articles in the prestigious
journal, Science, in which leading economists (including Nobel-
laureate Kenneth Arrow) rely on the Morrall table to argue for more
"rational" approaches to regulation. '8
Scores of newspapers and magazines across America have re-
ported Tengs/Graham's sensational claim that irrational federal regu-
lation is killing over 60,000 people per year." Graham and others have
repeated the claim in testimony before Congress, while members of
Congress regularly invoke the Tengs/Graham findings in floor de-
bates." The critique has been picked up in scholarly journals,2' in a
Problems, Text, and Cases 158-59 (Aspen 4th ed 1998); Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental
Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 561 figure 4.8 (Aspen 2d ed 1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulat-
ing the Regulators, in Robert N. Stavins, ed, Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings
325,332-33 (Norton 4th ed 2000).
18 See Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221, 221 (1996); Richard J. Zeckhauser and W. Kip
Viscusi, Risk within Reason, 248 Science 559,562-63 (1990).
19 See Bjorn Lomborg, Yes, It Looks Bad, But...,The Guardian (London) G2 (Aug 15,
2001); Sebastian Mallaby, Saving Statistical Lives, Wash Post Al (Mar 5, 2001); Risk vs. Risk:
Government Could Save Money and Lives, Houston Chron A38 (Mar 27, 1999); Jonathan Mar-
shall, Confused Rules Cost Lives, San Fran Chron D1 (Aug 7, 1995); Editorial, Try Again to Fix
Regulations, Boston Herald 26 (July 30, 1995). For magazine and journal articles, see Linda R.
Cohen and Robert W. Hahn, A Solution to Concerns over Public Access to Scientific Data, 285
Science 535 (1999); Paul Raeburn, Saving Lives Doesn't Have to Cost a Bundle, Bus Wk 29 (July
14, 1997). For rare critical appraisals, see Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interven-
tions and Their Misuse in the Debate over Regulatory Reform, 13 RISK 151, 161 (2002); Lisa
Heinzerling, Don't Put the Fox in Charge of the Hens, LA Times 15 (July 19, 2001); Joan Clay-
brook, Poor Tools for Changing the Rules, Wash Post A19 (Mar 24,2001).
20 See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, Hearings on S 746 before the Senate Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong, 1st Sess 34 (1999) (statement of John D. Graham);
Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Hearing on HR 1074 before the Subcommittee on Na-
tional Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Committee
on Government Reform, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 24, 1999) (statement of Angela Antonelli,
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies of the Heritage Foundation); Regulatory Improve-
ment Act of 1997, Hearing on S 981 before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
105th Cong, 1st Sess 27 (1997) (statement of Thomas F Walton).
For references by members of Congress, see, for example, Regulatory Improvement Act of
1997, S 981, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec S 6749, 6749 (June 27, 1997) (statement of
Senator Thompson); Remarks of Senator Dole, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec S 3787,
3788 (Apr 22, 1996).
21 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mich L Rev 1651,
1660 n 44 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U Chi Legal F 101,103 n 2. See also
Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More
than Money, 76 NYU L Rev 114, 126-27 n 35 (2001); Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regula-
tory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 873, 893 n 38 (2000); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum
L Rev 941,972 (1999); C. Boyden Gray, Obstacles to Regulatory Reform, 1997 U Chi Legal F 1, 1;
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Comparative Risk Analysis and Public Policy: Risk in the Republic, 8
Duke Envir L & Pol F 1, 20-21 n 44 (1997). For an example of Graham's own reiteration of the
"statistical murder" charge, see John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Pro-
tection against Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U Chi Legal F 13,28.
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leading casebook,2 and in the publications of some of Washington's
leading think tanks," while the authors' broader charge-that gov-
ernment regulation is inefficient-has also received wide and credu-
lous media coverage."
Hahn's conclusions likewise have appeared in dozens of major
newspapers and news magazines," in testimony before congressional
committees," and in publications of scholars," think tanks, lobbying
organizations, and regulatory watchdog groups alike.6
22 See Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 161-62 (cited in note 17).
23 See, for example, Robert W. Hahn and Patrick M. Dudley, Bush Regulatory Czar De-
serves High Marks, Policy Matters 02-05 (AEI-Brookings 2002), online at http://
www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=10 (visited May 5,2003); Linda R. Cohen and Robert
W. Hahn, A Solution to Concerns over Public Access to Scientific Data (AEI-Brookings 1999),
abstract online at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=10l (visited May
5, 2003), reprinted in 285 Science 535 (1999); EPA's Cancer Risk Guidelines: Guidance to No-
where, Cato Policy Analysis No 263 (Nov 12, 1996), online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/
pa-263.html (visited May 5, 2003); Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, PERC
Policy Series Issue No PS-5 (May 1996), online at http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/
superfund-full.html (visited May 5,2003).
24 For recent articles on this, see, for example, Nakashima, Bush's Regulatory 'Czar,' Wash
Post at A35 (cited in note 3); Editorial, Graham Will Help OMB, Boston Herald 16 (July 21,
2001); Douglas Jehl, Regulations Czar Prefers New Path, NY Times Al (Mar 25, 2001); Robert
Kasten, America's Worst Regulations, J Commerce 6A (July 3, 1996); John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA
Plans Radical Change in Cancer Risk, NY Times A] (Apr 16, 1996).
25 See Adam Wolfson, The Costs and Benefits of Cost Benefit Analysis, Pub Int 93 (Fall
2001); Mallaby, Saving Statistical Lives, Wash Post at Al9 (cited in note 19); Pietro S. Nivola, The
New Pork Barrel: What's Wrong with Regulation Today and What Reformers Need to Do to Get It
Right, 16 Brookings Rev 6, 8 (Winter 1998); Cindy Skrzycki and Peter Passell, The Drive to Put
Cost Limits on Regulatory Benefits Isn't Dead Yet, NY Times D2 (Apr 18, 1996). See also Gene
Marlowe, Are We Getting Our Money's Worth?, J Commerce 9A (July 24, 1997); James D. Johns-
ton, Let's Review and Prioritize Regulatory Costs, Detroit News A10 (Mar 21,1996). For criticism
of Hahn's study, see Eban Goodstein and Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overestimating Environ-
mental Costs, Am Prospect 64 (Nov-Dec 1997).
26 See, for example, Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Hearing on HR 1074 (state-
ment of Angela Antonelli) (cited in note 20). Hahn himself has testified before numerous con-
gressional committees on regulatory matters. See, for example, Elevating EPA to Cabinet Status,
Hearing on HR 64, 2438, and 2694 before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Re-
sources, and Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 59 (2001) (statement of Hahn and Randall
Lutter, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies). Testimony criticizing Hahn's meth-
ods and findings has been provided by Lisa Heinzerling. See Regulatory Right to Know Act of
1999, Hearing on HR 1074 (statement of Heinzerling) (cited in note 20).
27 A May 2003 Lexis search of law review articles published since 1996 yielded 65 cites to
Hahn's Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved. See, for example, Sunstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 1657 n 31
(cited in note 21); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Po-
litical Theory Perspective, 68 U Chi L Rev 1137,1181-82 n 115 (2001); Daniel H. Cole and Peter
Z. Grossman, When Is Command and Control Efficient?, 1999 Wis L Rev 887, 913-14; Eric A.
Posner and Matthew D. Adler, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165, 176 (1999);
Jeremy D. Fraiberg and Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic
Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 McGill L J 835,844 (1998); Graham, 1997 U Chi Legal F at 29 n
71 (cited in note 21).
28 See Clyde W. Crews, Creating a Regulatory Report Card: Toward Maximum Disclosure in
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Together, these studies have contributed mightily to a climate of
opinion in which it seems that the only question of interest is how to
accomplish sweeping reforms, not whether the regulatory system
needs reforming. 2' Hahn himself has been named Director of the pres-
tigious AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Graham
has been appointed Director of the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (OIRA) at OMB-a position that gives him oversight of
all agency regulation. Morrall is a senior official in OIRA. Their world
view is now the conventional wisdom, and that wisdom has been built
into the law of the land.
But upon what, exactly, is all this based? How solid is the empiri-
cal foundation for the anti-regulatory fervor that has gripped Con-
gress, academia, and millions of Americans for over a decade?
Only recently have scholars begun to probe these questions. In
1998, Professor Lisa Heinzerling published the first critical appraisal
of the data and methods behind the Morrall table-eleven years after
the table first appeared in print."' Since then, Heinzerling also has pub-
lished critical reviews of the Graham and Tengs studies, though with-
out the benefit of the source data for the Opportunity Cost study
(which produced the 60,000-lives claim), since the authors refused to
provide her that data.' Professors Thomas McGarity and Ruth Rut-
tenberg also have published brief critiques of a number of minor
"scorecards" in their important study of the uncertainty of regulatory9 2
cost estimates. No one has yet critiqued Hahn's scorecards in a sys-tematic way, though his are the most comprehensive and rigorous of
the Regulatory State, CEI Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations,
online at http://www.cei.org/gencon/O27,01619.cfm (visited May 5, 2003);Angela Antonelli, Regu-
lation: Demanding Accountability and Common Sense, in Issues 2000: The Candidate's Briefing
Book (Heritage Foundation 2000), online at http://inic.utexas.edu/-bennett/__310/
Antonelli.pdf (visited May 5,2003); William A. Niskanen, Regulating by Numbers, Regulation 9,
10 (Spring 1996).
29 See, for example, Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?,
29 Cap U L Rev 21 (2001). One of Stewart's chief charges is that many environmental regulatory
programs "entail costs that substantially exceed benefits," id at 33, a proposition he supports with
a cite to Hahn, Government's Numbers (1996) (cited in note 13), and to J. Clarence Davies and
Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United States: Evaluating the System (Resources for the Fu-
ture 1998), which, in turn, relies significantly on the Hahn and Tengs/Graham scorecards, id at
135, 137, 140-41. For a sampling of other reform proposals, see Robert W. Crandall, et al, An
Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform (AEI-Brookings 1997), online at http://
www.aei.brookings.org/publications/books/agenda-for-reg-reform.pdf (visited May 5,2003).
30 See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1981 (cited in note 15). This is not to criticize Heinzer-
ling, who did not enter the field until long after Morrall's table was published. The point is that
no one detected the problems with Morrall's table for over a decade, until Heinzerling came
along.
31 See Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-regulatory Move-
ment, 87 Cornell L Rev 648,664 (2002); Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 157 (cited in note 19).
32 See Thomas 0. McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex L Rev 1997 (2002).
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the three and have circulated widely in the national discourse for al-
most six years.
This Article builds on the work of Heinzerling, McGarity, and
others-along with extensive primary analysis of Hahn's and
Tengs/Graham's source data, which I finally obtained-to provide the
first comprehensive and integrated assessment of all three of the lead-
ing empirical studies behind the "regulatory reform" movement." It
examines the data, the analysis, and a sampling of the primary rules on
which each of these scorecards are based, seeking to replicate each
scorecard's numbers and to determine what, if anything, the numbers
leave out.u
The standards applied in this Article, it should be emphasized, are
those embraced by proponents and practitioners of cost-benefit analy-
sis itself. They are not the only standards that might be applied. More
than thirty years ago, Professor Laurence Tribe demonstrated that
cost-benefit analysis of any stripe necessarily harbors certain assump-
tions and value judgments that are ideological and contestable: for ex-
ample, that the litmus test of "rationality" is substantive and objective,
not procedural or historical; and that the proximate goal of regulation
is to maximize aggregate social utility, with consideration of people's
rights relegated to secondary status. His essays contesting such as-
sumptions remain as cogent today as they were three decades ago.
The motive for judging scorecards by the narrow standards of
cost-benefit analysis is not to take issue with those who have critiqued
33 Heinzerling's article, the pathbreaking work on this subject, focused on the Morrall
study and did not take issue with the other prominent analyses which come to the same conclu-
sion. Moreover, the scholarly reaction to her critique has tended to focus narrowly on the valid-
ity of discounting lives and life values (which she vigorously attacks), thereby obscuring the more
basic issues she has raised (and other issues she might have raised) about the validity of score-
cards in other respects. See John J. Donohue II1, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those
Who Discount Discounting, 108 Yale L J 1901 (1999). See also Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 946 n
19, 955 (cited in note 21). This narrow focus on discounting risks misses the forest for the trees.
The principal issue raised by scorecards is not whether discounting is good or bad, but whether
the scorecards are, overall, reliable litmus tests of regulatory rationality.
34 The goal is not to examine every entry, but to audit enough samples to provide a fair pic-
ture of how reliable the bookkeeping is.The rules examined in this Article were selected to rep-
resent a cross-section of agencies, subject matter, and numerical results, and to detect and illus-
trate problems with the methodology employed in scorecard analysis. Thus, rules that generated
extreme numbers in scorecards were more likely to be scrutinized in this study, but that does not
mean that the problems identified in this study are confined to the rules chosen to illustrate
them. A flawed methodology applied across the board will generate mistakes across the board.
35 See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil & Pub Aff 66 (1972);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv L
Rev 1329 (1971).
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this mode of analysis at its core, but simply to give the scorecards the
benefit of all possible doubt.'
How do scorecards fare when judged by the standards of their
own professional discipline? This Article will show that they fail badly.
Part I reveals that all three studies rely on undisclosed data and non-
replicable calculations; use regulatory samples that are biased against
a finding of rationality; misrepresent ex ante guesses of costs and
benefits as actual measurements; and grossly underestimate the value
of lives saved, or the number of lives saved, or both. It turns out that
Tengs and Graham's sensational conclusions are not supported by
their own data.
These are the avoidable errors. Part II examines a group of
equally serious shortcomings that could not have been avoided be-
cause they are inherent in the enterprise of compiling numerical
scorecards. First and foremost, regulatory scorecards ignore virtually
all benefits that are not quantified and/or monetized -thereby exclud-
ing most environmental benefits, many health benefits, and all intan-
gible benefits ranging from the avoidance of pain and suffering or fa-
milial and societal disruption to the promotion of a public sense of se-
curity, fairness, confidence in markets, etc. Scorecards also ignore the
impact of regulations on the distribution of social cost and risk, and
the fairness of such impacts. Finally, scorecards ignore and conceal the
large uncertainties that are present in virtually every regulatory im-
pact assessment. (That, ironically, is the key to their influence: their
use of speciously precise numbers lends them a scientific air which
impresses the unsuspecting media and the public, but is quite unwar-
ranted by the data.)
In short, the studies examined in this Article are so fundamen-
tally flawed that they prove nothing at all about the rationality of
regulation.
These basic flaws, moreover, are not merely flaws in the eye of
this beholder. When scorecardists disregard ordinal costs and benefits,
as well as distributive and equitable impacts and uncertainties, they do
so in violation of widely agreed upon principles of cost-benefit analy-
sis." Yet this Article will show that scorecards cannot follow the pre-
.cepts of responsible cost-benefit analysis while continuing to do the
36 Also, for better or worse, cost-benefit analysis (with all of its built-in value assumptions)
has been ratified by Congress-and applied to regulation-in recent years to a degree that Pro-
fessor Tribe could not have anticipated when he first issued his critique in 1971. See, for example,
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat 48. This renders cost-benefit analysis an indis-
putably relevant test-though not the only test-by which regulations and agency programs may
be evaluated.
37 See the discussion of these principles in Parts ll.A.2, IIB, lI.C, and lI.D.
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thing that has made them quotable and famous-boiling down huge
arrays of complex regulatory analyses to a few summary numbers.
Thus, although scholars to date have treated regulatory score-
cards as simply another form of cost-benefit analysis,"' this Article will
demonstrate that, in fact, regulatory scorecards represent a distinct
sub-species of cost-benefit analysis that inherently violates the basic
rules that govern such analysis. Scorecards cannot be salvaged. They
should simply be abandoned.
Part III addresses the inevitable follow-up question of how gov-
ernment regulatory performance should be evaluated, if not by nu-
merical scorecards. This Part argues that the place to begin is with bet-
ter agency analysis of the costs and benefits of individual rules and
regulatory opportunities. Perhaps the most important recommenda-
tion in this regard derives from the discovery in Part II that agencies
do not systematically overstate regulatory benefits, as commonly al-
leged. On the contrary, agencies often fail to describe benefits fully.
Indeed, they often relegate discussion of benefits (particularly non-
health benefits) to a few perfunctory sentences in the preambles of fi-
nal rules. The result is that important benefits often go unnoticed in
,both scorecards and in the press. Part III thus recommends that agen-
cies take steps to better assess and describe regulatory benefits.
Part III also offers several other suggestions for improving analy-
sis of individual rules, including: correcting obvious (yet long-
standing) errors in life and health values; abandoning the pretense
that such values are scientifically based; recognizing more clearly and
candidly the full range of uncertainties in each analysis; performing
many more retrospective studies to validate ex ante estimates; and ex-
tending cost-benefit analysis to regulatory opportunities.
At the systemic level, Part III recommends simply abandoning
scorecards as a tool for grading government regulatory performance.
Instead, Congress should establish an independent "ombudsman" to
investigate alleged regulatory failures (and failures to regulate) one
intervention at a time-mixing ordinal and quantitative analysis to
produce a full picture of costs, benefits, distributive impacts, and all
relevant uncertainties. This labor-intensive inquiry will not yield a nu-
merical "score" for government regulation overall. But it will provide
what is needed most-an independent and rigorous forum for clarify-
38 See, for example, Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1986 (cited in note 15) (treating the Mor-
rail table as symptomatic of deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis generally); Lisa Heinzerling and
Frank Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,
(Georgetown Envir L & Pol Center 2002), online at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/
papers/pricefnl.pdf (visited July 2, 2003).
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ing, if not resolving, the regulatory controversies that matter most to
the public and policy establishment.
Meanwhile, scholars, policymakers, and the public should be
aware that we simply do not know how "efficient" or "rational" gov-
ernment regulation is, from a cost-benefit perspective, because the
principal tests that have been used to reach such judgments are inva-
lid.
I. A CRITIQUE OF SCORECARDS: THE AVOIDABLE ERRORS
The last two decades have brought forth a spate of studies that
purport to offer rigorous assessments of the rationality of government
regulation overall. To begin with, there are studies, like Thomas Hop-
kins's, that dispense with benefits altogether, and merely tote up the
costs of regulation." These studies, though widely cited, are so unidi-
mensional that it is hard to imagine what the authors think they have
proved. Yes, the cost of regulation is high. So are the costs of national
defense, highways, schools, the war on drugs, police, health care, and
elections. So what? One cannot arrive at meaningful conclusions
about regulation by looking at costs in abstraction from benefits.
Then there are those who look at neither costs nor benefits, but
merely count Federal Register pages as evidence that the regulatory
burden is large and growing." These authors appear never to have
read the Federal Register. For simply reading any Federal Register fi-
nal rulemaking notice would immediately reveal that the vast majority
of the pages concerned with regulation are not devoted to setting
forth final rules. They are preambular pages devoted to proposing
rules, soliciting comments, explaining the final rule, responding to
comments, setting forth analyses of costs and benefits, and so forth. To
39 See, forexample, Thomas D. Hopkins, Costs of Regulation: Filling the Gaps (prepared for
Regulatory Information Service Center 1992); Thomas D. Hopkins, Cost of Regulation (RIT Pub-
lic Policy Working Paper 1991).
4( Similar problems (and others) afflict the annual regulatory cost reports published each
year by the Weidenbaum Center (at Washington University) and the Mercatus Center (at
George Mason University). For a good discussion of the poor scholarship found in these studies,
see McGarity and Ruttenberg, 80 Tex L Rev at 2016-18 (cited in note 32).
41 See, for example, Mercatus Center Press Release, President Clinton Sets Record for
Midnight Regulations (Jan 23,2001), online at http://www.mercatus.org/article.php/138.html (vis-
ited May 5, 2003) (noting that at least 25,605 pages of new regulations were published in the
Federal Register between November 2000 and January 2001); Clyde Wayne Crews, Regulatory
Budget Check (Apr 1, 2000) (Competitive Enterprise Institute), online at http://
www.cei.org/gencon/005,01746.cfm (visited May 5, 2003) (observing that the Federal Register
contained 71,161 pages in 1999, the highest count since the Carter presidency); Angela Antonelli,
The Cost of Federal Regulation, Heritage Foundation Press Release (Aug 4, 1999), online at
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed080499.cfm (visited May 5, 2003) (worrying that
the size of the Federal Register has increased from 53,376 pages in 1988, the last year of the
Reagan Administration, to 64,549 in 1997).
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take an example at random, the Department of Health and Human
Service's (HHS) final rule on seafood safety occupies 105 Federal
Register pages. These 105 pages consist of 100 pages of explanation
41followed by 5 pages of rule. Moreover, there is no necessary correla-
tion between the burden of regulation on one hand, and the numbers
or length of rules on the other. While a long rule may be burdensome,
a rule also may be long because it contains complicated concessions to
industry. Indeed, long rules may be passed to ease prior burdens on
industry. Conversely, Congress could eliminate thousands of pages of
text by reducing all environmental obligations to a single sentence:
"No one may pollute." Do the page counters think that this would
make the environmental laws 99.9999 percent less burdensome?
Each year since 1997, OMB has published an Annual Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation. OMB gen-
erally finds that the monetized net benefits of social regulation greatly
exceed its costs." As OMB points out, however, the aggregate figures
are dominated by a few major rules showing huge net benefits-such
as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) standards for lead
and particulate matter-which may cover a multitude of bad decisions
in other areas." Moreover, OMB's analysis of individual regulations
does not pretend to capture the non-monetized benefits of regula-
tions, nor does OMB feel free to impose its own subjective opinion as
to whether particular rules "pass" or "fail" cost-benefit tests.41 Thus,
OMB's Annual Report does not really serve as a numerical scorecard.
This Part will evaluate the three numerical scorecards that have
dominated discussion of regulatory rationality for the last fifteen
42 See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Proc-
essing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 60 Fed Reg 65096-65201 (1995).
43 OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Making Sense of Regulation: 2001
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State,
Local, and Tribal Entities 11 table 2 (2001), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
costbenefitreport.pdf (visited May 6,2003).
44 See id. OMB observes, "This benefits estimate is dominated by an EPA estimate that the
benefits of air pollution reduction are $1.25 trillion. OMB remains concerned about the plausi-
bility of these estimates." Prior reports make clear that the upper range of the EPA benefits es-
timate derives from EPA's § 812 Retrospective Report, so named because EPA prepared it pur-
suant to Section 812 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. See OMB, Report to Congress
on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 20 (2000), online at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf (visited May 6,2003), referring to EPA,
The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 (1997), online at http://www.epa.gov/
airprogm/oar/sect812/copy.html (visited Oct 14, 2003). As EPA notes in the latter report, "a large
proportion of the monetized benefits of the historical Clean Air Act derive from reducing two
pollutants: lead and particulate matter." Id at ES-9, ES-7, table ES-4.
45 See notes 226-28 and accompanying text. Instead, OMB inserts a "Not estimated" entry
in the benefits column in such cases, with an explanation in the "Other information" column.
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years: the Morrall, Tengs/Graham, and Hahn studies. Part A shows
that all three studies rely on undisclosed data, arbitrary adjustments to
agency data, and non-replicable calculations. Part B demonstrates that
all three scorecards employ sampling techniques that are systemati-
cally biased against a finding of regulatory rationality. Part C reveals
that all three scorecards misrepresent ex ante guesses as actual meas-
urements of costs and benefits, and suggests that reliance on pre-rule
predictions probably serves to underestimate net benefits in the ma-
jority of cases. Part D shows that Hahn's scorecards systematically un-
derstate the value of lives saved by regulation. Part E shows that Mor-
rall and Tengs/Graham inflate cost per life saved by discounting the
number of lives saved after a latency period. Part F presents the most
surprising discovery of this study: Graham and Tengs's famous (and
pessimistic) conclusions about regulation do not follow logically from
the authors' own data.
A. Unreliable Data, Arbitrary Adjustments,
Non-replicable Calculations
This Part applies to regulatory scorecards the most basic test of
scholarship: are the data reliable and the results replicable? It will be
seen that all three studies fail this basic test. These shortcomings alone
would be sufficient to disqualify these studies in any rigorous peer re-
view. Unfortunately, AEI-Brookings, OMB, and the Harvard Center
for Risk Analysis did not submit these studies to anonymous peer re-
view before publishing them. Thus, there was no screening process to
detect the fundamental problems of data and method discussed below.
Morrall. Morrall's table purports to be drawn from agency Regu-
latory Impact Assessments (RIAs). Morrall acknowledges, however,
that he "sometimes revised" agency estimates.6 In fact, it appears he
alters them by several orders of magnitude in some cases.47 Morrall
46 Morrall, Regulation at 28 (cited in note 8).
47 For example, as Heinzerling observes, OSHA estimated that its proposed 1985 formal-
dehyde exposure regulation would save from six to forty-seven lives over forty-five years. Mor-
rail alters that estimate to one life saved every hundred years. In 1986, EPA estimated that its re-
strictions on land disposal of certain persistent toxic and bio-accumulative wastes would avert
forty cases of cancer, fetal toxicity, reproductive disorders, and other ailments associated with
chronic toxic exposure per year. Morrall's table translates that to 2.5 lives saved per year-with
no explanation of where that number comes from (it is not found in any agency document). In
1983, EPA issued rules to provide for the control and clean-up of radioactive materials at ura-
nium processing sites. Morrall's figure for the lives saved from that rule (2.1) is less than half of
EPA's estimate (roughly 5). See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 2031 (cited in note 15).
Morrall also alters agency cost estimates without acknowledging that he is doing so. His arti-
cle states, "I generally accepted agency cost estimates without adjustment" and then goes on to
explain why he believes there is no need to adjust agency cost numbers. Morrall, Regulation at
29 (cited in note 8). Only by independent investigation did the author learn that Morrall substi-
tuted his own number of $1.4 billion per year for the agency estimate of $97 million per year as
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justifies these unilateral changes by stating that "regulatory agencies
... tend to overstate the effectiveness of their actions. Where such bi-
ases were evident and easily corrected, I made the corrections ... [re-
lying in some cases] on published studies.""
This easy-going explanation glosses over several acute difficulties.
First, Morrall offers no evidence for his claim that agencies systemati-
cally overstate the effectiveness of their actions. Indeed, the discussion
later in this Article refutes his charge." Second, Morrall has no train-
ing in any of the disciplines (chemistry, meteorology, toxicology, medi-
cine) that would qualify him to substitute his own judgment for that of
agency scientists on matters of exposure and risk. Third, Morrall does
not even name the other studies upon which he allegedly relied in
generating his own numbers, much less establish their superiority over
the agencies' analyses." Finally, Morrall's adjustments and calculations
are impossible to verify. His primary data, assumptions, and calcula-
tions are, by his own admission, "scattered around on yellow legal
pads" in his filing cabinets, and are not available.'
the cost of complying with EPA's rule restricting land disposal of toxic, bio-accumulative wastes.
Compare Morrall, Regulation at 30 table 4 (cited in note 8), with EPA, Restriction on Land Dis-
posal of California List Wastes: Toxic, Persistent, Bioaccumulative and/or Corrosive, 51 Fed Reg
44714, 44737 (1986). The effect of the cost adjustment, when combined with discounting, is to in-
crease the calculated cost per life saved from $2.38 million (the undiscounted agency figure) to
$3.5 billion. Morrall also appears to have increased, by a factor of 20, OSHA's estimate of the
cost of its proposed formaldehyde rule. See the discussion of the formaldehyde rule in notes 152-
57 and accompanying text.
48 Morrall, Regulation at 25,28-29 (cited in note 8).
49 See Part II.A.1. Even where agencies try to quantify benefits, they often tend to under-
estimate them. Percival, for example, notes that EPA grossly underestimated, initially, the risks of
lead in gasoline and PCBs. Percival, Environmental Regulation at 182 (cited in note 17).
51) See Appendix A and Morrall, Regulation at 28-29 (cited in note 8). Despite Morrall's no
doubt earnest belief in the superiority of his own judgment, few people outside of OMB are
likely to share his confidence that OMB economists know better than agency toxicologists the
risks of exposure to PCBs, or that OMB economists are better able than EPA engineers to pre-
dict the likely costs of incinerating toxic chemicals in tomorrow's high-tech combustors. Heinzer-
ling offers a striking quotation that reveals the frustration felt by OSHA health experts when
confronted with the pseudo-expertise of economists like Morrall:
[T]he comments we get from the economists at OMB are so ridiculous that they actually
become funny.... An example is that Dr. Infante and Dr. Rodgers and I met with two
economists from OMB and discussed the health hazards of formaldehyde with them, and
they adamantly argued with us about the toxicity of formaldehyde. Dr. Infante had to give
them an epidemiology lesson, and Dr. Rodgers had to give them a toxicology lesson, and I
had to describe how to do risk assessments for them.
107 Yale L J at 2027 (cited in note 15).
51 Telephone Interview with John F. Morrall III (Feb 22, 2002) (transcript on file with au-
thor).
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Morrall is, of course, a government official and a busy man.
Scholarship is not his first vocation. The fact remains that his findings
cannot be replicated.
Hahn. Hahn claims-in his title and at least eighteen times there-
after-that he is just "using the government's numbers," overtly dis-
tinguishing himself from Morrall in this regard.2 Buried in a few pas-
sages laden with technical jargon is the revelation that Hahn makes
numerous adjustments to those numbers-usually in the direction of
higher costs and lower benefits. For example, he excludes cost savings
from regulations because he believes "those savings are generally
questionable."" He assigns his own values to avoided risks of death or
injury, regardless of agency values. He excludes all but a handful of
environmental benefits." He discounts cost and benefit streams at his
own "standard" discount rates, regardless of agency practice." Costs
and benefits that occur before or after 1996 are discounted forward or
back to that arbitrary base year-a practice unique to Hahn that (he
admits) has a major effect on numerical outcomes. In the many cases
in which agencies indicate a range of costs or benefits, Hahn collapses
the range and takes only the mid-point, even where the agency has
specified a different point in the range as more plausible."
At a minimum, these adjustments call into question the candor of
his "government's numbers" claim. Moreover, it has proven difficult
(and in some cases impossible) for me to replicate Hahn's numbers by
applying to the numbers set forth in Regulatory Impact Assessments
the adjustments he describes.'
52 See Hahn, Government's Numbers (1996) passim (cited in note 13). See also id at 211
("Unlike Morrall, however, this study attempts to avoid introducing adjustments to individual
[agency] studies.").
53 Id at 228.
54 See id at 216. For fuller treatment of the nature and consequences of these exclusions,
see Part II.A.
55 See id at 216.
56 Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 45 (cited in note 13) ("Varying the base year for
the present-value calculation significantly affects the magnitude of the estimates.").
57 Hahn, Government's Numbers (1996) at 245 n 9 (cited in note 13).
58 Hahn's published study does not even disclose the names of the rules it analyzed. Simply
getting the list of rules and the spreadsheet of calculated costs, benefits, and net benefits required
months of supplication. When Hahn's spreadsheet was finally obtained, it turned out that the ad-
justments described do not necessarily yield the numbers used. For example, the Coast Guard at-
tributed ecological benefits valued at $230 million to $6 billion, over the period 1991-2015, to its
double-hull oil tanker rule. Hahn, Spreadsheet for Government's Numbers (2000) (cited in note
13): Selected Rules, cells CB9, CC9 (unpublished spreadsheet on file with author-hereinafter
Hahn spreadsheet). Hahn nonetheless assigns the rule a "zero" benefit while claiming he is using
the "government's numbers." Id at cells CF9-CH9. The difficulty of replicating Hahn's numbers
is compounded by the fact that he neither publishes his calculations nor includes them within the
Excel spreadsheet, as Excel users normally do, but simply uses the spreadsheet as a glorified
ledger in which to enter his off-the-record calculations. Nor does he anywhere describe the as-
sumptions he made to derive his "low," "base," and "high" value cost-benefit scenarios. Govern-
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The result, again, is a highly influential set of numbers that cannot
be independently verified.
Tengs/Graham. The Tengs/Graham data are drawn from a wide
range of public and private sector documents spanning more than a
decade, many of which are unpublished. Their stated criteria for inclu-
sion contain no filter to ensure that the studies upon which they rely
are of high quality, or even that they are directly comparable.
Moreover, key parameters are calculated in a non-transparent
manner that makes replication impossible. One crucial variable, for
example, is the estimated percentage implementation of each inter-
vention in the baseline: an intervention deemed capable of saving
50,000 lives at full implementation will save 25,000 additional lives
upon reallocation if the baseline estimate is 50 percent implementa-
tion, but no additional lives if the analyst believes that baseline im-
plementation is already 100 percent. Unfortunately, the authors pro-
vide no documentation of how their anonymous reviewers arrived at
the conclusion that, as of 1993, the mandatory seat belt use law was
"85 percent" implemented, while the public pedestrian safety informa-
tion campaign was "45 percent implemented" and selected traffic
enforcement programs were "78 percent implemented."O' These
ment's Numbers (2000) at 46 (cited in note 13).
59 The only stated criteria of inclusion are that the study must be in English, examine
American experience, and contain separate estimates of full implementation costs and life-
saving. See Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 370 (cited in note 9).
Spot checks of source documents reveal significant problems in the authors' database and
calculations. For example, at least sixteen of the key interventions related to auto safety (ac-
counting for nearly 12,500 additional lives saved in reallocation) are culled from a single non-
peer-reviewed National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) study which was
nearly fifteen years old when Tengs/Graham pulled it out of obscurity in 1995. See Appendix B-i,
rows 14,16-17, 19,21,26-27,34,41,44,46,67,70,80,95,107. See Appendix B-I, summary, for the
calculation of additional lives saved by reallocation to fully fund these interventions. The inter-
ventions listed in these rows are not assigned a source, but they match those derived from source
number 175 in Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 373-75, 385 (cited in note 9). That source is
NHTSA, Office of Traffic Safety Programs, Highway Safety Needs Study: 1981 Update of 1976
Report to Congress (1981) (hereinafter NHTSA Study). During the period between 1981 and
1995, technology evolved substantially, as did government policies and public attitudes on seat
belts, speed limits, and drunk driving. Yet these stale, ex ante estimates of hypothetical costs and
benefits of various interventions are used as proxies for actual costs and lives saved over a dec-
ade later.
0 See Appendix B-I, rows 14, 17, and 26, respectively. In contrast to their implementation
estimates, the authors' data on costs and life-saving can generally be found in the source docu-
ments. However, this is not always the case. The authors' data for some important interven-
tions-for example, oxygen for hypoxemia and flu shots-bear no clear relation to numbers ap-
pearing in the source documents. For hypoxemia, the authors estimate that full implementation
of the named oxygen therapy would save 45,000 additional lives at an incremental cost of $698
million (1993 dollars), see Appendix B-I, row 22, while the source document, Stephen D. Rob-
erts, Cost-Effective Oxygen Therapy, 93 Annals Internal Med 499-500 (Sept 1980), contains no
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numbers have no basis in the source documents-which often predate
these estimates by more than a decade-nor is any explanation given
for their derivation. Repeated requests for disclosure of the work-
sheets used to arrive at these numbers were denied. Such omissions
and concealments make it impossible to verify the authors' data or
replicate their results."'
B. Selection Bias
All three scorecards analyze samples drawn from the larger uni-
verse of regulation in order to support broader inferences about that
universe. Such inferences are valid only if and to the extent that the
samples in question are broadly representative of the population as a
whole. This section demonstrates that all three major scorecards fail
this basic condition as well.
Morrall. The forty-four rules that appear in the Morrall table may
seem like a lot, but they constitute only a tiny fraction of the regula-
tory universe. How were these particular rules chosen to serve as the
litmus test of agency rationality? Morrall himself never explains his
selection criterion except to note that he included regulations for
which "reasonably complete information" on cost and benefit was
available."2 However, as Heinzerling observes, Morrall omits clearly
beneficial final rules for which cost-benefit information was readily
available," while including eight rules that were never enacted.-
Heinzerling also correctly observes that the rules included are any-
such numbers. The source does observe that "[i]f a half million or so will receive continuous oxy-
gen therapy, the increase in the annual cost of the therapy may be $290 million [equivalent to
$509 million in 1993 dollars]," and that yearly mortality for continuous oxygen therapy is about
11 percent as contrasted to 20 percent for those on nocturnal oxygen therapy. Id. Multiplying
500,000 by the 9 percent survival differential yields the 45,000 figure used by the author. But the
Tengs/Graham cost figure cannot be derived from the source data by any obvious means, and the
500,000 figure itself is not, in any case, an appropriate full implementation number, since the pas-
sage just quoted makes clear that the source document author is using 500,000 as an arbitrary
benchmark, not as an estimate of full implementation use. Id. Likewise, the flu vaccine numbers
used by the authors cannot be found-or derived by obvious means-in the source documents
the authors cite. Compare Appendix B-I, row 20, with Office of Technology Assessment, Cost Ef-
fectiveness of Influenza Vaccination (Dec 1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
61 The consequences of the authors' casual treatment of implementation rates may be seen
in the confusion it created afterwards. Tengs recently declared that only 20 of the 185 interven-
tions in the Opportunity Costs database were assigned a zero implementation rate in the base-
line. Hearing on the Nomination of John D. Graham before the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Affairs, 107th Cong, 1st Sess 682 (2001). Yet the spreadsheet supplied by Tengs to this au-
thor lists 60 such interventions. See Appendix B-I, column F. Heinzerling has alleged that 79 of
the environmental "interventions" in the Opportunity Costs database were never implemented.
See Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 157-58 (cited in note 19).
62 Morrall, Regulation at 27 (cited in note 8).
63 Heinzerling cites EPA's phase-down of lead in gasoline and its regulations controlling
common air pollutants as examples. See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 2016 (cited in note 15).
64 Id.
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thing but a random walk down regulatory Main Street. Of the sixteen
EPA regulations on Morrall's list, fourteen have to do with four pol-
lutants-asbestos, benzene, arsenic, and radionuclides-that have
generated some of the most heated and litigated controversies in all of
environmental law." Nowhere does Morrall even attempt to demon-
strate that the rules appearing in his table represent a fair sampling of
the regulatory universe.' Moreover, his focus on proposed or enacted
rules (as opposed to regulatory opportunities) introduces a further
anti-regulatory bias, as will be seen in the following discussion of
Hahn's scorecard.
Hahn. Hahn's scorecard improves on Morrall's by adopting an
objective selection criterion: Hahn examines all major federal regula-
tions promulgated within a specified period. Hahn, however, follows
OMB in defining "major rules" as those that cost more than $100 mil-
lion per year. This filter effectively excludes from the database the
most cost-effective interventions of all: interventions that yield major
benefits without imposing major costs. The result is an in-built sam-
pling bias against regulation."
An equal or greater source of bias is that both Morrall and Hahn
focus on rules, actual or proposed. They choose not to examine rules
that were never issued but would be cost-effective if they had been.
This is a serious shortcoming. Basic environmental economics teaches
that efficient resource allocation requires internalizing externalities
(through regulation, Pigouvian taxes, or marketable permits) in all
cases where significant externalities arise.' This means that underregu-
lation can be just as inefficient-in the sense of producing a misalloca-
tion of resources-as overregulation. By systematically excluding all
cases of underregulation, Hahn and Morrall introduce yet a further
skew toward a finding of overregulation.
65 See, for example, the cases and controversies collected in note 71.
66 As Heinzerling notes, the cost-ineffective "bottom" of the Morrall table is heavily
stocked with regulations that he and others at OMB had heavily criticized. Heinzerling, 107 Yale
L J at 2015 (cited in note 15).
67 The "major rule" selection criterion also filters out minor rules that are not subject to
OMB review and detailed agency cost-benefit analysis. If such rules are systematically less cost-
effective than major rules (a point which has not been established empirically), the result would
be a contrary skew toward a higher grade for government regulation. It is thus difficult to deter-
mine, in Hahn's case, the direction of the selection bias, much less the magnitude.There is no rea-
son to assume, however, that opposing sources of bias simply cancel each other.
68 See Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30
J Econ Lit 675, 681 ("The basic theoretical result ... is that the efficient resolution of environ-
mental externalities calls for polluting agents to face a cost at the margin for their polluting ac-
tivities equal to the value of the damages they produce.").
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Tengs/Graham. Tengs/Graham avoid this skew by examining
regulatory opportunities as well as implemented regulations. They also
avoid problems of subjective sampling by defining their sample in ob-
jective terms: (1) a life-saving intervention must be analyzed in a writ-
ten study; (2) the study must be in English; (3) the study must be
about American experience; and (4) the study must be supported by
an estimate of full implementation cost and full-implementation lives
saved.
Unfortunately, this approach solves certain problems of bias only
by creating others. As the authors acknowledge, their "dataset may not
represent a random sample of all life-saving interventions" because
"those economic analyses that researchers have chosen to perform
and journal editors have chosen to publish may be disproportionately
expensive or inexpensive."' " It is extreme results, after all, that are
typically deemed most interesting and publishable. Moreover, authors
who choose to publish estimates of full-implementation costs and
benefits, as opposed to actual costs and benefits, likely do so because
they have concluded that full implementation is either quite a good
idea or quite a bad one. The bias toward extremes in sampling yields a
corollary bias in favor of greater life-saving through reallocation."
In practice, Tengs/Graham's publication bias appears to have
generated a sampling distortion that operates much like Morrall's se-
lection bias. For example, anyone familiar with environmental policy
will immediately recognize that the toxin control portion of the
Tengs/Graham sample (comprising more than half of the 185 interven-
tions in the sample) is dominated by just seven substances-asbestos,
arsenic, benzene, ozone, radionuclides/radon, and vinyl chloride-that
have generated some of the most contentious disputes in all of envi-
ronmental law.' There is no reason to assume that the saga of efforts
69 Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 372 (cited in note 9).
70 Indeed, as seen in note 60 and accompanying text, even the numbers for baseline costs
and lives saved were generated not by looking directly at actual costs and lives, but by multiply-
ing full implementation costs and lives by reviewers' estimates of the "percent implementation"
of the program. For the 104 programs implemented at either 0 or 100 percent in the baseline
scenario, this is not a source of error. But for the remaining 82 programs, the indirect approach
produces a needlessly inexact estimate of costs and lives saved in the baseline.
71 See, for example, Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457 (2001i
(discussing EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards for particulate matter and ozone);
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 614-15
(1980) (holding that the Secretary of Labor is required under the Occupational Health and
Safety Act (OSHA) to issue a benzene emission standard only after making an initial inquiry to
confirm that the standard is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" and the substance being regu-
lated can cause a "significant health risk"); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co v EPA, 139 F3d 914,
915 (DC Cir 1998) (holding that EPA's use of an inaccurate predictor of toxic mobility in prom-
ulgating its arsenic rule was arbitrary and capricious); Sierra Club v EPA, 1996 US App LEXIS
30422, *5-6 (DC Cir) (upholding EPA's decision to permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to regulate radionuclide emissions from nuclear reactors as not unreasonable); Leather Indus-
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to regulate these seven chemicals typifies the experience of the thou-
sands of pesticides and other toxic chemicals that EPA and Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) routinely oversee in
the marketplace.72 Yet these seven substances account for more than
ninety of the ninety-eight toxin control interventions, and 99 percent
of the toxin control baseline costs in the sample.
What would have been the right approach to regulatory sam-
pling? Clearly, the database should have included either a comprehen-
sive review or, more likely, a truly random sample of major and minor
rules and rule candidates. While finding a proper method for sampling
rule candidates is obviously a difficult enterprise," this does not excuse
biased regulatory sampling. Whatever the reasons for the bias, the fact
remains that scorecards based on non-random and biased sampling do
not support broad inferences about the rationality of regulation over-
all.
tries of America, Inc v EPA, 40 F3d 392, 394 (DC Cir 1994) (upholding in part a challenge to
EPA's regulation of heavy metal sludge contaminants, including arsenic); Corrosion Proof Fit-
tings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir 1991) (striking down EPA's comprehensive asbestos
ban); National Resources Defense Council, Inc v EPA, 824 F2d 1146, 1166 (DC Cir 1987) (re-
manding a vinyl chloride emissions standard to EPA for failing to evaluate the standard's esti-
mated effect on people's health).
For the dispute over radon regulation, see Gina Kolata, How Much Radiation is Too Much?,
NY Times FI (Nov 27,2001); Robert W. Hahn and Jason K. Burnett, The EPA's Radon Rule:A
Case Study in How Not to Regulate Risks, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies:
Regulatory Analysis 01-01 (AEI-Brookings 2001), online at http://www.aei.brookings.org/
publications/reganalyses/reg-analysis 01_01.pdf (visited May 6,2003).
72 Focusing obsessively on seven atypical substances may be thought to overstate the costs
of regulation, in view of the fact that these substances have been so controversial and hotly liti-
gated on grounds of cost. On the other hand, the relative efficiency of actual spending on these
substances may reflect the impact of searching judicial review which has restrained agencies
from regulating some of these substances as stringently as they would like. For example, the Cor-
rosion Proof Fittings decision may have restrained EPA from imposing high costs to phase out
asbestos in all uses. See 947 F2d 1201. This makes it impossible to determine the magnitude, or
even the direction, of the bias in sampling of toxics. But that just deepens the quandary created
by their sampling methods. All that one can say with confidence is that the toxic control inter-
ventions that appear in the Tengs/Graham studies are not representative of toxic regulation
overall. Indeed, Heinzerling points out that thirty-one of the ninety environmental measures in
the Tengs/Graham database were undertaken (or not) under statutory provisions (Section 6 of
the Toxic Substances Control Act) that have been effectively defunct for over a decade. See
Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 153-57 (cited in note 19).
73 Significantly, Hahn and Morrall would have treated these ninety-eight interventions as
just eight interventions since they appear in only eight rules.
74 Relying exclusively on the published literature does not work for the reasons described
above. A better approach might have been to convene an inter-agency (or non-governmental)
task force analogous to the EPA working group that Administrator Lee Thomas convened in
1986-87 with a mandate to survey the universe of rules and regulatory opportunities as an aid to
setting priorities for future regulation. See EPA, 1 Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assess-
ment of Environmental Problems v-vi (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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C. The Ex Ante Fallacy
Every year football pundits on pregame shows take turns guess-
ing the score or the point spread of the Super Bowl that is soon to fol-
low. But then the game happens, and newspapers report the results of
the game. Fortunately, there is no record of any occasion in recent his-
tory when a newspaper has committed the blunder of confusing the
pre-game guesses with the actual score of the game.
Yet this sort of blunder is virtually universal in scorecards where
conclusions are routinely described as if they represent actual meas-
urements of costs and benefits when, in fact, the numbers consist ex-
clusively of analysts' educated guesses about what future costs and
benefits might be in a variety of hypothetical scenarios.
For example, Graham and Tengs report that "the annual re-
sources consumed by those interventions total approximately $21.4
billion. For such a sum, we avert approximately 56,700 premature
deaths and save 592,000 years of life annually.' 7 In fact, the baseline
and reallocation numbers for all but seventeen of the interventions
that affect the Opportunity Costs results are derived exclusively from
ex ante guesses about cost or lives saved in a hypothetical full imple-
mentation scenario. 6 Moreover, many of those estimates were already
more than a decade old by the time the Tengs/Graham study was pub-
lished. 7 By relying on aged guesstimates, Graham and Tengs ignore, in
these cases, ten to twenty years of actual experience.
Morrall and Hahn likewise describe their findings as actual costs
and benefits when, in fact, Morrall and Hahn derive their data exclu-
sively from regulatory impact statements issued long before the rule
75 Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 172 (cited in note 10).
76 The only estimates not based on ex ante guesses about implementation rates are for in-
terventions that are fully implemented in the baseline scenario. Of these, the only interventions
that matter to the analysis-that is, that save additional lives in reallocation-are those that are
fully implemented in the baseline but are zeroed out in the reallocation to release funds for sav-
ing lives elsewhere. Inspection of Appendix B-1 reveals that there are seventeen such interve-
netions listed below row 101, the last intervention that is funded in the reallocation.
77 See Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at Appendices A-B (cited in note 9) (listing sources for
cost per life estimates used in both that and the smaller Opportunity Costs study). For example,
the numbers for twelve traffic safety education interventions come from a 1981 study (No 175 in
Tengs/Graham's database) that draws on data from the 1970s. The numbers for the life-saving
potential of universal influenza vaccination come from a 1981 study. See Office of Technology
Assessment, Cost Effectiveness of Influenza Vaccination (cited in note 60). The huge life-saving
potential of nocturnal oxygen for hypoxemia patients (which saves twenty-three thousand addi-
tional lives in the reallocation scenario) derives from a two-page editorial published in a medical
journal in 1980. See Roberts, 93 Annals Internal Med at 499-500 (cited in note 60). The numbers
for eleven interventions relating to pollution control at paper mills were drawn from a 1990
study (No 844), which was itself a study of EPA assessments made during the 1970s and early
1980s. See R.A. Luken, Efficiency in Environmental Regulation:A Benefit-Cost Analysis ofAlter-
nate Approaches 10-11 (Kluwer 1990) (describing the age of sources).
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in question took effect./
Confusing predictions with actual results has two deleterious ef-
fects. First, it creates a bogus appearance of precision that renders the
scorecards highly quotable-and fundamentally misleading." Second,
ex ante predictions likely understate net benefits in many cases. The
reason is not, as commonly believed, that costs of any given policy are
necessarily overestimated or benefits underestimated in agency as-
sessments."' The reason is found in the static nature of cost-benefit es-
timation.
Cost-benefit calculations made in the course of rulemaking or
rule advocacy are snapshots of a hypothetical future. They generally
assume the policy will be applied without adjustment for the duration
of the planning period. This assumption makes reasonably good sense
when applied to the evaluation of specific projects-like dams, roads,
and commercial developments-which are essentially irreversible
once installed." Most regulations, by contrast, may easily be modified,
eased by waivers, subcategories, and variances, or repealed at some fu-
78 See Morrall, Regulation at 25,27 (cited in note 8); Hahn, Governmenti" Numbers (2000)
at 32, 38 (cited in note 13).
79 Of course, ex ante estimates may serve as relevant indicators of decision rationality if all
understand that the latter is being judged solely by the facts available to the agency at the time it
made its decision. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402,419-20 (1971) (es-
tablishing this as the standard for judicial review of agency rules). The problem with this stan-
dard is that the facts available to the agency during rulemaking normally do not permit it to an-
ticipate how often (and in what cases) waivers and variances, rule modification, and enforcement
discretion will be used to reduce unexpected regulatory burdens.
Y4 Some authors point out, correctly, that hard-to-quantify benefits tend to be understated
in agency cost-benefit estimates. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of
Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 131 (Cambridge 1996). Others point out, equally
correctly, that agencies tend to overestimate those benefits that they do quantify when they
adopt conservative risk assumptions in evaluating proposed regulations. Morrall, Regulation at
29 (cited in note 8); Albert L. Nichols and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How
Conservative Risk Assessment Distorts Regulation, Regulation 13,13 (Nov-Dec 1986). The net ef-
fect of these opposing biases may well depend on the facts of each case. On the cost side, analysts
likewise disagree on whether the costs of any given policy tend to be understated or overstated.
See Part II.A.I.f. One of the few actual comparisons of cost predictions with actual experience
suggests that ex ante cost estimates are sometimes understated, sometimes overstated, and some-
times about right. See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the
Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, Discussion Paper 99-18, 2 (Resources for the Future
1999), online at http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc-papers/PDF-files/9918.pdf (visited May 6,
2(11)3). See also William D. Nordhaus, From Porcopolis to Carbopolis: The Evolution from Pork
Bellies to Emissions Trading, in Richard F. Kosobud, ed, Emissions Trading: Environmental Pol-
icy " New Approach 61,66 (John Wiley & Sons 2000) (noting that while sulfur dioxide reduction
costs were overestimated, chlorofluorocarbon control costs were, if anything, underestimated).
81 One might, of course, ease the impact of a dam by installing fish ladders or controlling
water flow in various ways. This is tinkering around the edges, however. Generally speaking, the
costs and benefits of a dam are what they are, once the dam is built, and there is not much (short
of removing the dam) that future decisionmakers can do about it.
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ture time. These dynamic feedback loops allow regulators to adjust the
impact of regulations, as applied, so that high net benefit regulations
stay in place, while low or negative net benefit regulations are re-
pealed, modified, or eased by variances.
Predictions that ignore dynamic policy adaptation will tend to
understate the net benefits of regulation. To take just one example,
EPA's Final Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance aims to curtail
emissions of persistent, bio-accumulative toxic pollutants into the
Great Lakes." EPA anticipated an annualized compliance cost of be-
tween $60 and $380 million per year (1994 dollars)." But EPA also
said that it expected actual costs to be near the low end of the range
because final decision authority for implementing the Guidance was
being delegated to states and tribes who would retain discretion to
provide waivers and variances in cases where strict compliance would
impose excessive costs." Yet Hahn's scorecard ignores this corrective
mechanism. It mechanically adopts the mid-point estimate of $218
million, thereby assuming that EPA will rigidly apply its rules in many
cases, even when EPA has expressly stated its intention not to do
that." In theory, the autopilot fallacy might be avoided by confining
the database to retrospective cost-benefit studies. These, however, are
few and far between, for two-reasons that McGarity and Ruttenberg
have well explained in a recent article. First, retrospective analyses
are surprisingly difficult: causal connections between regulation and
impact are hard to establish in practice, and even retrospective studies
require a counterfactual and hypothetical analysis of what the world
would have been like absent the regulation. Second, agencies have lit-
tle or no incentive to probe, in detail, the possibility of their own prior
analytical mistakes. As a candid EPA analyst once asked, rhetorically,
"How is my career going to be advanced by doing a study that shows
that three years ago the agency made a wrong prediction?""
82 EPA, Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 60 Fed Reg 15366
(1995).
83 Idat 15381.
84 Id.
85 See Appendix C, Row 70. The cost number listed in the seventh column, $2,764 million,
represents the present value of a twenty-year stream of costs that, according to Hahn's spread-
sheet, are assumed to be $218 million annually. The $218 million figure is stated as the assumed
annual cost in cell AH-9 of the spreadsheet (on file with author).
86 McGarity and Ruttenberg, 80 Tex L Rev at 2039-40 (cited in note 32).
87 Id at 2040. See also Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson, Accuracy of Regulatory Cost
Estimates at 2 (cited in note 80) ("[E]x post studies of the cost of regulation are quite scarce.").
The most comprehensive such analysis is unquestionably EPA's seven-year retrospective
study of the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act, mandated by Section 812 of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990. See EPA, Benefits and Costs (cited in note 44). However, that study
does not examine costs and benefits at the level of individual regulations. and therefore sheds no
light on the accuracy of ex ante Regulatory Impact Assessments. One study that directly com-
pared ex ante and ex post regulatory cost estimates found that ex ante estimates exceeded actual
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The result is a dearth of retrospective studies that forces score-
cardists to rely on ex ante guesses about regulatory costs and benefits.
This in no way justifies, however, the current practice of reporting
such guesses as if they were actual costs and benefits-thereby grossly
overstating the reliability of the figures and, probably, understating net
benefits.
D. Undervaluing Life and Health Benefits (Hahn) and Overstating
Cost per Life (Tengs/Graham and Morrall)
Hahn, as we have seen, assigns a "standard" value of $5 million
per statistical life saved, with $3 million and $7 million values used in
sensitivity analysis. He then discounts the value of lives saved in the
future-for example, after a latency period following exposure to a
carcinogen-at 5 percent per year.^ Such practices are now
commonplace in agency analysis as well." Some scholars have
objected on ethical grounds to the practice of monetizing, and then
discounting, the value of reducing risk to human life.' Others have
defended the inevitability of the first and the propriety of the second/9
Rather than reopen that argument, the discussion that follows
assumes that regulators will continue to monetize and discount for the
foreseeable future."2 This Part simply reviews findings of Professors
costs for twelve rules, underestimated costs for six rules, and were roughly accurate for the re-
maining seven rules. Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson, Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Esti-
mates at ii (cited in note 80).
88 Hahn, Governments Numbers (2000) at 39 (cited in note 13).
89 See, for example, OMB, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies
from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the
Format of Accounting Statements, M-00-08, at 6 (Mar 22, 2000), online at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/mOO-08.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2003) (calling on agencies to
"monetize quantitative estimates [of costs and benefits] whenever possible," to "discount
[monetized] benefits and costs that occur in different time periods," and to "provide a clear ex-
planation of the rationale behind" any regulatory choice that is based on "unquantifiable bene-
fits or costs"); OMB, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies from Mitchell
E. Daniels, Jr., 2001 Discount Rates for OMB Circular No. A-94, M-01-14, at Appendix C (Mar 7,
2001) (prescribing a 3 percent real interest rate for long-term cost-effectiveness analysis). While
OMB has not required that agencies all use the same life value, agencies typically assign a value
of less than $7 million per life saved. See OMB, Guidelines at 12-13.
9( See, for example, Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 2042-56 (cited in note 15); Heinzerling and
Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless at 11-16 (cited in note 38); Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statis-
tical People, 24 Harv Envir L Rev 189 (2000).
91 See, for example, Donohue, 108 Yale L J 1901 (cited in note 33); Morrall, Regulation at
28-29 (cited in note 8).
92 The standard answer to arguments that risk to life should not be assigned a monetary
value is that society implicitly assigns such a value every time it chooses to tolerate any risk at all.
Regarding life as infinitely valuable would require attempting to eliminate every conceivable
risk to life no matter how minute or costly to avoid-a policy that would impoverish society so
much that few people, if any, would choose it. Compare Heinzerling and Ackerman, Pricing the
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Revesz, Shapiro, Glicksman, and others-as well as work-in-progress
by this author-which suggest that the risk-to-life values in current
use are not empirically well-grounded, and are probably far too low
by their own logic.
Briefly, Hahn draws his risk-to-life values from a collection of
contingent valuation and labor market studies which are largely the
same studies upon which EPA and other agencies also rely." Contin-
gent valuation studies, as many scholars have pointed out, elicit hypo-
thetical answers to hypothetical questions, with no way to verify that
such polls measure people's real values.' Such studies are inherently
unreliable. Labor market studies, on the other hand, observe actual
market behavior in the form of wage-premiums accepted by workers
in high risk jobs: the yearly wage-risk premium divided by annual job
risk yields the implicit value of risk-to-life accepted by these workers.
Despite the advantage of having access to actual behavior, labor mar-
ket studies exhibit serious drawbacks of their own:
1. The labor market studies upon which Hahn and the agencies
rely have not been quality-controlled to a level remotely commensu-
rate with the weight they now carry. In fact, as Appendix D reveals,
these studies employ different data, methods, assumptions, and models
to yield implicit values of a statistical life (VSLs), which range from
less than $1 million to nearly $18 million, measured in 2000 dollars.9
Neither Hahn nor the agencies have ever supplied a full and convinc-
Priceless at 11-16 (cited in note 38), with Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 3-5 (cited in note 15).
93 See Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan L Rev 1153, 1196-
97 (2002) (criticizing contingent valuation techniques); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 962-87 (cited
in note 21) (criticizing simple extrapolations from labor market studies); Peter A. Diamond and
Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J Econ
Persp 45, 46 (Fall 1994) (arguing that contingent valuation techniques do not measure the pref-
erences they attempt to measure).
94 Specifically, he writes, "I used standard willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor mar-
ket studies of risk-dollar tradeoffs for fatal and nonfatal risks." Hahn, Government's Numbers
(2000) at 39 n 24 (cited in note 13). For this, Hahn cites W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life
and Health, 31 J Econ Lit 1912 (1993), which presents the same results as Viscusi's book, Fatal
Tradeoffs (cited in note 15).
95 This is only one of the many serious problems that plague contingent valuation studies.
For a trenchant critique by a Nobel-laureate economist raising issues unanswered by defenders
of the practice, see Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 931
(2000). It is true that the 1992 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Panel on Contingent Valuation provisionally endorsed Contingent Valuation Method (CVM),
subject to strict guidelines, for purposes of deriving non-use values of ecosystems, in light of the
fact that such values cannot be derived by another means. Neither expressly nor impliedly, how-
ever, did the Panel endorse the use of CVM for life valuation for which alternative, revealed-
preference estimation methods are available. NOAA, Report of the NOAA Contingent Valua-
tion Panel, 58 Fed Reg 4601 (Jan 15, 1993).
96 See Appendix D, columns A and C, listing studies relied on by EPA; EPA, Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses, EPA 240-R-00-003, 89 exhibit 7-3 (2000). Viscusi draws on many
of the same studies and attributes much of the variability in VSLs to differences in assumptions
and the design of various studies. Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-59 (cited in note 15).
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ing explanation of why estimated life values vary by more than an or-
der of magnitude, or why certain studies and/or values were preferred
over others."
2. Labor market studies generally assume, without proof, that the
workers in the database enjoy a free and unfettered choice of jobs
with various risks, and that they accurately assess the risks of the jobs
they are taking." Such assumptions raise considerable doubt as to
whether existing studies yield valid estimates of occupational VSLs.
3. The values that labor market studies elicit are derived from dif-
ferent contexts and are different values than those that regulators are
required to consider in assigning monetary numbers to regulatory
risks. For example, it is generally agreed that: (a) high-risk jobs are
typically voluntarily assumed and self-select for risk tolerance;" (b)
high-risk workers have incomes that are far below that of the average
beneficiary of regulations under review;" (c) workplace risks are typi-
97 EPA makes no distinction among the studies in its database. It simply takes the "central
tendency" of these studies while noting, "Further research on synthesizing the results of these
studies ... may provide better estimates." EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses at
90 (cited in note 96). The Department of Transportation, which houses the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration and NHTSA, has chosen a life value of $3 million (2002 dollars) with no public dis-
cussion. See Memorandum to Assistant Secertaries from Kirk K. Van Tine, General Counsel, Re-
vised Departmental Guidance on Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic
Valuations (Jan 29, 2002) (unpublished memorandum on file with author). Viscusi notes that
"most of the reasonable estimates of the value of life are clustered in the $3 to $7 million range,"
Fatal Tradeoffs at 73, when, in fact, more than half of the values in his own table fall outside that
range. Id at 52-53 table 4-1. Other scholars have performed meta-analyses that try, in various
ways, to control for quality and adjust for differences among methods, assumptions, and data-
bases. See, for example, Janusz R. Mrozek and Laura 0. Taylor, What Determines the Value of
Life?:A Meta-Analysis,21 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 252 (2002); Ted R. Miller, The Plausible Range
for the Value of Life-Red Herrings Among the Mackerel, 3 J Forensic Econ 17 (1990). But this,
without more, simply adds a new dimension of uncertainty about the assumptions and methods
of the meta-analyses.
98 Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 38 (cited in note 15). Even if workers accurately estimate the
risks they are assuming, labor market studies supply no evidence that high-risk workers enjoy
ready access to less risky job alternatives, as would be necessary to permit the inference that the
wage premiums reflect a voluntary decision. See Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman,
Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a Pragmatic Approach 98-100 (Stanford 2003); McGarity, Re-
inventing Rationality at 147-48 (cited in note 80).
99 As OMB observes: "the use of occupational-risk premiums [without adjustment] can be
a source of bias because the risks, when recognized, may be voluntarily rather than involuntarily
assumed, and the sample of individuals upon which premium estimates are based [blue-collar
workers in high-risk occupations] may be skewed toward more risk-tolerant people." OMB,
Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, Notice, 68 Fed
Reg 5492, 5519 (Feb 3, 2003). See also Mrozek and Taylor, 21 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 264
(cited in note 97) (finding self-selection effects dominant at very high-risk jobs); Cropper and
Oates, 30 J Econ Lit at 714 (cited in note 68) (citing studies showing that voluntary risks and
involuntary risks are valued differently).
M(S) See, for example, Viscusi, 31 J Econ Lit at 1930 (cited in note 94). Income matters be-
cause it is well-known that willingness to pay to avoid risk (and/or willingness to accept risk in
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cally safety risks which accrue to individuals in the prime of life, while
many regulatory risks involve cancer, a uniquely dreaded disease that
primarily afflicts the elderly."" On balance, Professor Revesz has con-
cluded that the failure to incorporate necessary adjustments may un-
derestimate regulatory VSL by as much as a factor of six."12 Yet,
astonishingly, the regulatory life-values employed by Hahn (and
agencies) are lifted directly from old labor market studies without
adjustments of any kind, other than for inflation.
Besides underestimating regulatory VSL, Hahn further skews his
results by discounting the value of lives saved in the future at a base-
line rate (5 percent) which is well above the "consumption" rate of in-
terest (2-3 percent) that many economists believe is the appropriate
rate for discounting future benefits to consumers in an open econ-
omy.' , Tengs/Graham and Morrall do not monetize life values and
hence do not discount the value of lives. However, they discount the
number of lives saved in future years."" The effect of this practice on
cost-effectiveness calculations can be dramatic. Consider, for example,
a regulation that costs $1,000 now to save 100 lives in 20 years. "Dis-
counting lives" has the effect of increasing the calculated cost per life
saved by a factor of 3 (at the 5 percent discount rate employed by
exchange for compensation) tends to rise with real income levels. In addition, income levels have
risen considerably since the date of the wage-risk studies (many of which use data that are more
than two decades old). Note that calling for an income adjustment does not mean that social
regulators should value rich people's lives more highly than poor people's in practice. The social
value of a life does not depend on the income of the person. The point is simply that the decision
to use a single life value for all people in society in no way justifies drawing that value exclu-
sively from the low-income segment of society, or from a lower-income time. period, with no ad-
justment to reflect the higher incomes of others, or income growth.
101 Though the propriety of adjusting life value for remaining life expectancy may be ques-
tioned (it implies that older people's lives are worth less than the lives of others), Revesz be-
lieves accounting for this difference would reduce the measured life-saving value of social regu-
lation by about 50 percent in the case of cancer fatalities that accrue to elderly people after a
twenty-year latency period. See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 981 (cited in note 21). Accounting
for the "dread factor" associated with cancer, on the other hand, would approximately double
the value of cancer risk avoidance, according to Revesz. Id at 972-73.
102 Id at 962-74 (noting that the first two sets of distinctions clearly point to an upward
adjustment, while the effect of the third set of differences is ambiguous).
103 Compare Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 39 (cited in note 13), with Kenneth J.
Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation: A Statement
of Principles 13-14 (AEI 1996) (hereinafter Annapolis Principles) ("The rate at which future
benefits and costs should be discounted to present values generally will not equal the rate of re-
turn on private investment. The discount rate should instead be based on how individuals trade
off current for future consumption."). See also Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 979 (cited in note 21)
(contrasting justifications for OMB's use of the marginal pre-tax rate of return on private in-
vestment with GAO, CBO, and EPA's use of the consumption rate of interest as discount rates
for cost-benefit analysis).
1(4 Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 169 (cited in note 10) (stating that "costs, lives,
and life-years saved should all be discounted to their present value at a rate of 5 percent"); Mor-
rail, Regulation at 28 (cited in note 8) ("For the sake of consistency, I adjusted these temporal
variations using a uniform 10-percent discount rate for both the benefits and the costs.").
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Tengs/Graham) or a factor of 7 (at the 10 percent rate employed by
Morrall)."'
What is wrong with discounting numbers of lives saved? One ob-
vious problem is that death does not recognize human accounting
conventions and death does not discount. As a result, if 1,000,000 peo-
ple are exposed to a toxic chemical that produces a 1:10,000 probabil-
ity of fatal cancer among those exposed, then the odds are quite high
that approximately 100 people (not 37, or 14) will lose their lives to
cancer. Moreover, whatever the interior logic to some economists of
discounting monetary values for risk to life, the average reader of the
Tengs/Graham articles or the Morrall table (and, I suspect, the major-
ity of senior policymakers) are unlikely to understand that the physi-
cal reality of 100 lives saved in 20 years is, in fact, being treated as 37,
or 14, lives saved today. In short, discounting lives is misleading and
therefore objectionable simply as a matter of English usage. "" A far
better approach would have been simply to follow the guideline em-
bodied in OMB's later advice to agencies:
As a first step, you should consider presenting the streams of
benefits and costs over time. These "raw" streams of benefits and
costs can help you-and your reader-better understand the ef-
fects of alternative regulatory actions.
7
15 Specifically, discounting lives at 5 percent has the effect of reducing the calculated num-
ber of lives saved to 100/(1.05)2", or 37 lives. The $1,000 expenditure yields a cost per life of $27,
which is roughly 3 times the $10 cost per life obtained without discounting. The factor of 7 differ-
ence over 20 years, mentioned above, is calculated in the same manner, substituting a 10 percent
rate. Discounting lives at 10 percent for 40 years, as Morrall appears to have done, has the effect
of reducing the 100 lives saved to only 2, thereby increasing the cost per life saved by a factor of
50. Heinzerling offers an excellent analysis of the impact of discounting in inflating Morrall's cost
per life saved estimates in Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J at 1985 nn 8-10 (cited in note 15).
106 Morrall has defended his practice of discounting lives in the following terms: "Discount-
ing costs but not benefits leads to absurd results,'such as that a rule saving 100 lives a decade
from now is more desirable than a rule of equal cost saving 99 lives right away, and that all rules
yielding continuous benefits are worth any amount of immediate costs." Morrall, Regulation at
28 (cited in note 8). Both arguments fail.The choice between 100 lives saved a decade from now
and 99 lives saved today may seem obvious to Morrall. But, obvious or not, it is fundamentally a
moral choice, not an economic one, which can and should be preserved for policymakers by sim-
ply announcing the number and timing of lives saved, free of discounting. Morrall's second ar-
gument-that, without discounting, "all rules yielding continuous benefits are worth any amount
of immediate costs"-ignores basic precepts of regulatory evaluation. All regulations yield
streams of costs and benefits that are, for analytical purposes, truncated at the end of some stipu-
lated planning period. Hahn, for example, assumes that the rules he studies will be in effect for
twenty years, meaning that costs are truncated after twenty years, and benefits are truncated af-
ter twenty years plus whatever the assumed latency period is. Hahn, Government's Numbers
(2000) at 40 (cited in note 13). So trivial benefits do not and cannot, in practice, accumulate to in-
finity over a period of infinity.
107 OMB, Guidelines at 6 (cited in note 89).
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By drawing life-values from labor market studies without quality
controls and without necessary adjustments to reflect relevant differ-
ences, and then discounting those values at excessive discount rates,
existing scorecards underestimate regulatory benefits while grossly
overstating the precision and reliability of their numbers.
E. Logically Unsupported Conclusions (Tengs/Graham)
The Morrall and Hahn studies may use unreliable data and dubi-
ous methods, but at least their conclusions follow from their data. The
same cannot be said of the Tengs/Graham studies. These studies make
three main assertions: (a) irrational regulation kills (the 60,000 lives
claim); (b) the existing pattern of regulation is grossly inefficient; and
(c) EPA and OSHA toxic control regulations are the worst of the lot.""
Yet the discussion that follows will show that their own data do not es-
tablish any of these propositions.
1. Tengs/Graham's data do not prove "statistical murder."
Although the statistical murder charge is sensational and widely
repeated, it rests entirely on two counterfactual assumptions. The first
is that the United States government operates under a fixed national
regulatory budget for allowable compliance cost, so that every private
-sector dollar spent to reduce Risk A is a dollar taken away from ef-
forts to mitigate Risk B. The second is that there is some mechanism
in place for reallocating to better uses the savings achieved by zeroing
out high-cost uses. In fact, there is no such compliance cost budget,
and no such reallocation mechanism. "' The reality is that we live in a
108 See Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 172 (cited in note 10) (claiming that an
additional 60,200 lives could be saved by rationally reallocating resources to high-value life-
saving interventions); Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 371, 372 (cited in note 9) (claiming that
"efficiency in promoting survival requires that the marginal dollar spent be the same across all
programs," whereas in the authors' sample the marginal cost per life saved ranged from less than
zero to more than $10 billion per life-year saved); id at 371 (claiming that the median toxic con-
trol intervention costs $2.8 million per life-year, compared to $42,000 for the median medical in-
tervention and $48,000 per life-year for the median injury reduction intervention).
109 Nor has Graham ever proposed establishing such a reallocation mechanism in his capac-
ity as President Bush's regulatory czar. Regulatory critics have proposed creating the regulatory
budget that claims of statistical murder assume. See, for example, Robert W. Hahn, Achieving
Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U Chi Legal F 143, 153 ("Congress should introduce a binding
regulatory budget on an experimental basis."); Susan Lee and Daniel Roth, The Mandate Man-
darins, Forbes 196, 200 (Dec 16, 1996) (reporting introduction of legislation to impose a regula-
tory budget to limit compliance costs that federal agencies may impose). With such a budget in
place, it would be true that a dollar spent on Risk A necessarily would be subtracted from Risk
B. Congress and agencies would be forced into a painful triage, with lives at stake, which might
produce more "efficiency." Of course, it also would force agencies either to ignore large, newly
discovered risks or cancel programs in place to make room in the risk budget cap. To date, Con-
gress has not seen fit to create a regulatory budget. Undaunted, Graham and others simply as-
sume such a budget exists by crafting a theory of "statistical murder" into which the assumption
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$9 trillion economy of which only a small fraction is spent on regula-
tory risk reductions. If money spent cleaning up hazardous waste sites
might save more lives if redirected to combat smoking, then so might
a portion of the $36 billion spent each year on lottery sales,"" the $92
billion spent on alcoholic beverages,' the $7.6 billion spent on specta-
tor sports,' 2 or the $54 billion spent on tobacco."' By the logic of
Tengs/Graham, lottery sales "kill" 4,500 people every year, while spec-
tator sports "kill" 950 statistical people."' Indeed, by the logic of Gra-
ham and Tengs, every highly paid baseball player or corporate CEO is
a statistical murderer since, like regulators, they consume resources
that might be devoted to risk reduction."'
Heinzerling finds an implicit political agenda in Graham's selec-
tive focus. As she points out, Tengs and Graham
do not ask, for example, whether the billions of dollars in subsi-
dies to the mining, logging, ranching and farming industries might
be better spent on, say, smoking cessation and childhood immu-
nizations. They do not even ask whether money spent subsidizing
tobacco itself might be better spent on smoking cessation pro-
grams.' 6
Noting its selective focus is not the only way to appreciate the fal-
lacy of Tengs/Graham's 60,000 lives claim. Another way is simply to
examine the actual interventions that, starved of funds in
Tengs/Graham's baseline scenario, do most of the new life-saving in
reallocation. Appendix B-1 reveals that just two interventions-
continuous (versus nocturnal) oxygen for hypoxemic obstructive lung
disease and influenza vaccines for all citizens -account for over forty-
two thousand of the sixty thousand additional lives saved by realloca-
tion."7 Yet few would suggest that the nation's failure to provide con-
tinuous oxygen for hypoxemic obstructive lung disease is somehow
caused by excessive regulation of benzene or other interventions at
is smuggled.
110 US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000 325 table 519 (GPO
120th ed 2000).
111 Id at 761 table 1283, Food and Alcoholic Beverages Sales by Sales Outlet: 1995 to 1998.
112 Id at 253 table 418, Personal Consumption Expenditures for Recreation: 1990 to 1998.
113 ld at 457 table 723, Personal Consumption Expenditures in Current and Real (1996)
Dollars by Type: 1990 to 1998.
114 These figures assume an $8 million marginal cost of saving a life.
115 Heinzerling makes the same point using the examples of soft drinks, fad diets, leaf blow-
ers, and Nicoret gum. See Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 162 (cited in note 19).
116 Id.
117 See Appendix B-i, rows 20 and 22.
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the "cost-ineffective" bottom of the list.'' The two sorts of interven-
tions do not compete with each other. Addressing low risks with ex-
pensive regulations may be inefficient in some sense, and it may there-
fore be a waste of money. But it is not killing anyone.
Of course, inefficient regulation may be undesirable, even if it
does not kill. The question then arises whether Tengs/Graham at least
establish a pattern of inefficient overregulation of small risks. The next
section will show that they do not.
2. Tengs/Graham do not establish pervasive overregulation of
small risks.
In Five-Hundred Interventions, Graham and Tengs uncover a
wide disparity in the median cost of regulatory interventions when
measured in cost per life saved. From this, they conclude that the ex-
isting pattern of regulation is inefficient because "efficiency in pro-
moting survival requires that the marginal benefit per dollar spent be
the same across programs......
This statement reflects a fundamental misapprehension of basic
economics. Contrary to Tengs/Graham's assertions, efficiency does not
require that all regulatory "investments" exhibit the same marginal re-
turn. There is, for example, nothing inefficient about a portfolio of
regulation that includes both "automatic shoulder seat belts in cars"
(at $94,000 per life-year saved) and "automatic fire extinguishers in
airplane lavatory trash receptacles" (at $279,000 per life saved).'2" One
cannot, after all, put fire extinguishers in more than all receptacles or
install automatic belts in more than all cars. Thus, an efficient portfolio
of regulatory investments may (and most likely will) contain programs
showing a wide range of cost per life saved. The efficiency criterion
118 See Appendix B-i, rows 170-87. Other scholars have postulated a different linkage be-
tween regulatory spending and mortality, whereby money spent on low-risk interventions re-
duces personal income and health care expenditures, thereby increasing mortality overall. See,
for example, Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Regulation, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 95,
102-04 (1994) (arguing that regulations' reduction in disposable income might cause shifts in in-
dividual purchasing behavior, increased stress, and less healthy behaviors like smoking, which in
turn raise mortality); W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of
Expenditures, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 19 (1994) (finding that regulatory expenditures increase
occupational risk by 3 to 4 percent of costs). Estimates of the marginal expenditure that would
lead to the loss of one statistical life range from $3 million to $70 million. See W. Kip Viscusi,
Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 5,8 table 1, 12 (1994). If we take $8 million per life as
the threshold of "efficient" spending, then about $2.6 billion of the $21 billion total spending in
the Tengs/Graham database is inefficiently spent. This corresponds to between 78 and 867 lives
lost due to inefficient expenditures under "income effect" hypotheses-still significant, but a far
cry from the 60,000 "statistical murders" alleged by Tengs and Graham. Moreover, even the more
attenuated linkage between income/health care spending and mortality is most likely illusory, for
reasons set forth in Part II.A.l.g.
1 9 Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 372 (cited in note 9).
120 See Appendix B-i, rows 30 and 43, respectively.
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does not preclude this. It simply precludes putting low-benefit pro-
grams into effect while leaving higher-benefit programs unimple-
mented. 2'
A second problem with Five-Hundred Interventions has been well
documented by Heinzerling: the authors include in their database all
sorts of interventions that are not regulatory programs at all, and that
in fact were never implemented or even proposed by any government
official. ' Obviously, one cannot draw conclusions about the efficiency
of government regulation from data that fail to distinguish between
real and hypothetical programs, or between government programs and
private-sector actions.
Opportunity Costs stands on firmer ground.2 It cures the proba-
tive shortcomings of the former study by generating, for each inter-
vention, an estimate of the degree of implementation along with pub-
lished estimates of the full-implementation costs and life-saving. ' This
121 The life-saving maximization problem is essentially a constrained optimization problem
in which the constraint is that no single intervention can be more than 100 percent implemented.
Once the implementation level for any intervention reaches 100 percent, it is necessary to allo-
cate any remaining risk reduction dollars to the next most cost-effective intervention, and so on.
The result over many interventions may well be a wide range of costs per life saved even in the
optimized allocation. Indeed, Tengs/Graham's Opportunity Costs study contains just such a "ra-
tional" reallocation. As seen in Appendix B-i, their "efficient" reallocation of life-saving dollars
produces a portfolio of interventions that display costs per life saved ranging from negative $8.5
billion to positive $8 million.
122 Heinzerling and Ackerman, 87 Cornell L Rev at 653-55 (cited in note 31) ("[T]hey in-
clude many life-saving interventions that have never been implemented by any agency; indeed,
they include many interventions that have never even been proposed by any agency.").
123 Heinzerling has criticized the latter study as well for including non-implemented inter-
ventions. See Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 156 (cited in note 19) (stating that only eleven of ninety
environmental measures studies were ever implemented); Heinzerling and Ackerman, 87 Cor-
nell L Rev at 663 (cited in note 31) (repeating the same observation). This criticism misappre-
hends what Opportunity Costs is trying to do. The purpose of that study is to see how many addi-
tional lives or dollars could be saved by reallocating funds from partially or fully implemented
(but cost-ineffective) programs to non- or partially implemented (but cost-effective) interven-
tions. Reallocation would be impossible if all interventions in the database were required to be
fully funded in the baseline. Moreover, unimplemented and exorbitantly expensive interventions
do not skew the analysis because they do no work. They are not implemented in the baseline;
they remain unimplemented in the reallocation; they add nothing to the total of lives or money
saved by reallocation. The same is true of highly effective interventions that are fully imple-
mented in both scenarios. Thus, the only interventions that matter to the reallocation exercise are
(a) high-cost interventions that are at least partially implemented in the baseline and (b) lower-
cost interventions that are not fully implemented in the baseline. All savings in lives and/or cost
come from reallocating compliance expenditures from group (a) to group (b). Nor is there merit
to Heinzerling's objection, id at 663, that Opportunity Costs reallocates funds among government
and non-government interventions (such as hospital practices) without distinction. In practice,
virtually all hospital practices (and other life-saving or endangering private sector activities) are
potential subjects for government regulation and hence fair game for reallocation.
124 Regrettably, the implementation estimates are unpublished, leaving the general reader
with no way to determine which interventions are implemented and which are not, or to verify
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produces the baseline spending scenario reproduced in Appendix
B-i: $21.35 billion spent to save 56,700 lives.' The authors then use
their linear optimization model to calculate that 60,200 additional
lives might be saved at the same cost, or $31 billion conserved without
additional loss of life, through an optimal reallocation of compliance
spending."6 The opportunity to save 60,200 additional lives at no extra
charge through reallocation seems like a telling indictment of our
propensity to lavish regulatory compliance dollars on small risks.
Close inspection of the authors' data reveals a rather different
picture, however. Appendix B-1 reveals that the authors have included
in their baseline eleven non-implemented interventions that, when
fully implemented in reallocation, save $9.5 billion more than they
cost.' 7 By contrast, if we take $8 million per life as the threshold of ef-
ficient life-saving expenditure, only about $2.6 billion is spent on "in-
efficient" life-saving interventions.2 1 In other words, for the interven-
tions in the Tengs/Graham Opportunity Costs database, nearly four
times more money is wasted by failing to regulate than is lost by over-
regulating.
-2
1
Moreover, the Opportunity Costs study is hardly a robust demon-
stration of systemic over- or underregulation. As seen, two-thirds of
implementation estimates. See discussion in Part I.A.
125 See Appendix B-i, cells G188 and H188.
126 Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 172 (cited in note 10). While the authors pro-
vided a spreadsheet setting forth their baseline scenario, they did not provide a spreadsheet set-
ting forth their reallocation pattern of spending. This author's attempt to replicate their realloca-
tion generated a number for total additional life saving (60,906) that is very close to
Tengs/Graham's number (60,200), but is not exactly that number. The discrepancy of less than 2
percent is most likely explained by differences in the way this author and Tengs/Graham defined
"clusters" of competing interventions which save lives by alternative means in identical situa-
tions. Obviously, only one intervention in each cluster can be fully implemented in reallocation.
The other interventions must be zeroed out-otherwise, life-saving from reallocation will be
double or triple counted. Unfortunately, the authors' spreadsheet is not always clear as to which
interventions are being grouped together in clusters.
127 See Appendix B-I, rows 3-13 of column C and the summary. The $9.5 billion value in the
summary is derived by subtracting the sum of cells G3 through G13 (total baseline spending on
negative-cost interventions) from the sum of cells 13 through 113 (total reallocation spending on
negative-cost interventions). This is the amount released for life-saving elsewhere by fully im-
plementing negative-cost interventions in the reallocation scenario.
128 Appendix B-i, summary. For a defense of the $8 million threshold, see Part i.D. The $2.6
billion figure is derived by summing the baseline cost of all interventions which display a mar-
ginal cost per life (Column D) of more than $8 million.These interventions are listed in rows 104
through 187. $2.6 billion represents the sum of baseline spending (Column G) on these interven-
tions. It should be noted, however, that the total spending on "inefficient" interventions is highly
sensitive to the stipulated threshold of efficiency. At a threshold of $7 million per life, $17 billion
(almost 80 percent of total baseline spending) is "inefficiently" spent. See Appendix B-i, sum-
mary. The lack of robustness is due to the fact that one intervention-South Coast of California
ozone control-accounts for $15 billion in baseline spending at an estimated cost of $7.5 million
per life saved. See Appendix B-i, row 101.
129 See also Appendix B-i, rows 103-87.
The University of Chicago Law Review
the 60,000 additional lives saved through reallocation in that study are
associated with just two interventions."" Nearly 95 percent of the
60,000 additional lives are saved by fully implementing just nine inter-
ventions, of which three are medical, five are traffic-related, and one is
environmental.
On the expenditure side, table 2 of Appendix B-2 reveals that op-
timization results in the reallocation of about $17.7 billion, of which 90
percent is generated by just eight interventions. Indeed, over half of
the $17.7 billion is supplied by the opinion of a single author that it
would be much more cost-effective to ban residential growth in tsu-
nami-prone areas than to construct sea walls to control the damage.'
These few interventions do yield startling numbers. While few will
be amazed by news that many more lives might be saved on the road,
the possibility of saving 42,000 additional lives a year with just two
medical measures, if true, is surprising. One wonders why this was not
the headline of their article. In fact, the authors do not even mention
these amazing life-saving opportunities in their published report. Nor
has Graham, an author of the study and the current regulatory "czar"
of the Bush Administration, done anything in office to further the
cause of oxygen for hypoxemics, to advocate flu vaccines for all, or to
promote a ban on residential growth in tsunami-prone areas. One
wonders whether he believes his own data, or if he is even aware of
them.
The major point for present purposes, however, is that the Oppor-
tunity Costs results are not robust. They are dominated by a handful of
interventions that certain authors believe should, or should not, have
happened. They do not establish a pervasive pattern of gross over-
regulation of small risks. Indeed, if they reveal any pattern at all, it is
one of significant underregulation, with no evidence that over-control
is somehow causing underregulation.
If the Tengs/Graham data fail to prove systemic overreaction to
small risks, we are left with the final question of whether Opportunity
Costs at least establishes that toxic regulations are singularly prone to
inefficient overregulation.
131) See note 117 and accompanying text. See also table I of Appendix B-2.
131 See Appendix B-2, table 2, rows 3 and 139. The source for these data is given in Tengs, et
al, 15 Risk Analysis at 389 (cited in note 9).
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3. Tengs/Graham's data do not prove that toxic-related
regulations are particularly inefficient.
Appendix B-3a contains the authors' spreadsheet numbers for all
non-toxic-related interventions. Appendix B-3b contains the authors'
spreadsheet numbers for the toxic control interventions in their sam-
ple. If we again take $8 million per life as our provisional threshold of
efficiency, these appendices indicate that about 4 percent of the funds
spent on toxic-exposure-related interventions were spent inefficiently
in the baseline case, whereas 63 percent of the non-toxic-related inter-
ventions were spent inefficiently. In other words, the authors' own
data suggest that toxic control programs are fifteen times more effi-
cient than their non-toxic counterparts in their overall pattern of
spending to save lives.
How do we reconcile the relative efficiency of spending on toxic
control with the authors' findings in Five-Hundred Interventions that
toxic control interventions exhibit median costs per life saved orders
of magnitude higher than interventions in other areas?"" The answer is
straightforward. As Appendix B-3b reveals, most of the high-cost in-
terventions for toxics in the sample are either not implemented, or
implemented at low compliance-cost levels. Non-toxic-related inter-
ventions, on the other hand, are much more likely to be implemented
notwithstanding an inordinately high cost.
This Part has shown that the Morrall, Hahn, and Tengs/Graham
scorecards contain a range of methodological errors: concealed data,
arbitrary and non-transparent calculations, non-replicable conclusions,
selection bias, confusion of ex ante guesses with ex post measure-
ments, systematic undervaluation of life and health benefits, and/or in-
ferences unsupported by data. These errors-which might have been
avoided through more careful analysis or reporting-are sufficient in
themselves to undermine these scorecards as a basis for claims about
government regulation.
II. CRITIQUE OFTHE TESTS: GENERIC DEFECTS
Besides the avoidable errors discussed in the preceding Part, the
Hahn, Morrall, and Tengs/Graham scorecards also exhibit a number of
analytical defects that appear to be endemic to the scorecard enter-
prise. This Part discusses three such shortcomings: (A) disregard of
whole categories of unquantified costs and benefits (and, amazingly,
many benefits that agencies quantified); (B) disregard of distributive
132 Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 371 (cited in note 9) ("[T]he median medical interven-
tion costs $19,000/life-year (n=310); the median injury reduction intervention costs $48,000/life-
year (n=133); and the median toxin control intervention costs $2,800,000/life-year (n=144).").
2003] 1381
The University of Chicago Law Review
impacts; and (C) failure to disclose the true level of uncertainty in the
analysis.
A. Disregarding Unquantified (and Some Quantified) Costs
and Benefits
Perusing Hahn's unpublished spreadsheet of regulatory costs and
benefits (reproduced in Appendix C) yields a startling discovery.
Forty-one of the 136 rules in his database-30 percent of all the
rules-are assigned a zero benefit. These rules, it should be empha-
sized, are not rules for which it is claimed that costs equal benefits.
These are rules alleged to offer no benefit whatsoever.
The list of zero benefit rules includes:
* a rule requiring that owners and operators of oil tankers de-
velop plans to respond to large oil spills (row 28);
* a rule requiring double hull construction for oil tankers like
the Exxon Valdez (row 29);
* a rule to implement 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that re-
quire certain sources of air pollutants to hold permits and
comply with permit conditions (row 51);
" a rule requiring the public reporting of releases of certain
toxic chemicals from manufacturing facilities (row 67);
* a Clean Water Act rule aimed at protecting sensitive coastal
areas from non-point source water pollution (row 73);
* a Clean Water Act rule establishing technology-based water
pollution discharge standards for electroplating and metal fin-
ishing point sources (row 76);
* a rule to protect agricultural workers from exposure to harm-
ful pesticides (row 78);
* a rule establishing financial responsibility requirements for
owners and operators of underground storage tanks (row 88);
* three rules establishing national primary drinking water stan-
dards to limit public exposure to toxic pollutants in drinking
water (rows 91, 94, and 95);
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* a regulation banning the manufacture and sale of products
containing PCB, a highly toxic and bioaccumulative substance
(row 98);
* a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rule establishing re-
quirements for the safe handling of seafood in commercial
processing operations (row 100);
* an HHS rule requiring improvements in clinical laboratory
practices (row 102); and
" a proposed rule to prevent or reduce oil spills from non-
transportation-related onshore oil handling facilities (row
127).1-
It turns out that Hahn, with a few narrow and limited exceptions,
has assigned a zero value to any benefit that the government's regula-
tory impact assessment does not quantify and monetize.' Hahn also
zero-values benefits that are quantified and monetized in an agency
regulatory impact assessment (RIA), unless they happen to fall into
one of his select categories of recognized benefits-even as he insists
that he is using the government's numbers. '
The omissions of unquantified variables are not confined to zero-
benefit rules. Rules that display a positive number in the benefits col-
umn turn out, on closer inspection, to have had whole categories of
important benefits excluded from the tally." The result is forty-one
zero-benefit rules and an indeterminate number of other rules for
which whole categories of benefits have been summarily excluded.
Morrall and Tengs/Graham adopt an even more extreme account-
ing convention: by evaluating every regulation solely in terms of cost
133 The zero benefit entries listed above are represented by a "-" in column 8 of each indi-
cated row in Appendix C.
134 All unquantified benefits are assigned a zero value. As seen in more detail below, Hahn
monetizes the value of a benefit that the agency has quantified but not monetized in the case of
benefits involving (1) avoidance of cancer, heart disease, or lead poisoning; (2) avoidance of ac-
cidental death or injury; and (3) pollution from any of four named air pollutants.
135 The exceptions (which Hahn monetizes regardless of whether the agency does so) are
health benefits of reducing emissions of a small group of air pollutants-carbon monoxide, hy-
drocarbons, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide-on a per-ton-of-reduction
basis. These benefits are counted only if the agency has quantified the lives saved, illnesses or in-
juries averted, or tons of a certain air pollutant removed. All other benefits are zero-valued.
Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 40 (cited in note 13).
136 See, for example, EPA, Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 60
Fed Reg 15366 (cited in note 82). See also notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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per life saved, they manage to exclude non-life-saving benefits en-
tirely.
These scorecards also omit certain unquantified costs: costs of re-
cord keeping and enforcement, diversion of management time, lost
productivity, diminished competitiveness (though most studies find
competitiveness effects of most regulations are small), and so forth.'
Agencies pay scant heed to these costs, and scorecards neglect them
altogether. Yet they clearly exist.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the nature and consequence
of cost and benefit omissions is to examine a sample of the actual
cases in which they occur. Section 1 documents the nature and conse-
quence of these omissions for the analysis of particular regulations.
Section 2 shows that the categorical exclusion of unquantified vari-
ables is both endemic to scorecards and inconsistent with basic princi-
ples of cost-benefit analysis.
1. A taxonomy of excluded costs and benefits.
My audit of the rules in Hahn's database reveals seven common
situations in which benefits and/or costs are likely to have been omit-
ted: (a) quantified and/or monetized benefits that the scorecard does
not recognize; (b) procedural benefits; (c) interlocking benefits; (d)
benefits that are hard to measure; (e) statutorily mandated benefits;
(f) indirect costs; and (g) costs associated with risk-risk tradeoffs. Ex-
amination of these rules suggests (though it does not prove) that the
omissions are most significant on the benefit side of the ledger.
a) Quantified but unrecognized benefits. Morrall and Tengs/
Graham exclude all benefits other than human life-saving, regardless
of whether an agency has quantified and/or monetized them. Hahn
likewise excludes benefits that agencies have quantified and
monetized, but that do not fit into one of his arbitrary categories-
even as he insists that he is using the "government's numbers."'"" A
few examples drawn from rules in Hahn's database may serve to
illustrate the nature and consequence of such exclusions.
Agricultural worker protection. In 1992, EPA promulgated an ag-
ricultural worker protection standard for pesticides. Noting that the
rule would help protect 3.9 million agricultural workers across the
137 See Part ll.A.1.f.
138 See Morrall, Regulation at 31 (cited in note 8) ("To elide the controversies and uncer-
tainties of choosing a single dollar figure for the value of saving a life, I have chosen a second-
best measure of desirability, cost-effectiveness, measured by cost per life saved."); Tengs and
Graham, Opportunity Costs passim (cited in note 10); Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) pas-
sim (cited in note 13).
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United States who are exposed to pesticides in their work, EPA pre-
dicted the following benefit:
[A]voiding 8,000-16,000 physician-diagnosed (non-hospitalized)
acute and allergic pesticide poisoning incidents, [while] avoiding
about 300 hospitalized acute and allergic pesticide poisoning in-
cidents, and avoiding potentially important numbers of cancer
cases, serious developmental defects, stillbirths, persistent neuro-
toxic effects and nondiagnosed acute and allergic poisoning inci-
dents."'
Hahn's scorecard, however, does not recognize any "health bene-
fit" other than "reducing the risk of cancer, heart disease, and lead
poisoning."'" Since avoiding stillbirths, persistent neurotoxic effects,
and pesticide poisoning does not fit within any of these categories, the
regulation is assigned a zero benefit. Protecting 3.9 million workers
from the risk of acute pesticide poisoning thus fails Hahn's cost-
benefit test.'
Seafood safety. In 1995, the FDA adopted a final regulation-the
"Seafood HACCP [Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point] rule"-to
ensure the safe and sanitary processing of fish and fishery products.'42
The rule was strongly supported by the seafood trade association,
which informed FDA:
[The association] strongly supports the adoption of a comprehen-
sive regulatory program by the FDA ... using HACCP principles.
HACCP systems have been applied successfully by individual
firms in our industry, and they have been shown to be a very cost-
effective way of controlling safety hazards.''
The agency's preamble to the regulation notes:
[F]oodborne illnesses tend to be significantly under-reported to
health authorities. Consequently, precise data on the numbers
and causes of foodborne illness in this country do not exist. FDA
does know, however, that illness from seafood does occur and
that a wide variety of hazards have been identified that could
cause illness from seafood.'"
Listed examples include ciguatera poisoning, hepatitis A, Nor-
walk virus, Vibrio vulnificus (a disease derived from eating an organ-
139 EPA, Worker Protection Standard for Agricultural Pesticides, 57 Fed Reg 38102, 38145
(1988).
144 Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 86 n 17 (cited in note 13).
141 See Appendix C, row 78.
142 60 Fed Reg 65096 (cited in note 42).
143 Id at 65102.
144 Id at 65103.
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ism of the same name that inhabits raw molluscan shellfish in the Gulf
of Mexico), salmonella, paralytic shellfish poisoning, scombrotoxin,
and nine other foodborne diseases. 4' FDA estimated that its seafood
safety rule would avert from 20,000 to 60,000 foodborne illnesses a
year, which the agency valued at $45 to $116 million per year, with ad-
ditional benefits expected in the form of (1) $20 million in annual cost
savings by exporting firms who no longer would need to pay fees for
European Union inspection services; (2) additional cost savings (un-
quantified) that would result from there being fewer recalls and fewer
enforcement actions; and (3) revenue gains (unquantified) from in-
creased consumer confidence in U.S. seafood at home and in export
markets.'4 The rule was expected to cost about $60 million in the first
year and about $40 million in subsequent years. 7 FDA therefore
found "that the estimated benefits exceed the estimated costs."'
'
14
Hahn, however, counts avoiding seafood illness as a "zero benefit"
since it does not involve cancer, heart disease, or lead poisoning. That
is how the FDA's seafood safety rule-which virtually everyone sup-
ported-managed to acquire a zero benefit and fail Hahn's "neutral
economist's cost-benefit test."44
Prevention of oil spills. In 1992, the Coast Guard estimated that
its oil tanker double hull requirement would yield benefits ranging
from $1.1 to $6 billion in avoided oil spills over the transition period
1990-2015."" But because Hahn's system counts only certain kinds of
benefits-avoiding cancer, heart disease, lead poisoning, injuries from
accidents, and environmental pollution by one of four air pollutants-
the benefit of avoiding major oil spills is valued at zero, even though
the government's number is in excess of a billion dollars. '
145 ld at 65186 table 6a, Estimate of Annual Cases Averted.
146 Id at 65185 table 7, Annual Cost of Seafood Illness, and 65185 table 8, Estimate of the
Efficacy of Mandatory HACCP at Reducing Foodborne Disease in the Third Year. See also id at
65187-88 (discussing benefits for consumer confidence and reduced enforcement).
147 id at 65182.
148 Id at 6519t.
149 See Appendix C, row 100.
150 Coast Guard. Double Hull Standards for Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, 57 Fed Reg
36222,36232 (1995).
151 See Appendix C, row 29. In this particular case, zeroing out an important benefit did not
change the result, since the Coast Guard's RIA predicted that the statutorily mandated rule
would impose costs in excess of the expected monetized benefit. See id (predicting that the rule
will raise transport costs by about half a penny per gallon, but that, based on historic accident
and loss rates and clean-up costs, the rule will cost more than $24,000 per barrel of oil spill
averted, producing a net discounted cost of $2.1 billion over the period 1990-2015, and over $1
billion per year thereafter). The point made by this example is not that all rules pass cost-benefit
analysis, but that Hahn's scorecard does not count all the benefits.
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Formaldehyde exposures in the workplace. Zeroing out unquanti-
fied benefits is not unique to Hahn. Morrall practices it, too, with con-
sequences that can best be illustrated by examining the rule at the
bottom of Morrall's table: OSHA's proposed formaldehyde exposure
rule, which, according to Morrall, would cost an incredible $72 billion
per life saved. ' How could any rational agency even propose such a
preposterously expensive rule? The answer is found in a combination
of Morrall's questionable accounting and the agency's concern with
unquantifiable risks.
The rule in question involved a proposal to reduce the Permissi-
ble Exposure Level (PEL) for formaldehyde in the workplace from
3.0 parts per million (ppm) to either 1.0 or 1.5 ppm."' OSHA antici-
pated that employers would meet this goal primarily by installing ven-
tilators in work areas where formaldehyde is present in high concen-
trations. In addition to these "engineering" precautions, employers
would be asked to better monitor exposures and conduct exposure
risk and reduction training programs for employees.
The rule would apply principally to manufacturers in five differ-
ent manufacturing industry categories-hardwood veneer and ply-
wood, particleboard and medium density fiberboard, furniture and fix-
tures, synthetic resins, and ferrous and nonferrous foundries."' OSHA
predicted that compliance with the 1.5 ppm PEL would cost these in-
dustries about $22.5 million per year, while compliance with the 1.0
ppm limit would cost $36 million per year. ' Unfortunately, OSHA
does not provide the perspective of total revenues for the affected in-
dustries, which makes it difficult to get a clear idea of how burden-
some such costs might be. But rough calculations based on Census
data for the value of aggregate shipments by producers in the indus-
trial categories named in the OSHA rule suggest that total revenues
for these industries in 1985 were probably in the neighborhood of $30
152 Morrall, Regulation at 30 table 4, The Cost of Various Risk-Reducing Regulations per
Life Saved (cited in note 8).
153 Department of Labor, Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed Reg 50412
(1985). Respirators (which are uncomfortable and therefore are prone to misuse or non-use)
would be prescribed only as a last resort for use in cases where ventilators are shown to be infea-
sible or ineffective. Id at 50464.
154 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for these industries are 2435 (hardwood
veneer and plywood); 2492 (particleboard); 2499 (fiberboard); 2821 (plastics, resins, and elastom-
ers); and 332/336 (ferrous and nonferrous foundries). Id at 50463 table 10, Number of Establish-
ments and Employees Exposed to Formaldehyde.
155 Id at 50464. All figures are in 1985 dollars. OSHA's exact figures are $38.9 million capital
cost and $17 million annual operating cost (1.5 ppm standard) and $57.8 million capital cost and
$28.3 million operating cost (1.0 ppm standard). Figures cited in the text above were derived by
annualizing capital costs at 7 percent over 10 years and adding these annualized capital costs to
the annual operating cost. My annualization of capital cost used the standard formula: Annual-
ized Cost (AC) = Capital Cost x r x (1+r)"/((1+r)"-i), where r is the annualization rate, and n is
the period of annualization.
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billion.'6 So the estimated cost of OSHA's proposed formaldehyde ex-
posure protection rule comes out to about 0.1 percent of revenues.
On the benefit side, OSHA predicted that the 1.5 ppm standard
would avert anywhere from 5 to 42 fatal cancers over a career of ex-
posure, while the 1.0 ppm standard would avoid 6 to 52 fatal cancers.
But OSHA's proposed rule preamble also devotes many pages to the
clinical evidence of the non-cancer benefits of a lower standard: re-
ducing or avoiding burning eyes or noses, sore or burning throats,
asthma attacks, chronic bronchitis, allergic reactions, dermatitis, and
skin sensitization. OSHA noted that over 500,000 American workers
are regularly exposed to formaldehyde at concentrations that have
been found to cause one or more of these illnesses or discomforts. Is
avoiding such discomforts and health hazards for 500,000 American
workers-as well as 6 to 52 lifetime cancers-"worth" the expenditure
of roughly 0.1 percent of revenues for a $30 billion group of indus-
tries? Will installing ventilators in the workplace also reduce em-
ployee exposure to other irritating and possibly hazardous chemical
vapors besides formaldehyde? These are the central questions of the
formaldehyde rulemaking. They are quite unlike (they are far more
nuanced than) the question implicitly posed by the Morrall table: how
could OSHA be so stupid as to propose a rule that will cost $72 billion
for every life saved?. 7
156 US Census Bureau, 1994 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Value of Product Shipments,
online at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/value.html (visited May 7, 2003). Total revenues
cited in the text are obtained by adding the 1992 value of product shipments cited in the table for
each of the industry and product class codes cited in note 154, and then converting that value to
1985 dollars to adjust for inflation during the intervening period, using the consumer price index.
This yields an accurate value for 1992 shipments of these product categories measured in 1985
dollars. The relevant statistic, however, is the value of shipments for these products in 1985 when
the rule was issued, and that value is not readily available. However, an approximate value for
1985 shipments can be obtained by deflating 1992 constant dollar shipments by 2 percent per
year (the average rate of real income growth) over the seven-year period, 1985-1992. That ad-
justment yields the value cited in the text above. Of course, these aggregate revenues for entire
industry categories may be over-inclusive. Also, some producers and industries might be more
severely affected than others in these categories, so it is nearly certain that some producers
would experience costs somewhat higher than 0.7 percent of revenues.
157 Where does Morrall's $72 billion figure come from in any case? Apparently, Morrall be-
gan by assuming that the rule would save only six cancer deaths (the low end of the agency
range) over a forty-year career with an assumed forty-year latency period. Nowhere does Mor-
rail provide a medical justification for assuming a forty-year latency period for cancer. Dividing 6
by 40 yields 0.15 lives saved per year. Discounting the stream of 0.15 annual lives at 10 percent
for the 40-year latency period yields 0.01 discounted lives saved per year, which is the figure that
appears in the "Annual Lives Saved" column in the Morrall table. Morrall, Regulation at 30
(cited in note 8). But dividing the annual cost of $36 million by 0.01 yields a cost per life of
"only" $3.6 billion per life. To arrive at his $72 billion cost per life, Morrall must have arbitrarily
multiplied the agency's cost figure by a factor of 20.
Suppose, now, one uses the agency's cost figures, takes the mid-point of the agency's cancer
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The preceding examples could be multiplied. They illustrate a
central problem with scorecards. Scorecards exclude whole categories
of benefits, thereby producing (in many cases) little more than
cartoon caricatures of the rules they purport to analyze.
b) Procedural benefits. Procedural rules pose particular
problems for scorecards because they do not directly save lives, avoid
illness, or confer environmental benefits. They merely support other
policies that do. Yet scorecards treat all such rules as having zero
benefit, with consequences that can best be appreciated by
considering a few examples.
Toxic chemical release reporting. In 1988, EPA issued a final rule
implementing a statutory requirement calling for the public reporting
of significant releases of toxic chemicals from large manufacturing fa-
cilities.'" The final rule (issued in the last year of the Reagan Admini-
stration) is silent as to the anticipated benefits of this statutory man-
date. Scholars, however, have noted that reported releases of toxic
chemicals declined dramatically-from 7 billion pounds in 1989 to 2.5
billion in 1997-in the aftermath of the reporting requirement.' '" Hahn
nonetheless assigns the rule a zero benefit. '("
Operating permits for air polluters. In 1992, EPA issued a rule
(mandated by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments) that required
covered sources to hold operating permits that set out in a single
document what each source's air pollution control obligations were.
The rule also required that such sources of air pollution pay a fee to
support state monitoring and enforcement efforts. ' ' EPA described
the benefits of the rule in the following terms:
The title V permit program will enable the source, States, EPA,
and the public to understand better the requirements to which
the source is subject, and whether the source is meeting those re-
quirements. Increased source accountability and better enforce-
ment should result .... [Also] an important benefit is that the
permit program ... will ensure that States have resources neces-
benefit range (twenty-nine lives), assumes a latency period of, say, twenty years, and does not dis-
count the number of lives saved, for reasons discussed in Part I.D. The cost per life saved under
this scenario is $61.7 million-still a high number, but a far cry from $72 billion.
158 See EPA, Toxic Chemical Release Reporting: Community Right-to-Know, 53 Fed Reg
4500 (1988).
159 Release of Toxic Chemicals in 1989 Reached 5.7 Billion Pounds, EPA Reports, 22 Envir
Rptr (BNA) 223 (1991) (reporting that between 1987 and 1988, U.S. manufacturers dropped the
amount of total toxic chemicals released by 18 percent, from 7 billion to 5.7 billion pounds); EPA
1997 Toxics Release Inventory: Public Data Release Report 3-8 table 3-1 (1999), online at
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri97/pdr/index.htm (visited July 2, 2003) (listing the drop in total
on- and offsite toxic releases between 1995 and 1997 as 38.8 million pounds).
1) See Appendix C, row 67.
161 See EPA, Operating Permits Program, 57 Fed Reg 32250 (1992).
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sary to develop and administer the program effectively [by re-
quiring sources to pay the cost of the program].... Greater com-
pliance may result in an improvement in air quality. 2
But such benefits cannot be reduced to numbers, so the rule is as-
signed a zero value in Hahn's benefit column, thereby chalking up an-
other (artificial) regulatory failure.
Such, indeed, is the fate of all procedural rules in Hahn's data-
base, including: an EPA rule expressing a preference for treatment
over containment in Superfund cleanups; an EPA rule calling for
states to develop programs for coastal non-point source pollution
control; two EPA rules establishing criteria and procedures for deter-
mining conformity of state and federal transportation plans with
Clean Air Act requirements; a follow-on EPA rule adding certain
chemicals to the Toxic Release Inventory; an EPA rule imposing fi-
nancial responsibility requirements for owner/operators of under-
ground oil storage tanks; an EPA rule establishing procedures for the
pre-manufacture notification, review, and possible testing of toxic sub-
stances entering the stream of commerce; and an HHS rule calling for
certain improvements in clinical laboratory practices. '
While the benefits of procedural rules may be impossible to
quantify, it surely is misleading to value such benefits at zero, and even
more misleading to claim that in doing so one is simply using the
"government's numbers." The "0" that appears in the benefits column
of the Clean Air Act permits rule is not an EPA number. It is Hahn's
number.
c) Interlocking benefits. Sometimes it is hard to disentangle
the consequences of interrelated rules. In such situations, agencies
may assign the benefits of one rule to another-never thinking, of
course, that the result will be another "failure" in some scorecard. This
circumstance is well illustrated by EPA's effort to control coliform
contamination of drinking water.
Regulating E. coli contamination of drinking water. In 1989, EPA
promulgated a rule establishing a maximum contaminant level of zero
for total coliform in drinking water and calling on public water sys-
tems to enhance their monitoring and testing of drinking water for
coliform."" In explaining its decision, EPA observed:
162 ldat32251.
163 See note 133 and accompanying text (noting zero benefit entries in Appendix C).
164 EPA, Drinking Water; National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Total Coliforms
(Including Fecal Coliforms and E. Coli), 54 Fed Reg 27544 (1989).
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The remedial measures necessary to comply with the total coli-
form rule will also fulfill some or all of the surface water treat-
ment requirements or the forthcoming groundwater disinfection
requirements. As with costs, for accounting purposes, EPA is at-
tributing all health benefits resulting from compliance with this
rule to the surface water treatment requirements and the disin-
fection rule for groundwater systems, rather than the total coli-
form rule, because the interrelationships among them make it
impossible to clearly distinguish which benefits are attributable
to each rule.'5
Hahn responds by assigning the rule a zero value and non-zero
cost, thereby chalking up yet another regulatory failure.' But the fail-
ure in this case-as in many other cases-lies in the accounting, not
the regulation.
d) Benefits that are hard to quantify or monetize. Of all the
risks that regulations address, the risks of accidents are the easiest to
quantify because the chain of causality is clear. Cancer risks are well
understood in some cases (for example, tobacco) but remain unclear
in many others."7 Non-cancer health risks are murkier still. Non-cancer
risk assessment is widely understood to be still in its infancy.'" Eco-
logical risk assessment is the most difficult of all: ecosystems are too
diverse and complex to permit any but the most rudimentary ecologi-
cal risk assessments in most cases."
A similar hierarchy of data and knowledge can be found in the
area of benefits valuation. The implicit value assigned in the market-
place to the avoidance of occupational risks of accidents can be
165 Id at 27560.
166 See Appendix C, row 95.
167 EPA's landmark report on comparative risk, Unfinished Business (cited in note 74), re-
ports the results of a large-scale comparative risk assessment organized into four groups to com-
pile comparative risk information about four kinds of risk: cancer, non-cancer, ecological, and
welfare effects. The authors note that "the cancer work group faced an easier task in comparing
risks ... than did the other work groups [because a] basic method for assessment of carcinogenic
risk has been adopted by the Agency." Id at 21. See also id at 24-25 (noting the massive uncer-
tainties that nonetheless remain in cancer risk assessment).
168 See id at Appendix 2, Report of the Non-Cancer Risk Work Group at 1-1 to 1-2:
There are thousands of different chemicals in the environment that may cause adverse hu-
man health effects .... EPA therefore has had great difficulty in analyzing non-cancer
health effects .... Most program offices do not actually assess risks from non-carcinogens.
... Most programs merely evaluate the extent to which a regulatory option prevents expo-
sures above the RfD [reference dose or acceptable daily intake] without an explicit calcula-
tion of risk.
169 Id at 43 ("No generally applicable methodology for evaluating economic risk currently
exists"). See also id at Appendix 1Il, Report of the Ecological Risk Work Group at 5 (noting that
due to massive data gaps and conceptual uncertainties ecological risk assessment "only rarely is
quantitative and almost never probabilistic").
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monetized reasonably well through labor market studies of wage
premiums paid in accident-prone industries.'" Involuntary accident
risks are harder to value, however. Cancer and non-cancer illnesses
are harder still, due to their diversity, latency, and lack of clear and di-
rect causal link between exposure and consequence.' Ecological
amenities are virtually impossible to value fully and reliably. Theorists
have developed a host of different approaches, but none, as yet, com-
mands a consensus. '
When scientific and economic uncertainties combine in a regula-
tory setting, the agency finds itself in a dilemma. If it tries to assign a
number to the benefit, the number may be attacked as inadequately
supported. If the agency assigns a partial number-representing the
portion of the benefit the agency is able to quantify more or less rig-
orously-the number for that portion may be taken as the number for
the whole benefit. And if the agency does not assign a number, then it
risks having the benefit overlooked altogether.
The dilemma can best be appreciated by looking more closely at
a few examples drawn from the scorecards. It will be seen that score-
cards systematically zero out whole categories of unquantifiable bene-
fits. It will also be observed, however, that agencies aggravate the
problem by frequently inadequate and, indeed, perfunctory treatment
of benefits in their own analysis.
The municipal waste combustor (MWC) rule. In 1995 EPA issued
emissions guidelines for existing municipal waste incinerators and new
170 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-74 (cited in note 15). As seen in Part L.D, however,
even these studies produce a rather wide range of implicit life values.
171 See Heinzerling, 13 RISK at 163 (cited in note 19) (noting that often, "life-saving bene-
fits, other than the prevention of cancer, are ignored because cancer prevention is often the only
life-saving benefit that can be quantified"). Indeed, neither EPA nor Viscusi has been able to
identify a single labor market study that implicitly values cancer risks specifically. See Viscusi, Fa-
tal Tradeoffv (cited in note 15); EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses at 76,89 (cited
in note 96) ("Hedonic wage studies tend to focus on accidental deaths occurring among prime
aged males while deaths associated with environmental risk often occur among the elderly and
may involve an extended latency period. Furthermore, elevated risks in hedonic wage studies are
voluntarily accepted while environmental risks are involuntarily borne.").
172 EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (cited in note 96), noted in 2000 that
"[allthough the economics literature is replete with benefit studies, the coverage is patchy con-
sidering the broad range of services and stressors addressed by EPA. Especially rare in the litera-
ture are examples of wide-scale changes, very small changes, or the consequences of long-term
ecological and economic change." Id at 98. The most eloquent statement of the Guidelines on
this point is implicit and inadvertent. EPA devotes a total of three pages in a two-hundred-page
analysis to ecological benefit valuation. These three pages do not actually offer guidelines. They
offer only a brief summary of five different approaches to ecological benefits valuation, without
endorsing any of them as valid. Id at 998-99.
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source performance standards for new combustors.'1 EPA predicted
the following incremental benefits from the rule:
Table 1
Predicted Emissions Reduction Benefits of Proposed Emissions
Guidelines (Existing Sources) and Standards (New Sources) '
New Source Existing Source
Pollutant Standards Guidelines
Particulate Matter 34% 50%
Acid Gases 58% 87%
(Sulfur Dioxide and
Hydrogen Chloride)
Nitrogen Oxides 1% 30%
Dioxins 33% 99%
Cadmium 53% 70-80%
Mercury 72% 70-80%
Lead 81% 70-80%
EPA's estimates for particulate matter, acid gases, and nitrogen
oxides were translated into emissions tonnage reductions for which
Hahn's scorecard supplied a monetary benefit value.' However, one
of the primary objectives of the rule was to achieve greater controls
on the highly toxic and bioaccumulative heavy metals (cadmium, mer-
cury, lead) and dioxin, which hitherto had not been regulated.' As
EPA noted in the preamble to the final rule:
The absence of sufficient exposure-response and valuation in-
formation precludes a comprehensive benefits analysis for many
of the MWC pollutants.... The total benefits would be
higher if benefits from reductions of other pollutants were
valuated."
EPA's (unpublished) economic impact analysis warns that because
some benefits are unquantifiable based on available data, "applying
the benefit-cost methodology to evaluating the regulatory alternatives
173 EPA, Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines
for Existing Sources: Municipal Waste Combustors, 60 Fed Reg 65387 (1995).
174 EPA, Emissions Guidelines: Municipal Waste Combustors, 59 Fed Reg 48228, 48238
(1994) (existing combustors); EPA, Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Mu-
nicipal Waste Combustors, 59 Fed Reg 48198,48207 (1994) (new combustors).
175 See Appendix C, row 32 (estimating a benefit of $2.2 billion over 20 years).
176 59 Fed Reg at 48239 (cited in note 174).
177 Id.
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examined in this analysis is limited to comparing some of the benefits
with most of the costs."
'
'
78
EPA's concern was prescient: Hahn's scorecard picks up the value
of reducing the ancillary pollutants-particulate matter, nitrogen ox-
ides, and sulfur dioxide-while zeroing out all of the benefits that had
provided the primary impetus for the rule. 7 However, EPA shares a
measure of blame for the omission. While EPA devotes several pages
to documenting the toxicity of heavy metals and dioxins in the ab-
stract, nowhere (not even in the two-hundred-page Economic Impact
Assessment buried in its docket room) does EPA address the funda-
mental, priority-setting questions facing risk managers in that rule: (1)
Are current levels of emissions of heavy metal and dioxin creating a
significant human health or ecosystem risk? (2) What portion of total
emissions, and total risk from emissions, is accounted for by hazardous
waste combustors?
While it may be unfair (given data limitations) to ask for numbers
in response to these questions, surely courts, policymakers, and the
public are entitled to some explanation of why agency risk managers
deem emissions from waste combustors a significant risk. We are left
with a record that fails to fully prove the rationality of the rule. But
that certainly does not justify Hahn's assertion (as manifest in his
negative net benefit number) that the rule is demonstrably irrational.
Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance. An excellent illustration of
both the risk-characterization dilemma and the way agencies aggra-
vate it may be found in the Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance. In
1995, EPA promulgated guidelines for the Great Lakes states aimed
particularly at controlling persistent pollutants such as mercury, cad-
mium, lead, PCBs, DDT, dioxin, chlordane, heptachlor, dieldrin, penta-
chlorobenzene, and mirex. ' These persistent pollutants bioaccumulate
in the food chain and are toxic at very low levels of chronic exposure.
So EPA established ambient limits for concentrations of these and
similar pollutants in the Great Lakes and their feedwaters, and in-
structed the bordering states to develop implementation strategies to
achieve these limits."
On the cost side, EPA estimated that the incremental costs of
complying with these measures might range from $60 to $240 million
178 EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, and Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards,
Economic Impact Analysis for Proposed Emissions Standards and Guidelines for Municipal
Waste Combustors, EPA-450/3-91-029, at 8-3 to 8-9 (March 1994).
179 See Appendix C, row 32.
180 60 Fed Reg 15336 (cited in note 82).
181 Id at 15368-71.
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(in 1994 dollars), with the low end of the range being more likely in
light of the flexibility and discretion left to states.'" But how does one
go about monetizing all the life-saving, health-enhancing, recreational,
and non-use values that are enhanced by reducing the discharge of
persistent, bioaccumulative toxins into the Great Lakes?
EPA ultimately concluded that available data permitted reliable
quantification only of the benefits of reduced incidence of fatal cancer
to sports anglers and Native American subsistence fishermen who eat
fish that they themselves have caught in the Great Lakes. So the
agency assigned a number to this very narrow and partial benefit. That
number, after extensive manipulation, became Hahn's number-$12
million-for the total benefit of the rule spread over twenty years. '
All other benefits of eliminating the yearly discharge of six to eight
million toxic-equivalent pounds of pollutants into the Great Lakes
were assigned a value of zero."
Not until 1999, when EPA revisited the rule, did the rulemaking
record make clear what had been overlooked five years earlier. In that
year EPA proposed a follow-up rule to prohibit the use of "mixing
zones" (in other words, dilution areas) in calculating water-quality
based effluent limits for discharges of persistent pollutants into the
Great Lakes and their feedwaters. The idea was to limit the ability of
dischargers to simply dilute discharges as opposed to cleaning up the
effluent before discharge. This time, EPA went to some lengths to de-
scribe in words (if not numbers) the benefits of reducing bioaccumula-
tive toxic loading in the Great Lakes: reducing human risks of cancer,
neurotoxicity, fetotoxicity, endocrine effects, hematological effects, re-
productive dysfunction, sensory and equilibrium disturbances, hyper-
activity, aggressiveness, impairment of peripheral vision, impairments
of hearing and speech, and so forth. ' Since these toxins accumulate in
mother's milk, EPA emphasized the special risks to children: possible
low birth weight, small head circumference, skeletal anomalies, mal-
formations such as scoliosis, cranio-facial abnormalities, delayed bone
development, and so forth. The agency also mentioned impacts of bio-
accumulative toxins on a range of nonhuman animals and plants.""
182 Id at 15381.
183 See Appendix C, row 70.
184 60 Fed Reg at 15382 (cited in note 82); Hahn spreadsheet, Row 9, columns BH-BT
(cited in note 58).The manipulation reflected in those columns involves discounting the number
of lives saved to reflect the assumed latency period of cancer, and valuing those lives at the stan-
dard value assigned by Hahn as opposed to the range of values chosen by the agency.
185 EPA, Proposal to Amend the Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System
to Prohibit Mixing Zones for Bioaccumulative Chemicals of Concern, 64 Fed Reg 53632,53638-
39 (1999).
186 Id.
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However, the agency's assessment offers no indication of whether
the probabilities of such impacts are high, medium, or low, or how
widespread or severe such impacts might be. The rule was not consid-
ered a "major rule" in any case (because of its small economic im-
pact), and both the rule and the benefits information it contained
were excluded from Hahn's database. The fact remains that if all these
non-cancer and ecological benefits existed for the mixing zone rule,
they must certainly also have existed for the main water quality guid-
ance issued four years earlier. Why did EPA not mention (much less
attempt to quantify) such benefits then? It cannot be the case that the
benefits were discovered after the original rule. The health and ecosys-
tem risks of persistent bioaccumulative chemicals have been generally
known since Rachel Carson's best-selling expos6, Silent Spring, was
published in 1962. , ' Indeed, the chemicals addressed by the guidance
include several of the very same chemicals-DDT, chlordane, dieldrin,
heptachlor-that Carson campaigned against forty years ago. EPA de-
serves some blame for a characterization of risk and benefit that was
perfunctory at best. But even the most detailed narrative description
of risk would have made no difference to the scorecards, which are
equipped to deal only with numbers.
Requiring proper handling of toxic petroleum refinery sludge. Oil
refineries around the country generate between 150,000 and 300,000
tons of sludge every year-sludge that contains lead, chromium, arse-
nic, benzene, toluene, benzo(a)pyrene (BaP), and several other known
poisons at "concentrations that are tens to thousands of times higher
than standard EPA health-based and ecological protection reference
levels."'' According to EPA, this toxic sludge is quite often stored in
unlined pits upgradient from wells and rivers or over "relatively shal-
low aquifers" causing contamination to spread considerable distances
underground. In 1990, EPA issued a rule officially classifying this
sludge as hazardous waste-a move that ended the practice of (le-
gally) storing sludge in unlined ponds. ' Henceforth, oil refineries
would have to properly manage their toxic sludge, through incinera-
tion, treatment, or storage in sealed containers, "or by some other
means that precludes the migration of toxic pollutants into ground
waters or surface waters.""'
187 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Riverside 1962).
188 EPA, Hazardous Waste Management Systems: Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste; CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation-Petroleum Refinery Primary and Secon-
dary Oil/Water/Solids Separation Sludge Listings, 55 Fed Reg 46354,46388 (1990).
189 Id.
19( Id at 46392.
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The common sense of this rule is so manifest that one might
reasonably wonder why EPA should have been forced to undertake a
massive study in order to justify it. Nonetheless, EPA dutifully per-
formed the required RIA to examine both the costs and the benefits
of the rule. That assessment perfectly illustrates the epistemological
hierarchy discussed earlier.
On the benefit side, EPA undertook a detailed exposure and risk
assessment for people living downgradient from oil refineries-
something that was not done in the waste combustor rule examined
above. The risk assessment predicted that baseline (pre-rule) practices
were causing one to three cancer cases per year, with the risks to the
most exposed individuals ranging from 1/10,000 to an alarming 1/100. "'
In addition, EPA concluded that 6,400-32,000 people could be ex-
posed to drinking water concentrations of lead and/or chromium in
excess of their respective health effect thresholds, thereby incurring
risks of kidney and/or liver damage from chromium ingestion as well
as neuro-toxicological damage from lead.' 2 However, EPA was unable
to ascertain-on the basis of reliable scientific data-either the prob-
able number of non-cancer health harms ,or their severity. Nor was
EPA able to predict the non-carcinogenic health effects, if any, from
the other toxins mentioned. The ecological benefit of the rule gets one
sentence:
An additional benefit, not quantified in this RIA, is that pollut-
ant loadings to surface waters and wetlands through groundwater
migration and transport at 56-102 refineries (about 75 percent of
sludge generators) should also be substantially reduced or elimi-
nated as a result of this rule. '9'
At the end of the presentation of its findings, EPA offers some-
thing that all regulatory assessments should provide-a Summary of
Analytical Limitations and Qualifications. EPA first lists the factors
that tend to overestimate benefits. For example, the agency employed
conservative groundwater transport and dose-response models that
might tend to overstate risk. In addition, EPA assumed that downgra-
dient people who get their water from wells would drink two liters of
untreated water per day, and that all wells within a specified distance
downgradient from the refinery would be contaminated. This is, of
course, a very conservative assumption, as is the assumption that no
other federal, state, or local regulations would intervene to mitigateharm.'"
191 Id at 46391.
192 Id at 46392.
193 Id at 46393.
194 Id at 46393-94.
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On the other hand, EPA made a number of assumptions that it
thought "may tend to underestimate benefits.'' . For example, the
agency examined the effects of only a few of the many toxic chemicals
present in oil refinery sludge. EPA ignored background exposures that
might add to the harm of refinery exposures. EPA considered one ex-
posure pathway (drinking), while ignoring inhalation, dermal contact,
and the risk of food chain contamination from using contaminated
surface water to irrigate crops.' No ecological damages were quanti-
fied, even though, in EPA's words,
surface waters exist downgradient within 1200 meters at 75 per-
cent of refineries and [ ] other wetlands (swamps, bogs, etc.) are
equally nearby at over 25 percent of refineries. [Moreover]
... several chemicals present in the sludge are known to bioac-
cumulate and/or concentrate in the benthic layers which is criti-
cal to the invertebrate elements of the food chain. "7
Such disclaimers are both reassuring and exasperating. Reassur-
ing because they are relevant and honest. Exasperating because they
do not tell the decisionmaker what she needs to know: is the agency
assessment, on balance, an overestimate, underestimate, or reasonably
accurate estimate of the benefits of the rule? Hahn is not troubled by
such Gordian knots. He simply assigns the entire rule a zero benefit. '"
e) Statutorily mandated benefits. Risk assessments and cost-
benefit analyses can be extraordinarily time consuming and expensive,
without necessarily yielding a clear picture of costs and benefits at the
end of the day. Agencies are understandably reluctant to spend vital
agency resources-and taxpayer dollars-perfecting such assessments
when Congress has already made the relevant determination on other
grounds, or has ordered the agency to make the determination on
other (for example, health- or technology-based) grounds. Two exam-
ples will serve to illustrate what happens when agencies try to save
money and time in such circumstances.
The SARA implementation rule. In 1990, EPA promulgated a rule
revising the National Contingency Plan to implement the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).'" SARA es-
195 Id at 46394.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Appendix C, row 85.
199 EPA, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed Reg
8666 (1990) (hereinafter SARA Rule). For Hahn's treatment of the same rule, see Appendix C,
row 66.
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tablished, among other things, a presumption in favor of cleaning up
hazardous waste sites rather than building perimeters around them.
EPA offers no published explanation of the benefits of this rule
apart from a reference to an unpublished consultant's report buried in
EPA's docket room. ' The agency did, however, devote three Federal
Register pages to the estimated costs of the rule.""
EPA gave two reasons for failing to quantify the benefits of this
rule. First, "[c]urrent program information was insufficient in several
areas necessary to develop reasonable estimates of quantified bene-
fits" for each of the several thousand individual waste sites scattered
around the country.' Second, the rule was statutorily mandated in any
case, meaning that the relevant cost-benefit determination had already
been made-by Congress.2' Under these circumstances, EPA con-
cluded that the benefits of a full cost-benefit analysis did not justify
the high analytical costs."
The result in Hahn's scorecard: a $21 billion cost, and a zero
benefit.""
Water pollution standards for the electroplating and metal finish-
ing industries. In 1983, EPA issued a rule setting forth effluent limita-
tions guidelines, pretreatment standards, and new source performance
standards for electroplating and metal finishing point sources under
the Clean Water Act... The preamble to the rule contains a section
entitled "Costs, Effluent Reduction Benefits, and Economic Impact,"
21K) See SARA Rule, 55 Fed Reg at 8811 (cited in note 199), citing EPA, Policy and Analysis
Staff, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Regulatory Impact Analysis in Support of
the Proposed Revisions to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, Docket No NCP-R2-8-1 (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (hereinafter
Proposed SARA Rule Staff Analysis). The benefits mentioned in that report include: reduced
health hazards from exposure to waste migrating off-site; recreation benefits from cleaner water
off-site; the option value of clean water; and a reduced challenge to containment in later years.
Proposed SARA Rule Staff Analysis at 3-24 to 3-25.
201 SARA Rule, 55 Fed Reg at 8810-12 (cited in note 199).
202 EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Regulatory Impact Analysis of Re-
visions to CERCLA and the National Contingency Plan 1-1 to 1-2 (1989) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
203 In EPA's words: "This report also does not present a formal benefits analysis.... Because
the Superfund is financed by a tax authorized by Congress, Congress determined implicitly that
the benefits of cleaning up hazardous waste sites were worth the expenditures of the Superfund."
Proposed SARA Rule Staff Analysis at 1-2 (cited in note 200).
20m Though EPA did not mention it overtly as a reason for not quantifying benefits, it seems
clear that another reason for not quantifying the benefits of the SARA Rule is found in the fact
that the rule is really a procedural rule. In essence, the rule establishes a presumption in favor of
treatment, which may be reversed on the basis of later (and much more manageable) risk as-
sessment and cost-benefit analysis of options for handling each individual site. As seen above,
the benefits of procedural rules are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. See Part II.A.I .b.
205 See Appendix C, row 66.
2(6 EPA, Electroplating and Metal Finishing Point Source Categories: Effluent Limitations
Guidelines. Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance Standards, 48 Fed Reg 32462
(1983).
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which devotes several pages to a lengthy, quantitative analysis of the
costs of the rule, followed by exactly three sentences on the benefit:
The Agency concludes that the final regulation is economically
achievable, and the impacts are justified in light of the effluent
reductions achieved. The metal finishing regulation will remove
an additional 20 million pounds per year of metals and cyanide
and 10 million pounds per year of toxic organics.... Executive
Order 12291 does not require a [full-blown] Regulatory Impact
Analysis where its consideration would conflict with the devel-
opment of regulations pursuant to a court order, as with this
metal finishing regulation."
The result in Hahn's scorecard was a $4 billion cost (over twenty
years) and a zero benefit-another failed regulation."
f) Indirect costs and cost savings. The scorecardists' omission
of unquantified variables is not confined to the benefits column.
Economists have long recognized that government regulations bring
with them an array of indirect costs and cost savings that tend to be
overlooked to varying degrees in agency RIAs and scorecards alike.
The list of omitted indirect costs includes: (1) government costs of
monitoring, inspection, and record keeping; (2) corporate costs for le-
gal advice, shifted management focus, disrupted production, and di-
verted investment; and (3) consumer price increases, welfare loss from
product substitution, possible unemployment or wage reduction, di-
minished returns to shareholders on invested capital, and/or retarded
product innovation."
Regulations may also generate cost savings through: (1) stimula-
tion of product or process innovation to minimize waste; (2) im-
provements in worker health and productivity; and/or (3) reduction or
avoidance of liability for damages."'
How important are these omitted costs and cost savings? Because
indirect costs are seldom discussed in agency regulatory analyses, they
cannot be readily illustrated with narratives drawn from the pream-
207 Id at 32472.
2118 See Appendix C, row 76. See also 57 Fed Reg at 36235 (cited in note 150) ("This [envi-
ronmental evaluation] makes only a limited assessment of the specific environmental conse-
quences of the double hull requirement since, even without this rule, double hull construction is
required by [the existing statutel.").
24") Adapted from Adam B. Jaffe, et al, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J Econ Lit 132, 139 table 9 (1995). Ob-
viously, these are categories of potential cost or cost saving. They do not necessarily apply to
every regulation or industry, and they certainly do not apply equally to all.
2111 See id.
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bles of rules, as the previous discussion has done for unquantified
benefits. However, some insight into their nature and likely magnitude
can be gleaned from the extensive literature on the link between regu-
lation and "competitiveness"-a linkage that captures the net effect of
most of the direct and indirect costs and cost savings of interest here."
In an important survey of the empirical work on point, Adam
Jaffe, et al, concluded that "overall, there is relatively little evidence to
support the hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a
large adverse effect on competitiveness, however that elusive term is
defined. 2 . One major reason for this slight impact, according to the
authors, is that direct compliance costs are very low as a percentage of
production costs-less than 2 percent of the value of shipments in in-
dustries with "high abatement costs" and less than 0.5 percent of the
value of shipments in other industries."3 Most indirect costs-such as
loss of productivity, employment, price increases, and loss of consumer
welfare-are derivative of direct compliance costs. Therefore, one
would expect low direct costs generally to produce low indirect costs
as well, yielding a low competitive and consumer impact overall."'
Professors Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde attracted a
great deal of attention a decade ago when they advanced the thesis
that environmental regulations may actually enhance corporate com-
petitiveness (and, by extension, consumer or shareholder welfare) by
providing management an incentive to re-examine and re-engineer
their production process with health, safety, resource conservation,
and waste reduction in mind."' While mainstream economists have
211 See id at 138-39 (citing costs listed above as indicative of potential impacts on
"competitiveness"). Jaffe claims that there were over one hundred studies of the regulation-
competitiveness link as of 1995. Id at 135. The two categories not conceptually encompassed by
the "competitiveness" impacts are government costs and consumer impacts. Government costs
are hard to measure because salaried legislators and regulators perform a range of lawmaking,
monitoring, and enforcement functions that vary widely in their particulars from year to year. It
is therefore extremely difficult to allocate their collective salaries to any particular activity. How-
ever, government costs of monitoring and enforcement are generally thought to be small relative
to overall costs of compliance. See Richard D. Morgenstern, et al, The Cost of Environmental
Protection, RFF Discussion Paper 98-36 9 (May 1998) ("Our results, in fact, allow us to statisti-
cally reject the hypothesis that the economic cost of an additional dollar of reported environ-
mental expenditure is much more than one dollar."). Consumer impacts, though conceptually
different from competitiveness impacts, probably move in parallel with such impacts in the sense
that both arise mainly from direct compliance costs in the first instance.
212 Jaffe, et al, 33 J Econ Lit at 157 (cited in note 209).
213 Id at 141 table 6.
214 In addition, indirect regulatory costs can be hard to identify, particularly in cases where
firms respond to regulations by changing their products or production processes to reduce waste
generation. The cost of efficiency-enhancing changes may or may not be captured as a regulatory
compliance cost, and the efficiencies that result may or may not be captured as an environmental
cost saving. As Jaffe puts it, "we may have found little relationship between environmental regu-
lations and competitiveness simply because the data are of poor quality." Id at 158.
215 See Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Envi-
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viewed the so-called "Porter hypothesis" skeptically-it rests princi-
pally on anecdotal evidence and implies that firms are ignorant of op-
portunities to increase profits until a regulation comes along"-what
is important for present purposes is what is not disputed: the competi-
tive impacts (and, by inclusion, the indirect impacts) of regulation are
generally small." 7 There is no evidence that omitted costs simply can-
cel out omitted benefits, thereby excusing the disregard of both.
Nonetheless, the scorecardists' omission of unquantified costs in
scorecards is more understandable than their treatment of benefits in
one respect: agencies do not normally offer a narrative description of
the various costs that are being overlooked in particular cases. So at
least scorecards are not distorting agency analysis-while claiming to
summarize it-when they fail to mention unquantified costs.
ronment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J Econ Persp 97, 98 (Fall 1995) (suggesting that "prop-
erly designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than
fully offset the costs of complying with them"); Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of
Nations 648 (Free' Press 1990) (suggesting that the Japanese Energy Conservation Law of 1979
stimulated start-ups and spurred product improvements by raising energy efficiency standards).
216 See Jaffe, 33 J Econ Lit at 155 (cited in note 209). In a 1995 article devoted to rebutting
the Porter hypothesis, Palmer, Oates, and Portney reported the results of telephone interviews
with vice presidents or corporate directors for environmental protection at four firms cited by
Porter and van der Linde: "While each manager acknowledged that in certain instances a par-
ticular regulatory requirement may have cost less than expected, or perhaps even paid for itself,
each also said quite emphatically that, on the whole, environmental regulation amounted to a
significant net cost to his company." Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney, Tight-
ening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?, 9 J Econ Persp 119,
127 (Fall 1995). The authors also reported the results of a Census Bureau survey of manufactur-
ers that specifically asked respondents to estimate both their pollution abatement and control
expenditures and the "cost offsets" (in other words cost savings) associated with these expendi-
tures. In 1992, the expenditure estimates totaled $102 billion while the cost savings amounted to
$1.2 billion, less than 2 percent of estimated environmental expenditures. Id at 127-28.
Of course, surveys of corporate executives are not necessarily dispositive of the issue. Capital
and operating costs of pollution control equipment are readily apparent to managers while any
cost savings associated with a product or process change appear nowhere on the balance sheet or
income statement of the corporation, and therefore tend to recede from memory. Under such
circumstances, it would hardly be surprising if corporate managers tended to underestimate cost
savings when asked for an off-the-cuff opinion in a telephone survey. In the last analysis, as Jaffe
concedes, while Porter has not proved his hypothesis, economists have not marshaled the hard
empirical evidence necessary to refute it either. See Jaffe, 33 J Econ Lit at 157 (cited in note 209)
("While economists have good reason to be skeptical of arguments based on non-optimizing be-
havior where the only support is anecdotal, it is also important to recognize that if we wish to
persuade others of the validity of our analysis we must go beyond tautological arguments that
rest solely on the postulate of profit-maximization.").
217 See Jaffe, 33 J Econ Lit at 157 (cited in note 209). However, as Jaffe emphasizes earlier
in the same review, his analysis is limited to the manufacturing sector. The competitive impacts of
regulation may loom considerably larger in the (much less examined) natural resource extrac-
tion sectors: forestry, fishing, mining, oil extraction, etc. See id at 136.
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g) Risk-risk tradeoffs. In addition to their monetary costs, risk-
reducing regulations may create new risks of their own. Professor
Sunstein has compiled numerous examples of these "ancillary risks."28
Fuel economy standards, designed to reduce environmental risks, may
make cars smaller and less safe. Removing contaminated soil from
Superfund sites creates the possibility of accidents in transit or con-
tamination of the site to which the soil is removed. The intense regula-
tion of nuclear power has encouraged a shift to coal, which has aggra-
vated acid rain and global warming."' Some economists have argued
that even the funds expended to comply with regulations reduce the
sum of money available for life-saving health care, thereby costing sta-
tistical lives. Proponents of this view argue that the value of lives lost
by regulation through the income effect ought tobe deducted from
the life-saving benefits of regulation.2
Sunstein also has compiled a number of reasons, good and bad,
for agencies' failure to quantify such risk-risk tradeoffs in their regula-
tory assessments. Agencies may be unaware of the ancillary risk. The
ancillary risk may fall outside the agencies' expertise or jurisdiction.
Some statutes bar agencies from considering ancillary risks in certain
decisions. The agency may find the ancillary risk too complex or too
speculative to warrant a major delay in the regulation of the primary
risk. Of course, agencies may sometimes ignore ancillary risks out of
218 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1535 (cited in note 15).
219 These and many other examples may be found in id at 1535-36,1556.
220 Id at 1543-51, 1562 (surveying literature devoted to assessing the claim that regulatory
expenditures can cost lives and calling for courts to adopt an interpretive principle that agencies
can incorporate assessment of health-health tradeoffs in decisionmaking absent a clear legisla-
tive statement otherwise). While few would dispute the existence of physical risk-risk tradeoffs,
the idea that regulatory expenditures costs lives per se is hotly contested on at least three
grounds. First, it is obviously counterintuitive. Second, it rests on empirical studies of question-
able validity that generally correlate higher income with lower mortality and then assume, illogi-
cally, that higher income somehow causes lower mortality. (In fact, both may correlate with some
omitted third factor, such as education levels.) For a critique of the empirical basis of the expen-
diture-mortality link, see V. Kerry Smith, Donald J. Epp, and Kurt A. Schwabe, Cross-Country
Analyses Don't Estimate Health-Health Responses, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 67 (1994).Third, sim-
ply as a logical matter, it is highly implausible to suggest that regulatory expenditures amounting
to, at most, a few percent of disposable income could so reduce discretionary income as to deny
people access to life-saving health care to a degree that would implicate their longevity. Such a
causal nexus is plausible, if at all, only for poor people who have no access to health insurance or
subsidized care, and who are subject to significant regulatory costs that have been passed on to
them in the form of higher-priced goods. No empirical studies of which I am aware have docu-
mented such a confluence of circumstances. Ultimately, then, the regulatory expenditure-
mortality link rests on little more than a suggestive statistical correlation that lacks grounding in
a persuasive model of causation. Moreover, if lack of adequate access to health care is a source
of mortality and access to good health care is the goal, it makes far more sense to reform our
medical system to directly ensure such access, rather than to try to achieve the same goal indi-
rectly through an attenuated and speculative link to regulatory reform. See Paul R. Portney and
Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-
Health Analysis, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 111, 118-19 (1994).
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simple myopia, or in capitulation to special interests or irrational pub-
lic pressures, or out of a desire to bolster the regulatory record sup-
porting a preferred primary regulation."2
Whatever the reason, risk-risk tradeoffs are typically slighted in
agency assessments and scorecards alike. These tradeoffs count as un-
quantified "costs" of regulation, the omission of which tends to over-
state the net benefits of regulation.
2. Are these exclusions defensible?
One possible line of defense to the exclusion of significant costs
and benefits in scorecards may be to argue that it is not the scorecard-
ists' fault. If the government does not bother to quantify and monetize
the benefits of the regulations it enacts, what is the scorekeeper sup-
posed to do? The agency, on this view, holds the keys to its reputation
in its own hand.
There are at least three main problems with this line of defense.
The first is that, as we have seen, current scorecards do not always
count even the benefits that agencies have monetized."'
The second problem with the only-numbers-matter theory is that
it is flatly inconsistent with what the scorecardists publicly claim they
are offering. Whatever the reason for the government's failure to as-
sign a number to all costs and benefits, one cannot claim to have dis-
cerned "the" costs and benefits of a regulation while excluding whole
categories of unmeasured costs and benefits. And one certainly cannot
claim to be using the "government's numbers" while supplying
streams of zeroes that are found nowhere in any agency analysis.
When a scorekeeper assigns a "zero" to a benefit that an agency de-
scribed but lacked data to quantify or monetize, that zero is not the
government's number. That is the scorekeeper's number.
The third, and most fundamental, problem with numbers-only
scorecards is that not all costs and benefits can be reduced to numbers,
certainly not to numbers that are empirically defensible. In most cases,
launching a regulation marks the beginning of an exploration of terri-
tory that is scientifically and economically unknown. Therefore, rule
analyses are not and cannot be what scorecardists implicitly assume
them to be: final declarations of exactly what one will find at the end
of the process. That is why a cardinal principle of cost-benefit analysis
holds that:
221 See Sunstein,63 U Chi L Rev at 1555-57 (cited in note 15).
222 See Part 1.A.l.a.
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[niot all impacts of a decision can be quantified or expressed in
dollar terms. Care should be taken to assure that quantitative fac-
tors do not dominate important qualitative factors in
decisionmaking.
21
No one disputes this principle.14 Scorecards simply do not practice it.
Of course, scorecardists cannot be expected to factor into their
analysis information of which regulatory evaluators are themselves
unaware. If EPA is ignorant of the existence of water pollution risks of
MBTE when it issues its regulation requiring that fuel additive, one
cannot reasonably expect Hahn to include them in his scorecard. Uni-
dentified costs and benefits plague every mode of regulatory analysis.
The culpability of scorecards is found, not in their failure to de-
tect previously unidentified costs and benefits, but in their omission of
costs and benefits that agencies identify and describe narratively, but
do not pretend to be able to quantify or monetize. These are the omis-
sions that violate cardinal principles of cost-benefit analysis, that are
unique to scorecards, and that call the viability of scorecards into seri-
ous question."'
223 Arrow, et al, Annapolis Principles at 10 (cited in note 103).
224 Indeed, Hahn is a co-author of these very words. Id.
225 Almost as troubling as the fact of such omissions is the scorecardists' failure to disclose
them properly. Hahn makes no mention in his Executive Summary of the fact that whole catego-
ries of health and non-health benefits have been zeroed out in his analysis. One must read the
fine print of his methodology section, the footnotes, and the unpublished spreadsheet (along with
the preambles to the rules referenced in the spreadsheet) to appreciate the significance of what
Hahn is not counting. See, for example, Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 94 n 71 (cited in
note 13):
I included only air pollution reduction benefits because the agencies did not generally
quantify any benefits from pollution reduction other than from air pollution reduction [Not
true-see Part lI.A.l.a.]. According to EPA, those [unquantified] benefits are large and
may therefore significantly affect the results of the regression. Pollution reduction benefits
can change the cost-effectiveness estimates by orders of magnitude and in some cases can
even change the sign of the estimates.
This caveat appears in an endnote at the back of his book. Hahn's presentation of his results in
the news media has never, to my knowledge, been accompanied by a similar caveat.
Tengs and Graham acknowledge-once, in the penultimate paragraph of Five-Hundred In-
terventions-that "we recognize that many of these interventions have benefits other than sur-
vival."Tengs, et al, 15 Risk Analysis at 372 (cited in note 9). This recognition, unfortunately, does
not lead to any exploration of its logical implications, and, again, never surfaces in media reports.
Morrall points out that "many regulations were projected to yield benefits in addition to sav-
ing lives, such as reducing non-fatal injuries and property damage." He claims that he "accounted
for" these benefits by "converting non-lifesaving health benefits into an index equivalent to addi-
tional lives saved. . . . 50 non-fatal hospitalizations avoided, or two permanent disabilities
avoided, were assumed to be equivalent to one death avoided." Morrall, Regulation at 28 (cited
in note 8). But he does not count non-health benefits at all. Nor does he tally health benefits
other than those which avoid hospitalization or permanent disability. And he offers no explana-
tion of the rationale, if any, that underlies his seemingly arbitrary illness/fatality conversion ra-
tios.
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Could better scorecard methodology avoid such problems? The
answer is clearly no. The point of scorecards, after all, is to come up
with the number of rules that generate positive net benefits, or that
cost less than some threshold amount per life saved. Without the
numbers, how does one keep score?
The dilemma facing scorecards is well illustrated in OMB's An-
nual Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regula-
tions.22 Each year OMB compiles its estimates of the costs and bene-
fits of regulations. Unlike the scorecards discussed in this article, how-
ever, OMB also includes a column entitled "Other Information" in
which unquantified costs and benefits are narratively described."'
These entries, of course, preclude final declarations about whether the
rules in question pass or fail cost-benefit tests, and OMB therefore of-
fers no statistic on that point. OMB has avoided the problem of ignor-
ing unenumerated benefits but, in so doing, has surrendered the func-
tion of a scorecard. OMB's candor also comes at the price of quotabil-
ity: OMB's reports have received far less media coverage than the
more sensational scorecards."
The discussion so far has focused on the exclusion of intangibles
because it is perhaps the most serious of the inherent problems of
method that scorecards confront. But it is by no means the only one.
Additional tradeoffs between brevity and realism can be found in the
way scorecards deal with distributive impacts.
226 See, for example, OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Making Sense of
Regulation (cited in note 43).
227 Id at 22-28 table 4.
228 A recent Lexis search of the Lexis Major Paper database turned up a total of eight cites
to OMB annual reports over a period of eight years. Of these, six are by Cindy Skrzycki of the
Washington Post and two are in other publications. Moreover, the main message of these articles
tends to be not the horrors of regulation, but the difficulty of measuring costs and benefits accu-
rately. See Cindy Skrzycki, OMB to Revisit Costs, Benefits of Rules, Wash Post El (May 29,2001);
Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: Paying by the Rules; OMB's Cost Analyses Questioned, Wash
Post El (Feb 4, 2000); Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: The Costs and Benefits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Wash Post El (Aug 6,1999); Bonner R. Cohen, Lawmakers Target the Regulatory Mon-
ster, J Commerce 9 (June 3, 1999); Cindy Skrzycki, OMB Tries to Add Up the Bill for Federal
Rules, Wash Post El (Feb 12, 1999); Cindy Skrzycki, Bringing Brainpower to the Commentary on
Rules, Wash Post GI (Oct 9, 1998); Murray Weidenbaum, Streamlining the Regulatory Tangle,
Christian Sci Monitor 19 (May 21, 1998); Cindy Skrzycki, Stacks and Stones at the Labor Rela-
tions Board, Wash Post G1 (Oct 31,1997).
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B. Disregarding Distributive Impacts
A particularly telling criticism of cost-benefit analysis is its ten-
dency to overlook the distributive and equitable impacts of regulatory
decisions.22" This section will show that while cost-benefit analysis is in
principle capable of both considering and deferring to such concerns,
scorecards are inherently incapable of doing so.
Most cost-benefit analyses treat risks and costs as fungible
commodities whose distribution can be largely ignored. The lives
saved are statistical lives; the resources expended are society's
resources. Indeed, I found no formal discussion of distributive impacts
in any of the regulatory impact analyses cited in this Article.
In purely statistical terms, a 1:100,000,000 risk imposed involun-
tarily on 10,000,000 people is statistically interchangeable with a 1:10
risk of death imposed involuntarily on a single person. Common sense
and basic fairness suggest otherwise. If a 1:100,000,000 risk is a tiny
and widely dispersed risk that seems a reasonable price to pay for the
benefit of modern living (assuming the activity brings a clear benefit),
a 1:10 risk of death is essentially a game of Russian roulette that soci-
ety has no right to force anyone to play for any amount of social eco-
nomic gain. Likewise, though the point is more debatable, a regulation
that costs a million consumers one dollar each is probably preferable
to one of similar aggregate cost that eliminates one hundred jobs.
Analysis that fails to consider the distribution of impacts (be they
costs or benefits) misses an important part of the picture.
Closely related to the distribution of impacts are questions about
the identity of the risk or cost bearers. Once again, aggregate statistics
conceal potentially important issues of who pays the cost of regula-
tion, and who benefits. Some would argue that a risk that falls dispro-
portionately on minorities or the poor (who often lack adequate ac-
cess to health care) should be weighted more heavily, other things
equal, than one whose burdens are more equitably distributed. Like-
wise, some assert that a regulation whose costs fall disproportionately
on the poor should be registered as more "costly" than a regulation
that does not place additional burdens on the poor or disadvantaged.""
Others maintain that regulations that disproportionately benefit the
229 See, for example. Heinzerling and Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless at 23-25 (cited in note
38) (noting that a "fundamental defect of cost-benefit analysis is that it tends to ignore, and
therefore to reinforce, patterns of economic and social inequality" while disregarding "questions
of rights and morality" that are not reducible to monetary terms).
230 See EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses at 139-71 (cited in note 96) (call-
ing for analysis of the impact of regulatory costs on employment, profitability, plant closure, com-
petitiveness, and small businesses, as well as "disproportionate" impacts on minorities, low-
income populations, children, and any risk to individuals "above generally accepted norms" -but
without identifying any weighting mechanism to reflect distributive justice concerns).
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poor, the aged, or the afflicted should be assigned a lower value than
those favoring the well-off, the young, and the healthy.'
Single-rule analyses are able, in principle at least, to take account
of the distributive impacts. Indeed, widely agreed canons of cost-
benefit analysis call on analysts to examine such impacts wherever
they are significant-though actual examples of this happening are
rather hard to find."' In any case, proponents of cost-benefit analysis
recognize that considerations of fairness ought to be considered side
by side with utilitarian arguments. And they recognize that the former
may, on occasion, trump the latter."'
Given this recognition, it is not quite fair to assert that cost-
benefit analysis inherently requires the wholesale subordination or
obfuscation of equitable concerns. But it is fair and, indeed, necessary
to say that the scorecards discussed in this Article pay absolutely no
attention to the distribution of cost or risk in society, or to any ethical
concerns, and it is hard to see how they could. The scorecard enter-
prise by its very nature requires tabulating costs per life saved or net
231 See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regu-
lation Policies, 3 NYU Envir L J 431,447 (1994) ("[Tlhe United States Department of Transpor-
tation should want to place a higher value on the well-being of the lives of airline passengers
than those killed in motor-vehicle crashes because the airline passengers have a higher in-
come."). Lawrence Summers, then chief economist at the World Bank and the current president.
of Harvard University, wrote in 1991:
The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depend ... on the foregone
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given amount of
health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be
the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of
toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.
Lawrence Summers, Internal World Bank Memo, in Heinzerling and Ackerman, Pricing the
Priceless at 24 (cited in note 38). Heinzerling elsewhere observes, astutely, that the recent em-
phasis on measuring "Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALY)" preserved, rather than lives saved,
is a backhanded way of privileging the young, the well-off, and the healthy over the older, the
poor, and the infirm. See Heinzerling, 24 Harv Envir L Rev at 193 (cited in note 90).
232 See Arrow, et al, Annapolis Principles at 8 (cited in note 103) ("[A] good cost-benefit
analysis will identify important distributional consequences of a policy."); OMB, Guidelines at 16
(cited in note 89) ("If ... distributive effects are important, you should describe the effects of
various regulatory alternatives quantitatively to the extent possible, including their magnitude,
likelihood, and incidence of effects on particular groups."); EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Eco-
nomic Analyses at 139 (cited in note 96) (devoting Chapter 9 to guidance for conducting distribu-
tional analyses).
233 See Arrow, et al, Annapolis Principles at 7 (cited in note 103) ("Agencies should not be
bound by a strict benefit-cost test .... There may be factors other than economic benefits and
costs that agencies will want to weigh in decisions, such as equity within and across genera-
tions."); Robert M. Solow, Reply to Steven Kelman, in Robert N. Stavins, ed, Economics of the
Environment: Selected Readings 367,368 (4th ed 2000) ("Treatises on the subject make clear that
certain ethical or political principles may irreversibly dominate the advantages and disadvan-
tages capturable by cost-benefit analyses.").
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benefits across large numbers of rules, and then compressing the tabu-
lation into a few summary statistics. This renders it difficult if not im-
possible for scorecards to take account of differences in the distribu-
tion of risks, costs, or benefits. The enormity of the task facing score-
cards will become even more evident when we turn to the treatment
of uncertainty.
C. Concealing Uncertainty
One of the most striking features of the Hahn, Morrall, and
Tengs/Graham scorecards-and, one suspects, a key to their great
influence-is the precision of their numbers, which they typically
report to three or four significant digits. '
Yet the appearance of precision is highly misleading. A large,
though esoteric, literature already documents the data gaps and other
uncertainties confronting efforts to estimate, and then monetize,
physical risks to human health and ecosystems. 23 A growing literature
attests to the huge uncertainties facing regulatory cost predictions as
well. 2, Yet scorecardists present their results (particularly in the me-dia) with the routine confidence of a draper measuring curtains. 7
234 See, for example, Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 43 table 3-5 (cited in note 13)
(reporting the net benefits of final rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act from 1981
through mid-1996 at $586.9 billion). How, one wonders, can he be so sure that they are not $587.2
billion? Or $627.4 billion? Or any number between, say, $500 billion and $700 billion? Tengs and
Graham inform the reader at one point that "all estimates are rounded to three significant fig-
ures to stress their approximate nature." Tengs and Graham, Opportunity Costs at 182 n 1 (cited
in note 10). The authors apparently fail to realize that "rounding to three significant figures" im-
plies accuracy to one-tenth of one percent.
235 See, for example, William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envir L Rep 10190,
10190-91 (1984) (discussing the difficulties of extrapolating low-dose human risks from high-
dose animal tests, and of establishing that any particular environmental risk has caused a particu-
lar human harm). See generally Celia Campbell-Mohn and John S. Applegate, Learning from
NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 Harv Envir L Rev 93, 99-102 (1999);
Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 Harv Envir L
Rev 409, 413-17 (1995): John P. Dwyer, Limits of Environmental Risk Assessment, 116 J Energy
Engineering 231,234-40, 243 (1990); David D. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A
Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 Ecol L Q 497,508-14 (1978).
236 It is generally known, for example, that indirect and/or unanticipated costs tend to in-
crease burdens above expected levels, while learning curves, economies of scale, and corporate
innovations tend to constrain cost impacts and may, on occasion, even improve productivity. See,
for example, Jaffe, 33 J Econ Lit at 139-40 (cited in note 209) (offering taxonomy of direct and
indirect costs and cost savings and noting that "[e]ven estimates of direct, compliance expendi-
tures vary greatly"). See also Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regula-
tory Cost Estimates (cited in note 80) (cataloguing unreliability of existing cost estimates and
sources of cost estimation errors); McGarity and Ruttenberg, 80 Tex L Rev at 1998-99 (cited in
note 32) (finding that actual regulatory costs were often significantly less than predicted costs, al-
though still uncertain); Goodstein and Hodges, Am Prospect at 64 (cited in note 25) (finding that
in eleven of twelve cases in which retrospective cost studies were performed, regulators had ini-
tially overestimated costs of regulations); David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental
Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 Ecol L Q 545,600-01 (citing exam-
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The scorecardists' failure to disclose uncertainties fully cannot be
excused by weaknesses in agency assessments. Agencies quite often
report ranges of estimates and disclose major sources of uncertainty in
their estimates, in keeping with good practice. It is the scorecardists
who largely omit this important step.
Again, basic principles of cost-benefit analysis require full docu-
mentation of major sources of uncertainty, with sensitivity analysis to
explore the impact of altering fundamental assumptions." The authors
pies of cost over-estimation).
237 Hahn's own writings in The Washington Post perfectly exemplify the way his and other
scorecardists' conclusions are routinely presented in the media:
Many of the regulations that deal with the environment, health, safety and employment ...
meet this common-sense test [of benefits exceeding costs]. But many don't. By our estimate,
more than half the social regulations issued between 1982 and mid-1996 flunked a cost
benefit test. Getting rid of those regulations would have increased the size of the economic
pie by $300 billion.
Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan, Putting Regulations to a Test, Wash Post A23 (July 30,
1997). The rest of the piece is spent detailing his proposals for "reform." Id. Hahn's primary
analysis is only slightly more nuanced. He offers numerical ranges to reflect different assump-
tions, but his ranges reflect only the impact of different values for life values and discount rates.
Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 46, 59 (cited in note 13). In fact, Hahn's only acknowl-
edgment of uncertainty is in reference to (1) the discount rate (within the range of 3-7 percent),
(2) the appropriate base year (he chooses 1996 but admits he had trouble choosing), and (3) two
sentences buried in a section devoted mainly to other matters and labeled "The relative effi-
ciency of regulations." In these sentences he acknowledges that: "technological advances and sci-
entific discoveries may reveal that agencies understated the benefits of existing rules," and
"variation in the assumptions agencies and program offices use to estimate benefits and costs af-
fects the results of such analytical exercises." Id at 54. Morrall and Tengs/Graham offer no sensi-
tivity analysis whatsoever.
238 See, for example, 55 Fed Reg at 46391-93 (cited in note 188) (predicting a range of can-
cer case avoidance, disclosing uncertainty in non-cancer benefits, and reviewing factors that tend
to overestimate and underestimate benefits); 57 Fed Reg at 38145 (cited in note 139) (providing
a range of costs and benefits, and a description of unquantifiable benefits); 60 Fed Reg at 65185
(cited in note 42) (same).
239 See Arrow, et al, Annapolis Principles at 10 (cited in note 103) ("Best estimates should
be presented along with a description of the uncertainties."). OMB's guidelines treat the issue
much more fully:
The principles of full disclosure and transparency apply to the treatment of uncertainty in
developing risk, benefit, and cost information-just as it does with the other elements of
economic analysis. You must identify data, models, and their implications for risk assess-
ment in the risk characterization. You must also explicitly identify and evaluate the infer-
ences and assumptions chosen and assess the effects of these choices on the analysis.
OMB, Guidelines at 15 (cited in note 89). OMB also confronts, and squarely rejects, the mis-
guided practice-ubiquitous in scorecards-of taking point estimates (usually the mid-point of a
range) as "best" estimates without knowledge of underlying probability curves: "If the uncer-
tainty in the estimates-for example, fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of knowl-
edge-prevents construction of a scientifically defensible probability distribution, you should de-
scribe the benefits and costs under plausible alternative assumptions." Id.
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of scorecards do not deny the validity of this canon. The problem is
that they do not implement it.
The reasons for such omissions are not hard to imagine. Proper
disclosure of ranges to reflect uncertainties would render many inter-
ventions numerically indeterminate: either because the high end of
the cost range would overlap the low end of the benefit range-or
vice-versa-or because important, unquantified costs or benefits
would vitiate the relevance of numerical ranges. In either event, score-
cards would no longer be able to provide a clear "score" for the regu-
lation in question. They would cease, in essence, to be scorecards. That
is why this Article suggests that the obfuscation of uncertainty is an
inherent-not merely a contingent-defect of scorecards.
D. Assuming Efficiency Is All That Matters
The discussion so far has assumed something that scorecards (and
most economists) regularly take for granted: "good" regulations are
those that maximize net benefits or cost per life saved as determined
by experts. While this Article generally does not contest this crudely
utilitarian premise, for the reasons stated in the Introduction, the
deeply problematic nature of that premise should not go entirely
without mention.
One major difficulty with assuming that the right policy is one
that maximizes aggregate net benefits may be illustrated with a simple
example. Automobile accidents kill over 40,000 Americans-about
thirteen times the death toll of the World Trade Center bombings-
every year." It is highly likely that a cross-section of experts assigned
to consider the issue would agree that at least some of the many bil-
lions of dollars now being spent searching diaper bags and grand-
mothers in airports would actually save more lives per dollar if di-
verted to programs for improving auto safety. Yet this is virtually un-
thinkable in the current climate. The American public is accustomed
to auto risks and terrified of terrorism. We want everything done that
can be done to stop the latter. Other threats, at other times, likewise
have dominated public consciousness for a period leading to rather
expensive public responses-cryptosporidium, AIDS, toxic waste in
basements, microwave towers, and cancer. Experts have known for
240 Following are motor vehicle death statistics for the period 1991-1998, the latest year for
which complete data are available:
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Deaths 143,536 140,982 141,893 142,524 143,363 143,649 143,458 143,5011
National Center of Health Statistics, Historical Tables on Leading Causes of Death, 1900-1998,
online at http://www.cdc.go/nchs/data/statab/lead1900_98.pdf (visited Sept 26,2003).
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over a decade that they rank risks differently than the public does.2
The question is, so what? What follows from the fact that public fears
and wishes are, at times, "inefficient" in the opinion of experts? To the
extent that there is psychological value in minimizing public fear (as
opposed to risk) -or democratic virtue in accountability to the pub-
lic-then the best regulation may not always be the most cost-
effective one.22
By the same token, the best regulation is not necessarily the one
that caters most to the public fear du jour. A tension exists between
the dueling goals of rationality and democracy in regulation. One way
to resolve it may be through better educating the public. Another way
might be through better educating experts about the things that mat-
ter to the public. The optimal strategy may well depend on the facts of
each particular case. But if that is so, it is certainly problematic to as-
sume, as scorecardists do, that accountability is weightless in the scales,
and that public risk and benefit perceptions are always of zero signifi-
cance when they differ from those of the "experts."
Besides ignoring public preferences, the simplistic utilitarianism
of scorecards also inherently occludes all questions of individual
rights. All agree that society may not condemn an innocent individual
to certain death, even for a monetary gain in excess of the monetary
value of a statistical life. That is why those who defend the valuation of
statistical lives take such pains to point out that they are assigning a
monetary value only to small increments of risk-increments that
some individuals have shown themselves willing to assume in market-
place behavior."
241 See Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 Science 616,616-18 (1990) (report-
ing results of two EPA task forces that found that agency experts rank environmental risks very
differently from the American public). For the original reports, see EPA, Unfinished Business
(cited in note 74); EPA, Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies
for Environmental Protection 12 (1990).
242 Finkel has also adduced a number of plausible reasons why the subjective comparative
risk assessments of experts may not necessarily be more plausible than the heuristic judgments
of laypersons. See Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The
Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 NYU Envir L J 295,318-21,328-31 (1995).
243 See, for example, Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 19-20 (cited in note 15), Hahn, Governmentsv
Numbers (2000) at 39 n 23 (cited in note 13). For insightful discussions of the difficulty cost-
benefit analysts face in accommodating rights-based concerns, see Tribe, 2 Philosophy & Pub Aff
at 9(0-94 (cited in note 35) (discussing the difficulties of using policy analysis to assign legal
rights); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation:
Ethical and Philosophical Considerations, in Daniel Swartzman, et al, eds, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Environmental Regulations: Politics, Ethics and Methods 137, 143-44 (Conservation Founda-
tion 1982) (noting the difficulty of monetizing non-market rights and the various attempts
economists have employed to do so); Heinzerling and Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless (cited in
note 38) ("[C]ost benefit analysis cannot produce more efficient decisions because the process of
reducing life, health, and the natural world to monetary values is inherently flawed.").
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It is necessary, however, to follow this concession to its logical
conclusion. If society may not impose certain death on an individual,
then it follows that society also may not impose a very high likelihood
of death on an individual. '" In other words, bringing a sense of rights
into the picture indicates, at a minimum, that there is a threshold of
risk that government may not allow one set of individuals to impose
upon another through market or non-market activity, whatever the
social gain." ' Likewise, our system of contract and tort law recognizes
individual rights by limiting the ability of an individual to impose
physical and economic losses on others, without compensation. Finally,
the present generation may be seen as holding certain ethical obliga-
tions to future generations."'
In principle, as seen above, rule- or project-specific cost-benefit
analysis can meet these democratic and right-based concerns by de-
tailing the impact of each regulation on the distribution of risk and
loss, and by allowing ethical considerations to trump the numerical
analysis whenever the physical or economic impact crosses a certain
threshold."' But purely quantitative analyses cannot do so, and neither
can strictly numerical scorecards.
This Part has shown that the Morrall, Tengs/Graham, and Hahn
scorecards ignore all considerations of public preference and individ-
ual rights. They also violate basic principles of cost-benefit analysis
that require consideration of significant, unquantified costs and bene-
fits; consideration of distributive and cumulative impacts; and full dis-
closure of the uncertainties, sources of uncertainty, and the conse-
quences of varying important default assumptions. Moreover, we have
seen that numerical scorecards cannot possibly conform to these basic
principles of sound cost-benefit analysis and still do what scorecards
claim to do, which is to compress a vast range of human experience
into a few small numbers. While regulatory scorecards may be faulted
on political and ethical grounds, it is important to understand that
scorecards fail to pass muster even by the interior logic of economic
cost-benefit analysis itself.
244 This observation leaves aside, for present purposes, the moral issues raised by a military
draft, or absence thereof.
245 Congress has expressly recognized this fact in passing statutes that require EPA, for ex-
ample, to regulate residual emissions of any toxic air pollutant causing a risk of more than one in
a million to the "the individual most exposed to emissions from a source." Clean Air Act, 42 USC
§ 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).
246 For the leading discussion of inter-generational equity, see Edith Brown Weiss, In Fair-
ness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity
(Transnational 1988).
247 See Part I.B.
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II1. TOWARD A RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO GRADING
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Before any lost traveler can find his way home, he must first
come to the realization that he is lost, and that he needs to seek direc-
tion. Before any problem can be fixed there must come, first, recogni-
tion that there is a problem that needs fixing.
This Article is not, fundamentally, about furnishing remedies but
about diagnosing a serious problem of evidence and proof at the heart
of the regulatory reform movement- a problem that arises from the
failure of studies that attempt to reduce regulatory analysis to a few
summary numbers. Nonetheless, the preceding discussion does yield a
number of affirmative insights into how regulatory performance ought
to be evaluated, if not by simplistic scorecards. This Part pulls together
those insights.
Part A discusses the implications for agency analysis of individual
rules. Part B addresses the implications of this Article for the evalua-
tion of regulatory performance overall.
A. Implications for Agency Analysis
Some will, no doubt, be tempted to find in the shortcomings of
scorecards another argument for rejecting cost-benefit analysis per se.
Such a reaction is especially understandable given the similarity of the
scorecard abuses documented in this Article to those that other schol-
ars have criticized in the analysis of individual rules over the last three
decades.24 As Professor McGarity asks in a recent essay, why continue
a practice that has proven itself over the years notoriously prone to
abuse?24 Despite the considerable force of McGarity's argument, I do
248 See, for example, Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin L Rev 7, 50-78
(1998) (criticizing Professor Cass Sunstein's optimistic assessment of the 104th Congress's regu-
latory reform legislation); Shapiro and Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk at 4-13 (cited in note
98) (contrasting cost-benefit analysis with a pragmatism-based approach to environmental and
health risk regulation); Driesen, 24 Ecol L Q at 550-51 (cited in note 236) (criticizing cost-
benefit analysis in the context of the "polluter pays" principle); Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Ar-
senic, 90 Georgetown L J 2311,2313 (2002) (criticizing an EPA rule reducing arsenic levels and
arguing that "the entire project of setting environmental standards based on decisions ostensibly
made in commercial markets is misguided"); Heinzerling and Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless at
I (cited in note 38) (criticizing cost-benefit valuation of life, health, and environmental values);
Howard Latin, Ideal versus Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
"Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 Stan L Rev 1267 (1985) (arguing that ideally efficient re-
forms need to meet real-world tests of practicability, and that technology-based regulation often
does this better than cost-benefit analysis).
249 As McGarity puts it, rather bluntly, in responding to Professor Sunstein's defense of
cost-benefit analysis: "It is critical to understand that many of the 'experts' to whom Professor
Sunstein would assign the important task of 'objectively' assessing and monetizing regulatory
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not go so far as to recommend the wholesale rejection of cost-benefit
analysis at this point, for three reasons.
First, cost-benefit analysis is a fait accompli. So long as millions of
Americans (and a majority of the House and Senate) are concerned
with the rationality of government regulations, they will continue to
demand cost-benefit analysis as a way of addressing their concerns.
Second, cost-benefit analysis, at least in theory, fills a gap that
other approaches leave open. Technology-based standard-setting, for
example, begs the question of whether the "best available" technology
is safe enough, or whether another approach would be much cheaper,
or pose fewer risks of some other kind. Cost-benefit analysis offers a
theoretical framework for addressing such questions in an orderly
250)
way.
Third, and most important, the analysis of this Article neither
supports nor refutes broad conclusions about the practice of cost-
benefit analysis per se. This Article has focused on multi-rule score-
cards that, as seen, raise particularly acute and inherent difficulties."'
Though the deficiencies of scorecards do not inspire much confidence
in cost-benefit analysis as a genre, conclusively proving the invalidity
of the latter would require a broader critique than this Article under-
takes.
Though this Article does not take a position on cost-benefit
analysis overall, the preceding analysis does suggest several important
recommendations for the conduct of cost-benefit analysis at the
agency level, assuming it continues to be done:
1. The evidence refutes the widespread belief of regulatory skep-
tics that agencies routinely overestimate the benefits of regulations
they propose or enact."2 While agencies may, in some cases, adopt
quite conservative assumptions in assessing cancer risks and cancer
reduction benefits, non-cancer health and ecological benefits are fre-
quently relegated to a few perfunctory sentences. Important data
about benefits are often buried in unpublished regulatory impact as-
benefits are not fair-minded scholars like Professor Sunstein, but self-promoters . . . many of
whom have devoted their careers to criticizing health, safety, and environmental regulation."
Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 Georgetown L J 2341,2369 (2002).
250 However, McGarity, Shapiro, Latin, and others have argued that technology-based regu-
lation may offer a more structured and rational approach to regulation in the context of large
uncertainties about regulatory costs and benefits. See Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L J
729,729; Latin, 37 Stan L Rev at 1267 (cited in note 248).
251 See Part II.
252 Contrast agency elision of benefits of rules discussed in Part Il.A with Morrall, Regula-
tion at 25 (cited in note 8) (stating that "regulatory agencies ... tend to overstate the effective-
ness of their actions"); Hahn, Government's Numbers (2000) at 35 (cited in note 13) ("[A]gencies
are likely to overstate net benefits,"); Nichols and Zeckhauser, Regulation at 13 (cited in note
80) (discussing how conservative risk assessment distorts regulation by overstating benefits).
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sessments that are then incorporated by reference in the final rule."'
This is a serious disservice to public understanding of regulatory mat-
ters. Even in cases where the data do not permit full quantification of
regulatory costs or benefits, agencies need to do a much better job of
narratively explaining the significance of costs and benefits (particu-
larly unquantified costs and benefits), and the reasons underlying the
agency's determination that the benefits justify the costs.""
2. While agencies cannot avoid valuing risk to human life (at least
implicitly), the life and health values in current use are empirically
questionable, and probably too low. At a minimum, adjustments
should be made to reflect the involuntariness of certain risks, the ef-
fect on risk preferences of income distribution and growth, and het-
erogeneity of risk tolerance.
3. Ultimately, agencies should consider simply abandoning the
pretense that the monetary values assigned to non-monetary impacts
are numerically rigorous and scientifically based. They are not, nor
need they be. Government agencies have a rightful normative func-
tion that they should exercise openly-without seeking to conceal
their exercise of discretion behind a gauzy veil of numbers."'
4. When conducting cost-effectiveness analysis (which looks at
cost per life saved), agencies should cease the semantically misleading
practice of discounting the number of lives saved.'
5. All analyses that involve monetizing and/or discounting non-
monetary values should include a clear and prominent statement of
the physical costs and benefits of the rule-the risks created as well as
the lives saved, illnesses avoided, and ecological harms prevented or
remedied-along with the timing and distribution of such costs and
benefits. Readers can then reach their own judgment as to whether
benefits justify costs, without the loss of information that results when
primary data are altered through assumptions supplied by econo-
mists. 7
6. Agency cost-benefit assessments should include a full discus-
sion of all relevant uncertainties. These uncertainties will often pre-
clude simple, numerically determined declarations about whether
benefits will exceed costs. Rather than feeling obligated to pretend to
adhere to a certainty that does not exist, agencies should be prepared
253 See Part II.A.1.
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 See Part I.D.
257 Much of the current controversy over life valuation and discount rate might have been
avoided (or marginalized) by this simple expedient, which OMB has endorsed. See Part I.D.
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to acknowledge such indeterminacies when they arise. The presence of
large uncertainties often counsels for incremental decisionmaking
through flexibility mechanisms such as variances, waivers, and preser-
vation of later implementation discretion. These mechanisms are al-
ready routinely employed. Agencies should carefully analyze the po-
tential significance of such mechanisms in characterizing the costs and
benefits of each rule. Agencies also should incorporate-as they now
do not-a discussion of the consequences of erring in the direction of
under- and overregulation, respectively."
7. Retrospective studies, though difficult, are indispensable tools
for capturing the impact of waivers, variances, and other uses of offi-
cial discretion; detecting errant predictions of costs and benefits; iden-
tifying important sources of estimation error; calibrating ex ante esti-
mates; and, most of all, identifying needed changes to rules.2"
8. If rational priority-setting in regulation is the goal, then it
seems clear that cost-benefit analysis cannot be limited to screening
final regulations. Agencies should also use the instrument for identify-
ing risks that are not now regulated but ought to be-even (and espe-
cially) if they lack statutory authority to address the risk at the time of
the assessment. Setting agendas for future legislative initiatives has
long been recognized as a vital function of cost-benefit analysis.2'
258 See Parts I.C and II.C.
259 Indeed, the idea that a single ex ante estimate could provide an accurate picture of regu-
latory costs and benefits in perpetuity is absurd on its face. Yet that is the proposition implicit in
the current practice of relying on ex ante estimates for conclusions about "the" costs and benefits
of each rule. See Part I.C.
260 The current OMB/OIRA director, John Graham, has made a start in the right direction
with a new policy of encouraging agencies to identify new opportunities for cost-effective regula-
tion. See Nakashima, Equation Is Persuasion, Wash Post at A35 (cited in note 3) (noting that
Graham has created the "prompt letter" which urges agencies to issue rules in areas that appear
to be cost-effective). It remains to be seen how far this initiative will extend in practice.
If OMB really intends to make the initiative meaningful, it should (1) instruct agencies to in-
clude a "regulatory opportunities" section as part of their strategic plans; (2) include an overview
of regulatory gaps in OMB's annual report on costs and benefits of legislation; and (3) propose
legislation that would require agencies and/or OMB to prepare periodic reports on gaps in regu-
latory programs that present real regulatory needs and cost-effective regulatory opportunities.
A new focus on regulatory opportunities may not be as controversial, or unlikely in the pre-
sent climate, as one might tend to assume. Indeed, identifying favorable regulatory opportunities
may present a win-win-win opportunity for agencies, public interest groups, and regulated inter-
ests. For agencies and public interest groups, closing regulatory gaps offers obvious public inter-
est benefits. But currently regulated entities stand to gain as well: to the degree that agencies
identify, and are given authority to regulate, the highest priority risks (including those now pro-
tected by gaps in agency jurisdiction), agencies may be less prone to try to extract the last ounce
of protection from the sources currently within their control. See National Academy of Public
Administration, Setting Priorities, Getting Results:A New Direction for the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 61-66 (NAPA 1995) (describing how EPA's lack of jurisdiction to regulate radon in
indoor air may have led the agency to focus excessively on regulation of radon in drinking water,
which EPA had jurisdiction to regulate).
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9. Requiring agencies to perform more-and more thorough-
cost-benefit analyses will be expensive. That is not an objection to the
requirement. It is simply an objection to imposing the requirement as
an unfunded mandate. By any reasonable reckoning, the costs of re-
sponsible analysis are trivial compared to the economic, human, and
ecological stakes involved in social regulation. If getting the analysis
right requires doubling or tripling agencies' analytical and regulatory
budgets, so be it. Congress must realize that in regulation, as else-
where, "you get what you pay for."
B. Implications for Comprehensive Evaluations of Regulation
While strengthening the quality of single-rule analysis is an im-
portant first step, it is not the end of the road. There remains the issue
of how best to evaluate regulatory performance overall. While full
treatment of this issue lies beyond the scope of this brief concluding
section, the broad contours of an appropriate approach may be in-
ferred from the critique this Article has offered.
The central message of this Article is that while responsible cost-
benefit analysis may reveal clear successes and failures in some cases,
it is also certain to yield a significant category of ambiguous cases, in
which existing data simply do not support an objective determination
of whether the net benefits of the regulation are positive or not. Poli-
cymakers and the public generally should defer to agencies in am-
biguous cases, just as courts are already instructed to do.2'
Once the clear successes and clearly ambiguous cases are sub-
tracted from the tally, what remains will be a smaller group of clear or
likely regulatory failures-situations in which it appears that neither
the health nor the ecological benefit of a regulation can plausibly jus-
tify the sums expended in pursuit of it; or in which more protection
could have been achieved at less cost through greater flexibility or
better regulatory design; or in which a cost-effective regulatory oppor-
tunity was overlooked. These are the cases that ought to attract the at-
tention of scholars and policymakers, whatever their ideological bent.
But these cases ought to attract attention in a different and more con-
structive way than they do now. Rather than merely serving as illustra-
tions for sweeping pro- or anti-regulatory polemics aimed at whole-
261 See Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 865-66
(1984) (calling for deference to agency interpretations when statutory text is ambiguous); Ethyl
Corp v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 33-36 (DC Cir 1976) (calling for judicial deference to agencies when
facts are ambiguous).
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sale "reforms," these cases should first stimulate a three-part empirical
investigation.
Initially, there should be a serious effort to obtain broad consen-
sus on the facts of each case and on the characterization of the case as
one of regulatory failure through overregulation, underregulation, or
misregulation. Then, if a failure is established, there should be a con-
certed effort to determine whether the failure is typical or aberrant.
Finally, if the failure is found to be of a programmatic nature, there
should be a sustained inquiry into causes-whether statutory, political,
or bureaucratic-so that reform efforts can be focused on the root
causes of failure.
The difference between the approach to regulatory reform de-
scribed above and the way now taken is, roughly speaking, the differ-
ence between pragmatic/inductive/empirical and polemical/deductive/
anecdotal approaches. The polemical approach in current use certainly
has its advantages: it offers ease of analysis, powerful rhetoric, and an
easy path to broad and clear conclusions that rigorous empiricism
might confound. The principal advantage of the empirical approach,
on the other hand, is simply that it offers the only reliable means of
finding the facts about regulation-and the only conceivable route of
escape from the vicious cycle of ideological claim and counterclaim in
which the regulatory debate is now mired. Everyone agrees that regu-
lation should be based on "sound science." Yet, as this Article has
shown, much of regulatory debate itself is being waged on profoundly
unscientific -indeed, pseudo-scientific- terms, using unverified anec-
dotes or unsupportable and misleading numbers. The obvious solution
is to hold critics and defenders of regulation to the same standard of
rigorous empiricism that all demand of regulators themselves.
Who would do the investigating? It seems doubtful that either ex-
isting agencies or their entrenched critics in think tanks have the
credibility, the independence, and the detachment needed to do the
job effectively and credibly themselves. Indeed, think tanks produced
two of the three studies this Article has critiqued, as well as the cur-
rent (controversial) director of OMB."2
Although academia might fill this investigative role, it seems
unlikely that academics will find it in their own professional interest to
devote to the humble, unprestigious task of empirical research the
time and effort needed to implement the methodical approach just
described over a sustained period."'
262 See discussion in text accompanying note 29.
263 See McGarity and Ruttenberg, 80 Tex L Rev at 2058 (cited in note 32) ("Perhaps be-
cause cost analysis lacks the intellectual sex appeal of benefits analysis, surprisingly few aca-
demic observers have decried the sorry state of retrospective empirical analysis of the hundreds
of ex-ante cost assessments that have accumulated over the last three decades.").
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The General Accounting Office (GAO) is currently empowered
to undertake its own independent evaluation of agency cost-benefit
analysis of economically significant rules. But it can do so only in re-
sponse to a specific request of a chairman or ranking member of a
congressional committee of jurisdiction.27 This requirement seems
likely to leave important parts of the regulatory picture unexamined.
If the GAO does not fill the gap, the only clear, remaining alter-
native is to establish a new body to act as a sort of external "ombuds-
man" in investigating allegations of regulatory failure, reporting
causes, and recommending remedies. "' While this may seem an expen-
sive and elaborate response, it can hardly be considered dispropor-
tionately so. If it is true that billions of dollars are wasted each year
due to over- and underregulation, then surely it would be cost-
effective to authorize a few million dollars a year for a bipartisan team
of researchers to investigate allegations of systemic failures, establish
the facts, and recommend suitable remedies.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory scorecards have played a major role in shaping con-
temporary views of the administrative state. They come from prestig-
ious sources, claim to be comprehensive and objective, and reach sen-
sational conclusions. The result has been an extraordinary degree of
influence for both the studies and their authors.
Yet this Article has shown that, in fact, these scorecards:
" alter agency numbers in undisclosed and arbitrary ways;
" draw on biased samples of regulation;
" undervalue the benefit of reducing risk to life and health;
" misrepresent ex ante guesses as actual cost-benefit measure-
ments;
* falsely assume that regulations will never be eased or modi-
fied;
264 See Truth in Regulating Act of 2000 § 4, Pub L No 106-312, 114 Stat 1248, codified at 5
USC § 801 note (2000).
265 For a discussion of responsibilities and issues raised by various types of ombuds, see
American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Onbuds
Offices: ABA Policy Adopted August 2001, online at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/
approvedreport.doc (visited July 2,2003).
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* disregard major categories of quantified and monetized bene-
fits;
" disregard all unquantified costs and benefits;
" ignore important non-linearities of risk and risk preferences, as
well as cumulative and distributive impacts;
* assume that savings from regulations foregone will be redi-
rected to save lives, even though no mechanism for accom-
plishing such a redirection exists; and
" conceal important uncertainties, as well as virtually all the
omissions and alterations discussed above.
In short, the three most widely cited and influential scorecards
underlying the regulatory reform movement-studies issued by AEI-
Brookings, the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, and a senior OMB
economist-are revealed to be, on close inspection, deeply flawed
analyses which fail to prove their own conclusions.
In a brilliant monograph entitled The Rhetoric of Reaction, A.O.
Hirschman describes the tried and effective rhetorical devices by
which very appealing goals-such as equality, self-determination, or,
by extension, protecting health, safety, or the environment-may be
assailed or ridiculed indirectly when frontal assault is impossible in
view of the popularity of the goals.2" One such rhetorical device is the
"perversity thesis" whereby the skeptic argues that pursuing the goal
in question will produce unexpected or disproportionate costs and
may, in fact, move society away from the goal. Scorecards-with their
focus on the costs imposed by government intervention and lives sup-
posedly sacrificed thereby-are perfect examples of the perversity
thesis applied to regulation. That, in itself, does not make them wrong:
truth can be trite. Nor do I mean to suggest that Hahn, Morrall, and
Tengs/Graham prepared their scorecards with intent to mislead. I
have found no evidence of any such motive. Nonetheless, when studies
are shown to be blatantly untrue, Hirschman's analysis does help ex-
plain why deeply flawed studies are received so uncritically, and why
they are circulated so enthusiastically, by those who disdain regulation.
266 Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy 3-8 (Har-
vard 1991) (comparing reactions against civil equality, universal suffrage, and the contemporary
welfare state, and evincing three arguments common to them all: perversity of effect, futility of
purpose, and jeopardy of the status quo).
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Scorecards draw on a tradition of rhetoric-the rhetoric of reaction-
that has been used, and proven effective, for centuries.
This is not to say that the American regulatory system is perfect,
rational, or even good. This Article reaches no conclusion on that issue
and certainly finds plenty of room for improvement in agency analy-
ses. The point is not that all regulations are rational, but that critics
have only pretended to prove that our regulatory system is perva-
sively irrational.
Arriving at valid conclusions about the cost-benefit rationality of
our regulatory system is going to require much more than has been
done so far. It will require closely investigating the facts of alleged
regulatory failures (including failures to regulate) one intervention at
a time, with careful regard to unquantified variables, uncertainties,
cumulative impacts, and distributive concerns. And it will require, in
cases where failure is found, patient empirical inquiry to determine
whether the problem is typical or aberrational, and to identify its root
causes.
Meanwhile, we should be wary of spectacular numerical claims
that purport to show the systemic irrationality of government regula-
tion from a cost-benefit perspective. For the tests that claim to show
this are invalid.
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Appendix B-2
Table 1*
Key Additional Life Savers in Reallocation
Additional
Row # Percent Lives Saved
App. Description Imp. in in Realloca-
B-1 (#, Date of Estimate) Baseline tion
22 Continuous (vs. nocturnal) oxygen 49% 22,950
for hypoxemic obstructive lung
disease (#709, 1980)
20 Influenza vaccine for all citizens 13% 19,205
(#455, 1981)
41 Full (vs 50%) enforcement of nat'l 3% 3,502
55 mph speed limit (#175, 1981)
50 Radon remediation in homes with 12% 2,955**
levels >8.11 pCi/L (#1267, 1991)
16 Media campaign to increase 15% 2,805
voluntary use of seatbelts (#175,
1981)
44 Alcohol safety program for drunk 8% 2,375
drivers (#175, 1981)
14 Mandatory seat belt use and child 85% 1,537
restraint law (#175, 1981)
37 Driver & passenger non-motorized 5% 1,185***
automatic (vs. manual) belts in light
trucks (#1089, 1990)
13 Brady method screening for group 10% 1,107
B streptococci colonization during
labor (#1220, 1990)
TOTAL 57,621
* All data derived from Graham/Tengs unpublished spreadsheet reproduced in Appendix B-1.
** Derived by subtracting 368 (number of lives saved in competing radon intervention-row 55)
from 3,323 (lives saved in dominant radon intervention-row 50).
*** Derived by subtracting 103 and 16 (number of lives saved in competing seat belt interventions-
rows 54 and 57, respectively) from 1,304 (lives saved in dominant intervention in cluster-row 37).
2003] 1,439
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Appendix B-2
Table 2*
Key Fund Sources in Reallocation
[70:1345
Row # Percent of
App. Description Funds Supplied for Funds Re-
B-1 (#, Date of Estimate) Reallocation allocated
Total funds reallocated $17,692,505,374** 100.0%
Funds supplied by fully $9,584,144,277 54.0%
implementing negative-cost
3 Ban residential growth in $8,655,184,021 49.0%
tsunami-prone areas (#1221,
1982)
4 1988 Safety Standard for $351,152,11.3 2.0%
concrete construction
6 Truss (vs. elective inguinal $317,196,000 1.8%
herniorrhaphy) for inguinal
hernia in elderly patients
(#148, 1977)
Funds supplied by $8,108,361,097 46.0%
eliminating or reducing
costly interventions
101 Ozone control for Southern $4,233,074,235 23.9%
California (partial
elimination)
122 Flammability standard for $1,029,138,693 5.8%
children's clothing
139 Construct sea walls to $576,022,732 3.3%
protect against 100-year
storm surges (#1221, 1982)
84 Widen lanes on rural roads $509,008,193 2.9%
138 Staff school buses with adult $351,251,057 2.0%
monitors (#1124, 1989)
* From Appendix B-I, column L.
** From Appendix B-I, cell L188.
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